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ABSTRACT   The American corporate media has proven to play a significant role in U.S. policy formation.  Operating as a member of the power elite, as defined by C. Wright Mills, the corporate media serve the crucial functions of creating, implementing, and maintaining politically motivated policies sought to serve the parochial interests of the power elite.  Disrupting a critical element of democracy – providing the public with the information needed for intelligent discharge of ones political responsibilities – the corporate media, filtered by a “guided-market system,” operate to “inculcate and defend the economic, social, and political agenda of privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and the state.”1 Developing this “guided-market system” within their Propaganda Model (PM), Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman have provided an abundance of data displaying this function of the corporate media.  The PM is utilized in this thesis, testing the corporate media’s role in sustaining and maintaining U.S. policy toward the Shi’a organization, Hezbollah.  This thesis argues that the current policy toward Hezbollah, defined by it’s designation on the U.S. State Department Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list, is outdated, yet maintained by the corporate media serving the interests of the power elite.  
   
 The PM states that where there is consensus among the power elite, the corporate media will offer its unconditional support for its chosen policy by creating narrow parameters for debate, or the bounds of “thinkable thought,” and 
                                                        1 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.), 298. 
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marginalizing any and all voices of dissent.  The “left” or “liberal” boundary of debate will be set by what is perceived to be the “liberal” media.  This thesis conducted a content analysis of the “liberal” corporate media outlet, the New York 
Times, and its coverage of Hezbollah.  Further, in order to argue that the current policy is outdated, yet maintained by the corporate media serving the interests of the power elite, this thesis included a historical analysis of Hezbollah, an investigation into the political nature of the FTO designation process, and the interests of the power elite that guides the outdated policy.    The findings demonstrated that the New York Times consistently supported the current policy and never questioned its validity.  Further, the Times remained silent on all voices of dissent, marking out the left, liberal parameter.  This thesis proved that the current U.S. policy toward Hezbollah is outdated, yet maintained by the corporate media operating as a significant member of the power elite.   
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CHAPTER 1   
INTRODUCTION   
 
To criticize one's country is to do it a service and pay it a compliment.   - J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power 
 
I.  Introduction 
  Since the U.S. entrance into WWI, the American corporate media has proven to be a useful, political instrument.  Multiple studies have displayed its ability to set the agenda for presidential elections,2 demonize an enemy state while boasting their own moral principles,3 and justify American support towards numerous dictators around the world.4  The corporate media functions to justify numerous politically driven policies.  This ability of the corporate media has been observed through numerous methods.5
 Propaganda campaigns have been used in the U.S. since Woodrow Wilson implemented the Creel Commission to turn a “pacifist population into a hysterical, 
  Working as a member of the power elite the corporate media has developed a process that allows it to filter news “fit to print” in efforts to support specific policies.  This process is also called systematic propaganda.  
                                                        2 See Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, “The Agenda Setting Function of the Mass Media,” Public Opinion Quarterly 316, no. 2, (1972); and their updated research in Maxwell McCombs, “A Look at Agenda-Setting:  Past, Present, and Future,” Journalism Studies 6, no. 4, (2005).  3 See Robert Entman, Projections of Power:  Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. 
Foreign Policy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).   4 Noam Chomsky and Herman Edwards, Manufacturing Consent:  The Political 
Economy of the Mass Media, (New York:  Pantheon Books, 2002). 5 Including Agenda-Setting in McCombs, “Agenda Setting”;  Framing in Entman, 
Power Projections; and Indexing in W. Lance Bennet, When the Press Fails (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
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war-mongering population.”6  Warning that following public opinion would create a “morbid derangement of the true functions of power” and produce policies “deadly to the very survival of the state as a free society,”7 Walter Lippmann argued that in a properly functioning democracy, or what he called a “progressive democracy,” there are two classes.  This consists of a small class of elites that can understand the common interests that “elude the general public,” and what he termed the “bewildering herd,” or everyone else.  In this view, the bewildered herd can “rage, trample and destroy things”, and as a result he deemed it necessary to “tame”8
 Lippmann claimed propaganda to be “a regular organ of popular government”
 the herd.  As a member of the power elite, the corporate media is able to tame the herd by fixing the parameters of debate to assure the management of public opinion.    
9
                                                        6 Noam Chomsky, Media Control:  The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda 
Campaigns (New York:  Seven Stories Press, 1997), 8. 
 in 1955, and the studies discussed in this thesis provide ample support that this “organ” continues to pump.  Employing various tactics, one of the best-proven strategies is the creation of “dangerous enemies” that are “threatening” the national interests of the United States.  Succeeding former constructed threats – the “Godless Communists,” the “Yellow Hordes,” and the “extreme” Arab nationalists - the “Green Peril”, or “a cancer spreading around the globe, undermining the legitimacy of western values and threatening the national security of the United 
7 Walter Lippman, Essays in the Public Philosophy  (Boston:  Little Brown, 1955), 26-27. 8 Chomsky, Media Control, 12. 9 Walter Lippman, Essays in the Public Philosophy  (Boston:  Little Brown, 1955), 26-27. 
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States,”10 was conveniently created after the emergence of political Islam in the 1960’s.  The 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the 1973 OPEC oil boycott, and the 1978–79 Iranian revolution and ensuing hostage crisis, were filtered through the American corporate media, furnishing the perception of an Islamic/Arab threat, or “the return of Islam.”11  During the 1990’s the “bewildering herd” witnessed, through the corporate media prism, self proclaimed Muslims committing a string of politically motivated violent acts - 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the 1996 Khobr Towers attack, the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole – which offered tangible data to sustain this perception.  Even though FBI sources report that most terrorists attacks committed against Americans in the 1980’s and 90’s were carried out by Puerto Ricans (76), followed by Jewish groups (16), right-wing groups (6), and then Muslims (5),12 these events were delivered by the corporate media in neatly packaged frames, utilized by competing politicians, profiting CEO’s, and budget-conscious military leaders, to manufacture the “Islamic/Arab threat” as the propaganda theme of the 1990’s.13 Former American Diplomat William Fisher recently warned of  “an uninformed and unreasoning Islamophobia that is rapidly becoming implanted in our national genetics.”
  
14                                                        10 Leon Hadar, “What Green Peril?,” Foreign Affairs 72, No. 2, (Spring, 1993): 27-42.  
  This phobia, aided by the corporate media, has, and is, 
11 Edward Said, Covering Islam:  How the Media and the Experts Determine How We 
See the Rest of the World (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), x. 12 Federal Bureau of Investigation. Terrorist Research and Analytical Section. 1995. 13 Other examples in Andrea Lueg, “The Perception of Islam in Western Debate,” in 
The Next Threat:  Western Perceptions of Islam, ed. Hippler, Jochan, and Andrea Lueg. (Colorado:  Pluto Press, 1995), 7, 15-16.  14 Quoted in Peter Singer, “America, Islam, and the 9-11 War,” Current History (December, 2006):  416. 
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circulating throughout society, producing a redundant discourse within the public sphere, official government statements, and elite corporate circles.  It has constructed a constraining climate for progressive U.S. foreign policy makers who are trying to break through an unsustainable status quo and adapt to the changing dynamics of global politics, while also enabling others to justify, maintain, and extend existing U.S. policies. Although complemented by think tanks and Hollywood directors, the medium of the corporate media establishes the boundaries of thought, or the opposing sides of debate, placing the idea of dialogue with Islamic political organizations such as Hamas or Hezbollah outside of the parameters.  Yet, the political landscape is always changing, and these organizations continue to expand in power and influence.  This thesis will focus on the Lebanese Shiite movement, Hezbollah.  Given their social, political, and military strength, Hezbollah is a proactive force within global politics.  It continues to gain popularity among large portions of the Lebanese population, expand its political role within the Lebanese political system, and increase its military capabilities in efforts to deter future domestic or international resistance.  Hezbollah is unique in its structure and requires further research for one to properly engage it.    Formed in 1982 with the primary goal of resisting the 1978 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Hezbollah has emerged as a powerful player in regional and global politics.  Throughout the past two decades, Hezbollah has made notable developments, gaining recognition and legitimacy from numerous world leaders.  Unlike its fractured, unorganized nature of the 80’s and early 90’s, Hezbollah now possesses a 
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sophisticated military, an array of social services, and considerable political clout in the Lebanese political system and the surrounding region.15
 In the 2011 State Department publication, Country Reports on Terrorism,
  Although Hezbollah has transformed into a significant political organization, efforts to engage it diplomatically are hampered because the U.S. government identifies it as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).   
16 Hezbollah’s inclusion on the FTO list is justified by the 1983 bombing of the U.S. embassy and marine barracks, the 1985 high jacking of TWA flight 847, it’s suspected role in the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina, and the 1994 bombing of the Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires.  Putting aside the fact that the Argentina Embassy and AMIA bombings were never proved to involve Hezbollah, the only sound evidence used to designate Hezbollah dates back twenty-six years.  Although notable U.S. officials have requested Hezbollah be removed from the list,17
Examining Hezbollah’s development and political power, the Shi’a organization demands further study.  Moreover, the dubious nature of its FTO 
 the corporate media has marginalized their dissent, maintaining the narrow, constructed boundaries of debate.   
                                                        15 See chapter 4 for a detailed description of Hezbollah’s development during the past three decades.  16 United States State Department, Office of the Coordination for Counterterrorism. 
Country Reports on Terrorism 2010. August 18, 2011. 17 On June 8, 2010, Ryan Crocker, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, called for direct talks with Hezbollah officials before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. John Brennan, former Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security, called for dialogue in his published study in the July 2008 edition of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.   
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designation also demands an examination of the role played by the corporate media.  Hezbollah is a powerful social and political force with a potent military force, and will continue to be a significant part of the Middle East’s political future.  Consequently, the current U.S. policy must be debated outside of the media’s constructed limits.    Hezbollah’s continued designation on the FTO list invites an investigation of the designating process, or more specifically, the politicized nature of the process.  After a 2004 amendment on the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Congress applied numerous restrictions to the judicial branch’s ability to review FTO designations, thus awarding the executive branch, specifically the Secretary of State, a tremendous amount of power in determining who is designated and who is not.18   This centralized power coupled with the vague designation criteria,19 and lack of accountability, offers the executive branch the ability to advance a political agenda and blacklist groups based on the current political climate.20 Observing that the FTO list is re-evaluated every two years, how is Hezbollah’s designation justified?  Why do members of Congress continue to claim Hezbollah is an active terrorist organization?  When the latest evidence dates back 
   
                                                        18 See "S. 2845--108th Congress: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004." GovTrack.us (database of federal legislation). 2004. January 12, 2012 <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s108-2845> 19 For example, a group can be designated for a one-time use of a  “dangerous device” by one member of the organization for the whole organization to be designated. See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)-(iv) (LexisNexis 2008). 20 For more examples see Julie B. Shapiro, “The Politization of the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations:  The Effect of the Separation of Powers” Cardoza 
Public Law, Policy and Ethics Journal, (Spring 2008). 
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twenty-six years, how is the perception that Hezbollah is still a foreign terrorist organization of global reach maintained?  What role does the American corporate media possess in justifying Hezbollah’s continued designation?    
II. Research Questions  This thesis analyzes the role of the American corporate media in U.S. policy towards the Islamic political organization of Hezbollah.  Specifically, it asks:  If evidence supports that Hezbollah has evolved away from a U.S. defined Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), causing the current U.S. policy towards Hezbollah to be ineffective, why does the policy continue in the face of substantial challenges?  Further, what are the political forces working together to maintain its designation, and how does the American corporate media play a role in reproducing the needed perception to justify the designation?  Using the Propaganda Model (PM), published by Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman in their book Manufacturing Consent,21
                                                        21 Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political 
Economy of the Mass Media (New York:  Pantheon Books, 1988). 
 this analysis explores the intricate operations between the corporate and government elite, or the power elite, and it’s ability to utilize the corporate media to serve it’s interests. Through an investigation of the political nature of the FTO designation process, this thesis argues that Hezbollah’s current designation is inaccurate, yet maintained by the corporate media, which is operating as a significant member of the power elite.  The power elite, defined by C. Wright Mills, operating in order to sustain and enhance their elite position, has a tremendous stake in the weapon manufacturing industry.  Although 
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the power elites need for Hezbollah to remain on the FTO list includes other variables, this thesis will focus on the profitable weapons industry and the corporate medias role in sustaining their high profits.    
III. Outline & Methodology   Utilizing Power Elite theory and the Propaganda Model, chapter 2 explores the elite forces working together to sustain and enhance their elite position.  This chapter begins by defining the fundamentals of power elite theory.  Adding substantial support to Mills’ theoretical assumptions, this chapter then outlines the Propaganda Model and its specific analysis of the role of the corporate media.  This model will be utilized to explain how the power elite operates in order to filter out raw information fit to print in efforts to support an elite led government policy.   Specifically, this chapter analyzes how the corporate media operates as a member of the power elite in its efforts to maintain Hezbollah’s designation, further villainizing them as a current threat.     Investigating the power elite’s interest in Hezbollah’s designation, chapter 3 explores the corporate and government connections at the elite level, specifically within the weapons industry.  This analysis involves an examination of the major weapons manufacturers in the U.S., their involvement in and benefit from the Hezbollah-Israel conflict, and the close interlocking relationships between these corporate elites and top tier government officials.  Investigating the interests at stake for Hezbollah’s designation, this chapter demonstrates the established policy line that the power elite pursues, thus the policy line that the corporate media 
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supports.  Operating as a member of the power elite, the PM explains that any corporate media giant will follow and support the policy line when there is consensus among the power elite.  The chosen corporate media outlet for this thesis is The New York Times.  Before applying the PM to The New York Times and its coverage of Hezbollah, chapter 4 conducts a brief historical analysis of the Shi’a organizations’ development over the past three decades.  Utilizing various primary and secondary sources, this chapter explains the development of Hezbollah and its initial goals, its resistance operations against Israel, its controversial entry into Lebanese politics, and its development into a significant political organization encompassing an array of social services and an effective military.  This review provides a basis to investigate the accuracy of its FTO designation.    Next, chapter 5 examines the FTO designation process, the criteria for designation, and the political nature of the process.  This analysis requires an examination of government documents and previous cases in order to lay bare the politicized nature of the FTO list.  Once definitions are defined and the designation criteria are examined, this chapter then observes the accuracy of Hezbollah’s FTO designation utilizing the historical overview in the previous chapter.  Being listed on the FTO list, Hezbollah is labeled as a current, dangerous, “terrorist” threat.  This analysis tests the validity of that label.    Chapter 6 applies the PM to the corporate media outlet, The New York Times, and its reporting regarding Hezbollah.  This analysis focuses on The New York Times online newspaper.  This media outlet was selected for three reasons.  First, it was 
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chosen due to its highly regarded status within the U.S.  Describing its influential reach, one author stated:  Its contents influence other newspapers, wire services, news magazines, television and radio news.  In international affairs, The New York Times is a premier member of the elite press and plays an influential role in informing American leaders and interested members of the citizenry on international affairs.22    Noam Chomsky described the Times as “the most important newspaper in the United States, and one could argue the most important newspaper in the world.  It plays an enormous role in shaping the perception of the current world,” to the extent that it “creates history.  That is, history is what appears in The New York 
Times archives; the place where people will go to find out what happened is The New 
York Times.”23  The Times is the third highest viewed paper in the U.S.,24 and its online version is the most popular American newspaper website, receiving 30 million viewers per month.25  Second, The New York Times covers more foreign news than any other American newspaper.26
                                                        22 Quoted in Olga V. Malinkina and Douglas McLeod, “From Afghanistan to Chechnya:  
News Coverage by Izvestia and The New York Times,” Journalism and Mass 
Communication Quarterly 77, no. 1 (2000): 37-49. 
  Because Hezbollah resides and operates in a foreign country, analyzing a newspaper that offers more coverage of 
23 Quoted in an Interview with Noam Chomsky, “Excerpts From Manufacturing Consent,” 1992.  http://www.chomsky.info/interviews/1992----02.htm 24 James Hamilton found that The New York Times, the Washington Post, and U.S. 
Today accounted for 41% of viewership out of the top 100 papers in James Hamilton, All the News That’s Fit to Sell: how the market transforms information into 
news, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2004). 25 Russell Adams, "New York Times Prepares Plan to Charge for Online Reading," 
The Wall Street Journal. January 24, 2011. Accessed September 18, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704213404576100033883758352.html 26 Howard J. Wiarda, American Foreign Policy: Actors and Processes (Amherst, MA,   HarperCollins, 1996) 78.  
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foreign news benefits the quality of the data under analysis.  Third, the PM explains that the corporate media defines the parameters of debate, or what Chomsky calls “thinkable thought.”  Further, Chomsky explains that the “liberal” news outlets serve the crucial function of setting the “left” boundary of debate.  The Times is widely recognized as one of the largest, most popular newspapers accepted as having a liberal bias.27
 This paper’s analysis of the Times examines how the company operates within the boundaries established by the power elite, being guided by the five filters of the PM.  Further, this analysis observes the way in which these filters guide the Times framing of its reporting regarding Hezbollah.  It’s hypothesized in this thesis that these frames will be a part of the systematic propaganda, stemming from the power elite, in efforts to uphold Hezbollah’s FTO designation.  This analysis studies the media frames regarding Hezbollah, and examines if there is a false perception being projected by the Times of Hezbollah, satisfying the above hypothesis.  
  Therefore, the Times can be observed as setting the left, or liberal boundary for “thinkable thought.”  Meaning, whatever is reported out of the Times is the furthest someone can go before being outside the box of  “thinkable thought.” 
 This thesis argues that the current U.S. policy towards Hezbollah is outdated and must be re-evaluated.  Further, this thesis argues that Hezbollah’s FTO designation, utilized as a political instrument and maintained by the corporate                                                         27 See BBC, "Findings on 9/11 split US press," June 17, 2004, accessed September 23, 2011; The Sunday Times, "History, but not as America knows its", February 6, 2005; Also, According to a 2007 survey by Rasmussen Reports of public perceptions of major media outlets, 40% believe The New York Times has a liberal slant and 11% believe it has a conservative slant, and in December 2004 a University of California, Los Angeles study gave The New York Times a score of 73.7 on a 100 point scale, with 0 being most conservative and 100 being most liberal. 
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media operating as a member of the power elite, needs to be removed.  Hezbollah is a significant political organization with far reaching regional influence, and must be engaged without the hindrances of its FTO designation.  The current U.S. policy towards Hezbollah eliminates all diplomatic options of engagement.  Hezbollah proved that it cannot be deterred by force in the 2006 war with Israel, thus the U.S. must remove the FTO designation, allowing for alternative options to be pursued.                                  
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Chapter 2  
The Power Elite & The Propaganda Model 
 
I. The Power Elite 
  Elite theory and the concept of the power elite are well established in the disciplines of political science, sociology, and economics.28  Throughout the latter part of the 20th century, elite theory expanded into sub-theories, producing a range of definitions and varying models.29  Despite the differences, all elite theorists agree on one thing:  the powerful position of a small group of individuals or groups who either shape, or take decisions that affect, national outcomes.  Thus, all actors occupying key positions in the “political, economic, military, governmental, cultural, and administrative institutions and organizations are considered members of the elite because they affect the national outcomes.”30
The power elites are composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences. Whether they do or do not make such decisions is less important than the fact that they do occupy such pivotal positions: their failure to act, their failure to make decisions, is itself an act that is often of greater consequence than the decisions they do make, for they are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern society. They run the big corporations [including the corporate media]. They run the machinery of the state and claim its prerogatives. They direct the military establishment. They occupy the strategic command posts of 
  When defining the elite, this study utilizes C. Wright Mills’ Power Elite Model defined in his book The Power Elite: 
                                                        28 See for example, Balbus, 1971; Burch, 1981; Domhoff, 1983, 1990; Dye & Zeigler, 1990; Etzioni-Halevi, 1992; Field & Higley, 1973, 1980; Higley & Burton, 1989; Higley & Moore, 1981; Hunter, 1953, 1959; Jones, 1987; Lindblom, 1990; Macpherson, 1987; Mills, 1956; Mosca, 1939; Parenti, 1988; Prewitt & Stone, 1973;  Schumpeter, 1942/1976. 29 Including the Consensus Elite model, Plural Elite Model, Ruling Class Elite Model, and the Power Elite Model, all of which are cited in the previous note.  30 Ali Farazmand, “The Elite Question,” Administration and Society 31, no. 321, (1999).  
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the social structure, in which are now centered the effective means of the power and the wealth and the celebrity which they enjoy. The power elite are not solitary rulers. Advisors and consultants, spokesmen and opinion makers, are often the captains of their higher thought and decision. Immediately below the elite are the professional politicians of the middle levels of power, in the Congress and in the pressure groups, as well as among the new and old upper classes of town and city and region.31  Unlike other elite models,32
 United by shared objectives, interests, values, wealth and social backgrounds, the uppermost elites include the top business elites, such as the board of directors, the top military commanders, and the executive cabinet members.  Although the former is considered to be the most powerful actor in the circle, there is extensive positional overlap, interlock, and interchanges among these uppermost elites.   This group sets the broad parameters and boundaries of the political and governmental system, where the secondary-level of non-inner circle elites interact and function.  The second group includes the operational decision makers and implementers who work at the direction of the uppermost elites.  Subject to sanctions or possible removal of membership, they must function within the boundaries constructed by the first group.
 Mills’ definition of the power elite concept is precise and comprehensive, including not only the macro-elites, but also the micro-elites who manage the organizations and institutions controlled by the power elite.  
33 The power elites operate in order to further their shared interests.  These interests are driven by their overriding rationale and goal of maintaining and 
 
                                                        31 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite,  (Oxford University Press, 1956), 3-4. 32 See note 30.   33 Farazmand, “The Elite Question”. 
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enhancing themselves.34  These shared interests can sometimes run contrary to the overall national interests, or at least the opinion of mass society.  Mills explains the second group of people, everyone who is not in the power elite, by sketching out the differences in public society and mass society.  He distinguishes these two groups in terms of the characteristic forms of communication found in each.  Public society operates in the form of a conversation between equals where “virtually as many people express opinions as receive them” and “communications are so organized that there is a chance immediately and effectively to answer any opinion expressed in public.”35  In mass society, communication is a broadcast that delivers one unanswerable voice to millions of quiet and attentive listeners.  There is little or no scope for individuals to answer back to the messages they receive, and there is certainly no way that the inhabitants of a mass society can translate their opinions into politically effective action.36   Within a liberal-democratic society, such as the U.S., the viability of the power elite depends on the support it receives from the masses.  The masses must be managed in order for the power elite to remain the power elite.  This requires the crucial functions of coercion and manipulation.  Utilizing their control over the established institutions and organizations, the corporate media, functioning as a member of the power elite, will operate in order to control the opinion of the masses. This process is further explained by the PM.    
  
                                                         34 Ibid. 35 Mills, The Power Elite, 298. 36 Ibid., 300.  
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II. The Propaganda Model  In 1988, Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky published Manufacturing 
Consent:  The Political Economy of the Mass Media, providing a mechanism for analyzing the extent to which information in the corporate media reflects the interests of corporate and government elites. Throughout the past two decades, the PM has proven to be an accurate framework.  Through content analysis of news paper coverage, Chomsky and Herman have utilized this model in the cases of the murdered Polish priest, Jerzy Popieluszko, and other religious victims in Latin America; elections in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua; the ‘KGB-Bulgarian plot’ to kill the Pope; and the wars in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. The 2002 edition of Manufacturing Consent expanded the studies to include mainstream media usage of the term ‘genocide’ to describe events in East Timor, Iraq, Kosovo and Turkey; plus the coverage of elections in Cambodia, Kenya, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.  Herman and Chomsky have insisted that recent economic, political and technological transformations – more specifically globalization, the ideological hegemony of ‘the market’ and the corporate colonization of the new media – have only strengthened the explanatory power of the PM.37  Chomsky contends that the PM is applicable to a range of issues, and despite neglect, the PM remains one of the most tested models in the social sciences.38
…we’ve studied a great number of cases, from every methodological point of view that we’ve been able to think of – and they all support the Propaganda Model. And by now there are thousands of pages of similar material confirming the thesis in books and articles by other people too – in fact, I would hazard a guess that the Propaganda Model is one of the best-confirmed 
  Chomsky emphasizes: 
                                                        37 Ibid.  38 Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent (2002), xii. 
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theses in the social sciences. There has been no serious counter-discussion of it at all, actually, that I’m aware of.39      Chomsky and Herman define the power elite as “the government, the leaders of the corporate community, the top media owners and executives and the assorted individuals and groups who are assigned or allowed to take constructive initiatives.”40  Their Propaganda Model (PM) serves as an analytical framework that attempts to explain the performance of the U.S. media in terms of the basic institutional structures and relationships within which it operates.  It is their view that, among its other functions, the corporate media serves, and propagandizes on behalf of, the powerful societal interests that control and finance it.41
The mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to the general populace. It is their function to amuse, entertain, inform and inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs and codes of behavior that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society. In a world of concentrated wealth and major conflicts of class interest, to fulfill this role requires systematic propaganda.
  Expanding on the functions of the media, they state in the opening paragraph:  
42  
 
A. Elite Consensus 
  The PM puts forth three hypotheses.  First, where there is a consensus amongst the corporate and political elites on a particular issue, this “system” constructs the acceptable language and structure of debate, to the exclusion of rival 
                                                        39 Noam Chomsky cited in P. Mitchell and J. Schoeffel, Understanding Power:  The 
Indispensible Chomsky (New York:  New Press, 2002), 18. 40 Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, xii. 41 Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political 
Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon, 2011 Kindle ed.), Kindle Locations 68-70.  42 Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (1988), 1. 
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viewpoints.43    Expounding on elite consensus, Herman later explained, “Where the elite are really concerned and unified, and/or where ordinary citizens are not aware of their own stake in an issue or are immobilized by effective propaganda, the media will serve elite interests uncompromisingly.”44 Where there is dissent, Herman and Chomsky noted that the PM did not work as efficiently.   They conceded, “The mass media are not a solid monolith on all issues.  Where the powerful are in disagreement, there will be a certain diversity of tactical judgments on how to attain generally shared aims, reflected in media debate.”
 
45  Others have furthered this argument stating that where there is dissent among elites “news media coverage might have the ability to influence executive policy processes.”46  Gadi Wolfsfeld supported this claim in his policy-media interaction model, claiming that occasionally the media can play a role in elite policy formation.47  But as Chomsky and Herman emphasize, the media never strays away from the bounds of “thinkable thought.”   They explain, “views that challenge fundamental premises or suggest that the observed modes of exercise of state power are based on systemic factors will be excluded from the mass media even when elite controversy over tactics rages fiercely.”48
                                                        43 Andrew Mullen, “Twenty years on:  the second-order prediction of the Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model,” Media, Culture, and Society 32, no. 673, 2010. 
 Similarly to Herman and Chomsky, Mills explains that factions do exist within the higher circles of the power 
44 Edward Herman, “The Propaganda Model Revisited,” Monthly Review 48, July-August (1996). 45 Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (1988), xii. 46 Piers Robinson, “Theorizing the Influence of Media on World Politics 2001,” 
European Journal of Communication 16, no. 1, (2001): 523-544. 47 Gadi Wolfsfeld, Media and Political Conflict:  News from the Middle East, (Cambridge University Press, 1997).  48 Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (1988), xii. 
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elite, but these factions do not outweigh “the internal discipline and the community of interests that bind the power elite together.”49 The corporate media produces elite consensus by narrowing the parameters of debate and producing a perception that there are opposing biases within different media outlets.   This perception, a conservative and countering liberal bias, provides the framework of what Chomsky and Herman called “thinkable thought.”  Chomsky explains that propaganda can only work if there is a conservative and liberal bias.   “In fact, if the system functions well, it ought to have a liberal bias, or at least appear to.  Because if it appears to have a liberal bias, that will serve to bound thought even more effectively.”  Chomsky explains further: 
   
In other words, if the press is indeed adversarial and liberal and all these bad things, then how can I go beyond it?  They're already so extreme in their opposition to power that to go beyond it would be to take off from the planet. So therefore it must be that the presuppositions that are accepted in the liberal media are sacrosanct -- can't go beyond them.  And a well-functioning system would in fact have a bias of that kind. The media would then serve to say in effect: Thus far and no further.50   
 
B. The Five Filters    The second hypothesis in the PM explains that in liberal-democratic regimes such as the U.S., where the mass media function under corporate rather than state control, media coverage is shaped by what is, in effect, a “guided-market system” underpinned by five filters.  Herman and Chomsky suggest: Money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalize dissent and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their message across to the public. The essential ingredients of our propaganda                                                         49 Mills, Power Elite, 283. 50 Chomsky Interview, “Excerpts From Manufacturing Consent,”  
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model, or set of news “filters”, fall under the following headings: (1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms; (2) advertising as the primary income source of the mass media; (3) the reliance of the media on information provided by governments, business and “experts” funded and approved by these primary sources and agents of power; (4) “flak” as a means of disciplining the media; and (5) “anti-communism” as a national religion and control mechanism. These elements interact with and reinforce one another. The raw material of news must pass through successive filters, leaving only the cleansed residue fit to print. They fix the premise of discourse and interpretation, and the definitions of what is newsworthy in the first place.51   
1. Size, Concentrated Ownership, Owner Wealth, and Profit Orientation 
  The first filter – the limitation on ownership of media with any substantial outreach by the requisite large size of investment52– can be traced back to the 19th century.  Debunking the conspiracy accusations leveled against the PM, this filter emerged out of the free market system.  The rise in scale of newspaper enterprise and the associated increase in capital costs from the mid-nineteenth century onward, which was based on technological improvements along with the owners’ increased stress on reaching large audiences, created the “industrialization of the press.”53  Where the start-up cost of a new paper in New York City in 1851 was $69,000; the public sale of the St. Louis Democrat in 1872 yielded $456,000; and city newspapers were selling from $6 to $18 million in the 1920s.54
                                                        51 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (1988), 2. 
  By 1945 it was said, “Even small-newspaper publishing [was] big business … [and was] no longer a trade 
52 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2002). 53 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle Edition), Kindle Locations 1393-1395.  54 Lee McClung, The Daily Newspaper in America (New York: Macmillan, 1937), 166, 173.   
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one takes up lightly even if he has substantial cash—or takes up at all if he doesn’t.”55 By 1986 there was 1,500 daily newspapers, 11,000 magazines, 9,000 radio and 1,500 TV stations, 2,400 book publishers, and seven movie studios in the United States—over 25,000 media entities in all.
 
56  Despite the large numbers of media outlets, Ben Bagdikian explains that the twenty-nine largest media systems account for over half of the output of newspapers, and most of the sales and audiences in magazines, broadcasting, books, and movies.  He suggests that this “constitutes a new Private Ministry of Information and Culture” that can set the national agenda.57 Today, the media in the United States is even more centralized, comprised of twenty-four media giants that sit at the top tier of the media system.  Chomsky attributes this increased concentration to the rise of television and the national networking of this important medium.
 
58(1) the three television networks: ABC (through its parent, Capital Cities), CBS, and NBC (through its ultimate parent, General Electric [GE]); (2) the leading newspaper empires: New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times (Times-Mirror), Wall Street Journal (Dow Jones), Knight-Ridder, Gannett, Hearst, Scripps-Howard, Newhouse (Advance Publications), and the Tribune Company; (3) the major news and general-interest magazines: Time, 
Newsweek (subsumed under Washington Post), Readers Digest, TV Guide (Triangle), and U.S. News & World Report; (4) a major book publisher (McGraw-Hill); and (5) other cable-TV systems of large and growing 
  This compilation includes:  
                                                        55 Lynn Vance, “Freedom of the Press for Whom,” Virginia Quarterly Review (Summer 1945), quoted in Survival of a Free, Competitive Press: The Small Newspaper: Democracy’s Grass Roots, Report of the Chairman, Senate Small Business Committee, 80th Cong., 1st session, 1947, 54.   56 Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle Edition), Kindle Locations 1407-1408.  57 Ben Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly, (Boston:  Beacon Press, 1987), xvi.   58 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.), Kindle Location 1421). 
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importance: those of Murdoch, Turner, Cox, General Corp., Taft, Storer, and Group W (Westinghouse).59     Many of these systems are prominent in more than one field, and are only arbitrarily placed in a particular category.60  These twenty-four media companies, which are large, profit seeking corporations, owned and controlled by extremely wealthy people, have become fully integrated into the market.  In recent years, the market integration of the media was accelerated by the loosening of rules limiting media concentration, cross-ownership, and control by non-media companies.61 Directing these top-tier companies are what Chomsky and Herman call “control groups,”
   
62 some of which are comprised of families.  For seven of the twenty-four companies, the market value of their media properties exceeds a billion dollars.  “These control groups obviously have a special stake in the status quo by virtue of their wealth and their strategic position in one of the great institutions of society. And they exercise the power of this strategic position, if only by establishing the general aims of the company and choosing its top management.”63 These control groups are bound together with the mainstream of the corporate community through boards of directors and social links.  Example: NBC and the Group W television and cable systems are owned by GE and Westinghouse, and have a board of directors dominated by corporate and banking executives.  
 
                                                        59 Ibid., Kindle Location 1434. 60  For example, Time, Inc., is very important in cable as well as magazines; McGraw-Hill is a major publisher of magazines; the Tribune Company has become a large force in television as well as newspapers; Hearst is important in magazines as well as newspapers; and Murdoch has significant newspaper interests as well as television and movie holdings. Cited in Ibid., Kindle Locations 1434-1437.   61 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1450-1451.  62 Ibid., Kindle Location 1470.  63 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1466-1469.  
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Because the stock is distributed so widely, the majority of the boards consist of outside directors.  Among the twenty–four media giants, corporate executives, bankers, retired bankers, and lawyers, make up two-thirds of the outside directors.64 Another growing trend is media ownership by non-media companies.  One of the most important cases is GE, which owns RCA, which owns the NBC network and Westinghouse, which owns major television broadcasting stations, a cable network, and a radio-station network.  GE and Westinghouse are also both large corporations that are heavily involved in weapons production.  GE, being heavily involved in the weapons industry, has investments throughout the world.  It has become a highly centralized organization, and an effective lobbying force with its vast stake in political decisions.
 
65  As if owning its own media outlets were not enough, GE has gone even further to insure the correct messages are conveyed, donating large amounts of money to the right-wing think tank, American Enterprise Institute.66 The “guided market” system, coupled with required government licenses and franchises, has created a legal dependency, causing the corporate media giants and government officials to cultivate political relationships.  Fifteen of the ninety-five outside directors of the ten largest media companies are former government officials.  Another study, focused on newspapers, found that of the 290 board members from the top major American newspapers, 36 had held high-level 
  
                                                        64 Ibid., Kindle Location 1476. 65 See Thomas B. Edsall, “Bringing Good Things to GE: Firm’s Political Savvy Scores in Washington,” Washington Post, April 13, 1985.   66 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.), Kindle Location 1525.  
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positions in the federal government.67  Besides the legal control the government has over the media, general government policy support, such as business taxes, interests rates, and labor policies, is desired by many of the multinational corporations.  GE and Westinghouse both prefer a favorable political climate for their overseas sales, and Readers Digest, Time, and movie syndication sellers prefer diplomatic support for their rights to penetrate foreign cultures with U.S. commercial and value messages.68 The first filter, ownership, is extremely powerful.  In sum, the corporate media are profit-seeking companies who hold membership within the power elite.  They share common interests with other major corporations, banks, and government officials, and they are legally dependent on the government.  Further, this potent filter has created close connections between the corporate elites and government officials, or those within the power elite.   
  
 
2. The Advertising License To Do Business  With the birth of advertising, papers that relied solely on sales for revenue either pursued the ad-based system or ceased to exist.  When it comes to advertising, the “free market does not yield a neutral system in which final buyer choice decides.”69
                                                        67 Peter Dreier, “The Position of the Press in the U.S. Power Structure,” Social 
Problems, (February 1992): 303. 
  The media companies that “present patrons [advertisers] with 
68 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.), Kindle Location 1549. 69 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1568-1569. 
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the greatest opportunities to make a profit through their publics will receive support while those that cannot compete on this score will not survive.”70 The profitability of advertisement has led the large media corporations to create specialized teams charged with convincing advertisers that their programs will meet their customer’s needs.  The demands of the advertisers must be met for the general welfare of these media outlets.  To put this in perspective, an audience gain or loss of one percentage point in the Neilson ratings translates into a change in advertising revenue from $80 - $100 million a year.
 
71  This type of demand has created close relationships between media owners and advertisers.  And this close relationship, or “continual interaction of producers and primary patrons [advertisers], plays a dominant part in setting the general boundary conditions for day-to-day production activity.”72 The advertising company usually has the upper hand in negotiations, meaning it usually gets to choose the media outlet, not vise-versa.  When choosing, media that is perceived as “fringe” or “radical” suffers from political discrimination.  Advertisers will avoid those outlets that it perceives as an ideological enemy or damaging to its interests.  For example, in 1985, after airing the documentary “Hungry for Profit,” which contained material critical of corporations’ activities in the Third World, the Public-television station WNET lost its corporate funding from Gulf + Western.  The chief of Gulf + Western complained to the station that the 
 
                                                        70 Joseph Turow, Media Industries: The Production of News and Entertainment (New York: Longman, 1984): 52.   71 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.), Kindle Location 1611.  72 Turow, Media Industries, 51.   
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program was “virulently anti-business if not anti-American,” and that the station’s carrying the program was not the behavior of a “friend” of the corporation.73 Advertisers choose programs with similar principles.  The majority of the time, according to Chomsky and Herman, these principles are culturally and politically conservative.
   
74  Proctor and Gamble instructed their ad agency that “There will be no material on any of our programs which could in any way further the concept of business as cold, ruthless, and lacking in all sentiment or spiritual motivation.”75  The corporate communications manager for GE, the company who owns NBC-TV, stated: “We insist on a program environment that reinforces our corporate messages.”76 Advertisers are also looking for media outlets that do not interfere with the “buying mood.”  Seeking to “lightly entertain,” they will avoid media outlets that dwell on serious complexities and disturbing controversies that may disrupt the primary purpose of program purchases – the dissemination of a selling message.
 
77  Instead of focusing the public’s attention on documentaries like “Selling of the Pentagon,” the sponsor dollars will be attracted to “A birds eye view of Scotland,” “An Essay on Hotels, and “Mr. Rooney Goes to Dinner”—a CBS program on “how Americans eat when they dine out, where they go and why.”78
                                                        73 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.), Kindle Locations 1623-1624.   
 
74 Ibid., Kindle Locations 1627-1628. 75 Bagdikian, Media Monopoly, 160.  76 Ibid. 77 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.), Kindle Location 1642. 78 Erik Barnouw, The Sponsor, (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1972): 134.   
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 Within the current ad-based system, the advertiser holds the bargaining power.  Utilizing this advantageous position, the advertiser is able to filter news that supports the “buying mood,” or a mood that is more in line with its politics and principles.   
3. Sourcing Corporate Media  Economic necessity and reciprocity of interests pull the corporate media and government elites into a symbiotic relationship.79
Newsworkers are predisposed to treat bureaucratic accounts as factual because news personnel participate in upholding a normative order of authorized knowers in the society. Reporters operate with the attitude that officials ought to know what it is their job to know.… In particular, a newsworker will recognize an official’s claim to knowledge not merely as a claim, but as a credible, competent piece of knowledge. This amounts to a 
   The media have numerous demands and strict deadlines to meet, and access to the quick, reliable, raw material of news is crucial.  In efforts to operate efficiently, their resources must be concentrated in important, “news-happening” areas.  Obtaining much of their information from news conferences, a majority of their time in the U.S. is spent at the White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department, or business corporations and trade groups which are also seen as credible, reliable sources.  These bureaucracies are able to distribute easily accessible information in high volume.  Also, the media knows that the audience regards government and corporate sources as acceptable and reliable authorities.   
                                                        79 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.), Kindle Locations 1659-1660.  
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moral division of labor: officials have and give the facts; reporters merely get them.80  Corporate media is also trying to convince its audience that they are a news provider free of bias.  They are consistently reminding their audience that they are “objective” in their reporting.  This argument is supported when they use material from government and corporate sources that are portrayed as accurate.81 Large government and corporate bureaucracies have extremely large public-information operations that work closely with corporate media.  For example, the Pentagon’s public information service includes thousands of employees and a yearly budget that operates in the hundreds of millions.
   
82
140 newspapers producing 690,000 copies per week, Airman magazine monthly circulation of 125,000, 34 radio and 17 TV stations, primarily overseas, 45,000 headquarters and unit news releases 615,000 hometown news releases 6,600 interviews with news media 3,200 news conferences 500 news media orientation flights 50 meetings with editorial boards 11,000 speeches.
  During a rare occasion in 1979 and 1980, the U.S. Air Force made known its vast public-information outreach.   
83   Although this information is unattainable today, one other report in 1987 revealed that the Air Force increased their newspapers to 277 in 1987, compared to 140 in 1979.84                                                        80 Mark Fishman, Manufacturing the News, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980): 143.   
  There is no reason to believe this pattern has not continued.  
81 Gaye Tuchman, “Objectivity as Strategic Ritual: An Examination of Newsmen’s Notions of Objectivity,” American Journal of Sociology 77, no. 2 (1972), 662–64.   82 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.), Kindle Location 1683.  83 States Air Force, “Fact Sheet: The United States Air Force Information Program” (March 1979); “News Releases: 600,000 in a Year,” Air Force Times, April 28, 1980.   84 An Associated Press report on “Newspapers Mustered as Air Force Defends B1B,” published in the Washington Post, April 3, 1987,  cited by Chomsky and Herman in ibid. 
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 The public information services for the government and other large corporations work diligently to ensure that the corporate media continue to receive its information from them.  They provide facilities for media organizations to gather; give journalists advance copies of speeches and forthcoming reports; schedule press conferences at hours well-geared to news deadlines; write press releases in usable language; and carefully organize their press conferences and “photo opportunity” sessions.85
 Throughout this symbiotic relationship, routine contacts are established, and cooperative media are awarded privileged access.  This type of relationship gives the power elite the ability to use awards or threats in efforts to influence how a story is filtered.  Within this relationship, the corporate media may feel obligated to support the administration’s policy so that the close relationship between the journalist and their source is not disturbed.  Judith Miller was awarded access to the highest of officials within the Bush administration, consistently supporting the 2003 Iraq invasion and never expressing dissent.
  These conveniences help reduce the costs associated with news production, thus offering the media organizations higher profits.   
86 The most consequential outcome of this relationship is the government’s ability to “manage” or manipulate a story into a certain frame.
 
87
                                                        85 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.), Kindle Location 1734.  
  The most efficient way for the government to carry out this task is to flood the media with stories, or “facts.”  Stephen Vaughn traces this process back to the Committee of Public 
86 Boyd-Barrett, Oliver, “Judith Miller, The New York Times, and the Propaganda Model,” Journalism Studies 5, no. 4, (2004): 435-449. 87 See Mark Hertsgaard, “How Reagan Seduced Us: Inside the President’s Propaganda Factory,” Village Voice, September 18, 1984. 
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Information, established to coordinate effective propaganda during World War I, which “discovered in 1917–18 that one of the best means of controlling news was flooding news channels with ‘facts,’ or what amounted to official information.”88 Numerous studies have catalogued the amount of governmental sources on which the corporate media depends.  Leon Sigal showed that nearly three-quarters of the front-page stories in the Washington Post and The New York Times depended on official sources.
 
89  Mian Hanan revealed how The New York Times coverage of the 2003 Iraq war was highly influenced by governmental sources.  Observing 168 front page news stories that dealt with the war, “U.S. official sources” were quoted 320 times (60.7%), “Iraqi sources” 36 times (6.8%), and “bureau/staff/correspondents sources” 164 times (31.1%).90  Sandra Dickson concluded in her study of media coverage over the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama “there is a heavy reliance on government sources and themes” and “the mainstream media often serves to sustain the U.S. government line in foreign policy crises.”91 Corporate media not only utilizes official sources to sell its story, but it is also keen on bringing in “experts.”  To further validate “factual” information, many “experts” will be put on the payroll and placed in specific think tanks, thus providing 
 
                                                        88 Stephen Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 194.   89 Leon Sigal, Reporters and Officials:  The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking (D.C. Heath, 1973), 48.  90 Hanan Mian, “War in Iraq:  Comparative Coverage of the Toronto Star and the New 
York Times,” Canadian Journal of Media Studies 3 no. 1 (2003): 19. 91 Sandra Dickson, “Understand Media Bias:  The Press and the U.S. Invasion of Panama,” Journalism Quarterly 71, no. 4 (1994): 809.  
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the media with a highly respectable unofficial source to counter the official source.92
 Throughout the past three decades, the “experts” on terrorism have been in abundance.  During the 1980’s, the majority of the terrorism “experts” appearing on the popular “McNeil-Lehrer News Hour,” were current government officials (54%) and employees from conservative think tanks (15%).
 By having the “expert” and the official source debating each other, the boundaries are established.   
93  The media themselves have also provided “experts” on terrorism including John Barron and Claire Sterling, who were household names as authorities on the KGB and terrorism because the 
Reader’s Digest had funded, published, and publicized their work, and the Soviet defector Arkady Shevchenko, who became an expert on Soviet arms and intelligence because Time, ABC-TV, and The New York Times chose to feature him (despite his badly tarnished credentials).94
 Throughout the past decade Brian Crozier has been a regular “expert” on terrorism, yet he “characterized violence by non-state actors as ‘terrorism’ and 
  By featuring these “experts” on their programs or in their text, these media outlets confirm their expertise and authority on the given subject.  
                                                        92 Bruce Owen and Ronald Braeutigam, The Regulation Game: Strategic Use of the 
Administrative Process (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1978), 7.   93 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.), Kindle Location 1789. 94 On Sterling’s qualifications as an expert, see Edward Herman and Frank Brodhead, The Rise and Fall of The Bulgarian Connection (New York:  Sheridan Square Publications, 1986), 125–46; on Shevchenko, see Edward J. Epstein, “The Invention of Arkady Shevchenko, Supermole: The Spy Who Came In to Be Sold,” New 
Republic, July 15–22, (1985).  
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violence by states as ‘counterterrorism’.”95
 A terror group, Ansar al-Jihad al-Alami, or the Helpers of the Global Jihad, issued a statement claiming responsibility for the attack, according to Will McCants, a terrorism analyst at C.N.A., a research institute that studies terrorism. 
  This elementary theory demonstrates he is not an “expert”.  Recently, the Times produced an article citing an “expert” stating the Oslo massacre was carried out by an Islamic terror group.  The article stated: 
 Shortly after the release of this article it was revealed that one Norwegien carried out the massacre, and Will McCants was not an expert.96 Another popular source offering “factual” information are former radicals who have reformed their “wicked ways” and now “see the light.”  During the McCarthy era, defectors and ex-Communists fiercely competed with one another to tell first hand accounts of the “evil empire.”
  
97  More recently, numerous reports have confirmed that Kamal Saleem and Walid Shoebat, who claim to have been former terrorists and are now speaking throughout the U.S. in efforts to convince Americans that Islam is dangerous, are frauds.98 The corporate media relies on government sources in order to stay profitable, and the government relies on the corporate media to convey its desired message.      
   
                                                        95 David Miller and Tom Mills, “The Terror Experts and the Mainstream Media,” 
Critical Studies on Terrorism, Vol 2. No. 3, December 2009, 414-437 96 Doherty, Benjamin, “How a clueless “terrorism expert” set media suspicion n Muslims after Oslo horror,” The Electronic Intifada, July 23, 2011, accessed November 10, 2011, http://electronicintifada.net/blog/benjamin-doherty/how-clueless-terrorism-expert-set-media-suspicion-muslims-after-oslo-horror. 97 See David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and 
Eisenhower (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), 114–38.   98 For Kamal Saleem see http://www.booksandculture.com/articles/2010/mayjun/mixedmessage.html; and for Walid Shoebat see http://www.jpost.com/Features/Article.aspx?id=96502. 
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4.  Flak And The Enforcers 
 “Flak refers to negative responses to a media statement or program, and can come in the form of letters, telegrams, phone calls, petitions, lawsuits, speeches and bills before Congress, and other modes of complaint, threat, and punitive action.”99
 During the 1970’s and 1980’s the corporate community sponsored the growth of “flak producing” institutions such as American Legal Foundation, the Capital Legal Foundation, the Media Institute, the Center for Media and Public Affairs, and Accuracy in Media (AIM), in efforts to monitor the media’s adherence to the corporate message.  Instead of focusing on foreign policy in the media, these institutions put their efforts towards demonstrating the “liberal bias and anti-propensities of the corporate media.”
  Receiving flak can be extremely costly to a media organization, as this may put off advertisers or effect crucial government relations for sources.   
100 AIM is one of the more prominent institutions, a small yet crucial part of the larger corporate right-wing campaign attack.  Established by Reed Irvine, AIM grew quickly as it was funded well by eight different oil companies.
  
101  The function of AIM is to harass and pressure the media to follow the corporate agenda and a hard-line, right wing foreign policy. It attacks the media for alleged deficiencies whenever they fail to toe the line on foreign policy.102                                                        99  Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.), Kindle Location 1811.  
  Through the work of Irvine, AIM has 
100 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.), 27. 101 Louis Wolf, “Accuracy in Media Rewrites News and History,” Covert Action 
Information Bulletin (Spring 1984): 26–29.   102 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.), Kindle Locations 1851-1853).  
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done well to apply “flak” when journalist stray away from the established policy, 
such as Raymond Bonners’ departure from Time.103  Chomsky noted Irvine’s 
influence stating, ‘‘His ability to get the publisher of The New York Times to meet 
with him personally once a year-----a first objective of any lobbyist-----is impressive testimony to influence.104 Although Chomsky and Herman’s model is two decades old, the flak filter “may be more prevalent now than Chomsky and Herman ever envisioned.”
 
105  Analyzing 36 AIM reports between 2007 and 2008, Brian Goss interrogated AIM’s discourse and their investment in making truth claims.  Goss’s investigation concludes that AIM remains one of the top producers of flak, and their discourse does not align with its stated mission of ‘‘fairness, balance, and accuracy”.106 One of the most recent cases of flak came in July of 2010 when CNN’s Senior Editor of Middle East Affairs, Octavia Nasr, was fired after tweeting, “Sad to hear of the passing of Sayyed Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah… One of Hezbollah’s giants I respect a lot.”
 
107  Before CNN made the decision to fire Nasr, numerous flak producing machines applied pressure for her termination, such as the Anti-Defamation League.108
                                                        103 Louis Wolf, “Accuracy in Media,” 32–33.   
  Although CNN stated in an internal memo that Octavia was “an extremely dedicated and committed member of the team”, it concluded “her 
104 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.), Kindle Locations 8616-8617.  105 Brian Goss, “The Left-Media’s Stranglehold:  Flak and Accuracy in Media Reports,” Journalism Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2009, 455-473.  106 Ibid.  107 The tweet can be viewed at http://twitter.com/#!/octavianasrcnn. 108 The Anti-Defamation League, “ADL Letter to CNN,” July 6th, 2010, http://www.adl.org/media_watch/tv/CNN_Editor_Praises_Hezbollah_Leader_070610.htm. 
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credibility in her position as senior editor for Middle Eastern affairs had been compromised.”109  Times columnist, Thomas Friedman, found CNN’s actions “troubling,” yet made sure he did not make the same mistake as he followed with, “She should have been suspended for a month, but not fired.”110 Flak can also come from government officials.  As Oliver Boyd explains regarding the 2003 Iraq invasion: 
 
There is direct evidence from the televised press conferences of leading administration officials such as President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, or Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, of how such sources frequently use their privileged voice and elevated position on the podium to embarrass journalists who ask the ‘wrong’ question, or adapt the ‘wrong’ tone, and to marginalize or ignore journalists who they think are unlikely to conform.111   Flak stems from the media themselves, the corporate community, and most of all, the government.  Through its symbiotic relationship with the media, the government is able to assail, threaten, or “correct” the media who may deviate to far off the established line.  This process enables flak to be a crucial factor in filtering news.  
 
5.  Manichean Thinking   Ideology marks the last filter in the PM.  When the PM was first published in 1988, this filter focused on anti-Communism; the consistent projection of the evils of                                                         109 Steve Krakauer, “CNN’s Octavia Nasr Leaving Network After Controversial Tweet,” Mediaite, July 7, 2010. http://www.mediaite.com/tv/breaking-cnns-octavia-nasr-leaving-network-after-controversial-tweet. 110 Thomas Friedman, “Can We Talk?” New York Times, July 17th, 2010, accessed October 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/27/opinion/27friedman.html. 111 Oliver Boyd-Barrett, “Judith Miller, The New York Times, and the Propaganda Model,” Journalism Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2004, p. 435-449.  
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communism and its threat to Western ideology and politics.  Now, this filter remains applicable as opposing ideologies remain elevated in the media.  Chomsky and Herman state, “This ideology helps mobilize the populace against an enemy, and because the concept is fuzzy it can be used against anybody advocating policies that threaten property interests or support accommodation with Communist states and radicalism.”112  The current prevailing anti-Western ideology is “radical Islam” or what many in the media call “the return of Islam.”113 What tends to happen in the media is a process of dichotomizing the world into “us” and “them.”  This method has been seen as a regular practice, but can be intensified to prepare the nation for war. David Altheide demonstrated through extensive qualitative media analysis how the U.S. government promoted the “War on Terrorism”, via media outlets, by disseminating a “discourse of fear”, and by “selectively framing discourse to proclaim the moral and social superiority of the United States.”
   
114  He explains “by providing a context of meanings and images, the mass media prepare audiences for political decisions about specific actions, including war.”115
                                                        112 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (Kindle Locations 1881-1883). Pantheon. Kindle Edition.    
  In a content analysis of the Times and Newsweek five weeks after the 9/11 attacks, Domke Hutcheson concluded that “government and military officials consistently focus on American core values including individualism, liberty and equality and themes of U.S. strength and power such as the U.S. role as a super power and moral leader among nations while simultaneously demoralizing the 
113 Edward Said, Covering Islam, x. 114 David Altheide, “The Mass Media and Terrorism”, Communication and Discourse 1 no. 287, (2007): 287-308.  115 Ibid., 287.  
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enemy in a good versus them context.”116
 When an event occurs in the world, raw information is collected.  In the U.S., this information must pass through the guided-market system, shaped by these five filters.  Before the information is broadcast or printed for the audience, the residue is cleansed, leaving a story that fits well within the acceptable boundaries constructed by the power elite.   
  This anti-Western ideology filter is a critical and potent element of effective propaganda.  
 
C. Marginalizing Dissent & The Validity of the PM   A third hypothesis advanced by Chomsky and Herman was that the PM would be “effectively excluded from discussion…however well-confirmed the model may be … it is inadmissible, and … should remain outside the spectrum of debate over the media…Plainly it is either valid or invalid. If invalid, it may be dismissed; if valid it will be dismissed.”117  As predicted, the PM has been largely excluded from the media, as well as the fields of political science and communications.118 Supporting this claim further, Noam Chomsky himself has in fact been marginalized from the chosen media outlet analyzed in this thesis, The New York 
Times.  Discussed in his recent book, Death of the Liberal Class, Chris Hedges notes 
   
                                                        116 J. Domke Hutcheson, D. Billeaudeaux, and A. Garland, “U.S. National Identity, Political Elites, and a Patriotic Press following September 11,” Political 
Communication 21 (2004): 27-50. 117 Noam Chomsky, Necessary Illusions:  Thought Control in Democratic Societies (London:  Pluto, 1989), 11. 118  Analyzing 3053 articles sampled from ten media and communication journals published in Europe and North America between 1988 to 2007, only 79 articles (representing 2. 6 per cent of the total) attended to the PM.  See Mullen, Twenty 
Years On. 
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that during the 1970s, the Times editor Abe Rosenthal “banned social critics such as Chomsky from being quoted in the paper.”119  Observing some of the minute coverage Chomsky has received in the Times, one review accused Chomsky of employing “falsehoods with exaggerations.”120 Another article states that Chomsky “evades the complexities of the world as it is,”121 and another simply claims, “he exaggerates.”122 A large part of the criticism targets the PM as a conspiratorial view of the media.
 
123  Herman and Chomsky respond stressing that the PM actually constitutes a “free market analyses” of media, “with the results largely an outcome of the working of market forces.”124With equal logic, one could argue that an analyst of General Motors who concludes that its managers try to maximize profits (instead of selflessly labouring to satisfy the needs of the public) is adopting a conspiracy theory.
  
125  As noted in the five filters discussed above, the PM is a framework that conveys how market forces produce a filtered text, not the work of a conspiracy.   Another criticism claims the PM is deterministic, functionalist and simplistic.126
                                                        119 Chris Hedges, Death of the Liberal Class (Nation Books, October 17, 2010).  
  Herman has replied to these criticisms, declaring that, “Any model involves deterministic elements.”  The PM explains patterns of media behavior in 
120 Samantha Power, “The Everything Explainer,” New York Times, January 4, 2004.   121 A. O. Scott, “Overflowing with Opinions, Lacking in Minced Words,” New York 
Times, November 22, 2002.  122 James Chase, “The Complex Metamorphosis of American Foreign Policy,” New 
York Times, December 16, 2003.  123 Including Entman, 1990; Lemann, 1989; and Nelson, 1990. 124 Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent (2002), xii. 125 Noam Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War:  Essays on the Current Crisis and How 
We Got There (London:  Sinclair Browne,1982), 94. 126 Including Eldridge, 1993; Golding and Murdock, 1991; and Schlesinger, 1989. 
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terms of “mechanisms and policies whereby the powerful protect their interests naturally and without overt conspiracy.”127  Another sharp criticism is that the model neglects the impact of journalistic professionalism.128  The PM does state that journalists and editors play central roles in disseminating information and mobilizing media audiences in support of the special interest groups that dominate the state and private economy, but it assumes that the processes of control are often unconscious.  It argues that meanings, which are formed at an unconscious level, are essentially filtered by the constraints that are built into the system (rewards and punishments), causing conscious decisions to be understood as natural, objective, and within commonsense.129
Those who choose to conform, hence to remain within the system, will  
  Instead of assuming that newsroom workers consciously align themselves with the dominant elites, it states that the corporate media recruit right-minded personnel to fill staff positions. 
soon find that they internalize the beliefs and attitudes that they express and that shape their work; it is a rare individual who can believe one thing and say another on a regular basis.130   Countering other critiques of their model, Herman and Chomsky concede that the PM cannot account “for every detail of such a complex matter as the working of the national mass media.”131
                                                        127 Edward Herman, “The Propaganda Model:  A Retrospective,” Against All Reason 1, no. 1-14, (December 2003).   http://www.chomsky.info/onchomsky/20031209.htm 
  They also note that the media are not monolithic, and are not entirely closed to dissent or debate.  
128 Including Goodwin, 1994; Hallin, 1994; and Sparks, 2007. 129 Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent (2002), 2. 130 Noam Chomsky, On Power and Ideology:  the Managua Lectures (Cambridge:  South End Press, 1987), 125. 131 Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent (2002), 304.  
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Whatever the advantages of the powerful ... the struggle goes on, space exists and dissent light breaks through in unexpected ways. The mass media are no monolith.132  In Manufacturing Consent, Herman and Chomsky acknowledge, “The system is not all powerful.”133  They conclude, “Government and elite domination of the media have not succeeded in overcoming the Vietnam syndrome and public hostility to direct US involvement in the destabilization and overthrow of foreign governments.”134 Herman and Chomsky state that there is “a need for a macro, alongside a micro view of media operations” so as “to see the pattern of manipulation and systemic bias.”
  
135
 
 This thesis approaches media operations in the micro sense, investigating a specific policy, and the media’s role in upholding that policy.  This thesis applies the PM to the Times reporting regarding Hezbollah’s continued FTO designation in Chapter 6.    
                                                        132 Edward Herman cited in Philip Schlesinger, Culture and Power:  Media, Culture, 
and Society (London: 1992, Sage), 308. 133 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2002), 306. 134 Ibid. 306. 135 Chomsky and Herman, Manufacturing Consent (1988), 2.  
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Chapter 3  
The Power Elite’s Interests in Hezbollah’s Designation 
  This thesis argues Hezbollah’s FTO designation, a political instrument for the power elite, is justified and maintained largely by the corporate media working as a member of the power elite.  In efforts to further this argument, the question must be explored:  How are the power elite’s interests served by designating Hezbollah a FTO?  Although varying interests are at stake, this investigation focuses on the highly profitable weapons industry, and the ensuing corporate and political connections among the power elite.  As this chapter will explain, the weapons industry was chosen because Hezbollah’s “threat” allows weapons to continuously flow from the large weapon manufacturers to the state of Israel, creating a continuous flow of profits to the power elite.    
I. The Big Business of the Weapons Industry  Weapon manufacturing is a sizeable and profitable industry within the United States.  In 2010, arms sales totaled 4.8% of GDP.136   In 2008, despite the global economic recession, the U.S. increased its sales by 8%, accounting for 68% of the world’s foreign weapon sales.137
                                                        136 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2010, http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010. 
  While the global average fell 7.6%, U.S. weapon sales increased totaling $37.8 billion in U.S. dollars.  Despite intense international competition, U.S. arms manufacturers were expected to sell a record $46.1 billion in 
137 Jasmin Melvin, “U.S. Leads World in Foreign Weapon Sales: Report,” Reuters, September 6, 2009, accessed October 10, 2011.  http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/06/us-arms-usa-idUSTRE5851XH20090906. 
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military hardware to foreign governments in 2011, a nearly 50% jump from $31.6 billion from 2010.138 Among the world’s top twenty weapon manufactures, fourteen are American companies.
  
139  Although the UK company, BAE Systems, is the number one weapons manufacturer in the world, the next five spots belong to U.S. companies:  Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman Corporation, General Dynamics, and Raytheon.  In 2002, these companies received $82.7 billion from government defense contracts, or 41.9% of the total revenue from government defense contracts awarded to the top 100.140  In 2008, these five U.S. companies sold $128 billion in arm sales alone.141
 
  In sum, the weapons industry is big business.  
II. Loyal Customer  One of the largest customers of U.S. weapons is the state of Israel.  Granted as military assistance, Israel received $7.2 billion in weaponry from 1990-2000.142
                                                        138 W.J. Hennigan, “U.S. arms makers look overseas as domestic demand shrinks,” 
Los Angeles Times, June 15, 2011, accessed October 11, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/15/business/la-fi-weapon-exports-20110616. 
  Between 2000-2009, it received $19 billion in weapons from the U.S.  Under the 
139 Economist, “Bangs for Bucks,” April 12, 2010, accessed, October 11, 2011. http://www.economist.com/node/15895032. 140 Richard Girard, “The Weapons Manufacturer That Does it All:  A Profile of Arms Giant Lockheed Martin,” Polaris Institute, November 2005. http://www.polarisinstitute.org/files/Lockheed%20Martin.pdf.  141 Stockholm International Research Peace Institute, Yearbook 2010, Table 6A.1 http://www.caat.org.uk/resources/facts-figures/top-world-cos.php. 142 William D. Hartung and Frida Berrigan, “Report:  U.S. Arms Transfers and Security Assistance to Israel,” World Policy Institute, May 6, 2002. http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/israel050602.html 
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2007 Memorandum of Understanding, the U.S. will transfer $30 billion of weapons to Israel between 2009-2018.  Today, the U.S supplies 18% of Israel’s defense budget.143 These weapons, given by the U.S. government through grants, or Foreign Military Financing (FMF), are manufactured by the companies listed above, which have been awarded defense contracts.  Lockheed Martin, the largest weapons manufacturer in the U.S., has supplied Israel with 237 F-16 fighter planes at $34 million a unit, along with a number of C-130 transport planes.   Boeing has sold Israel 50 F-4E Phantom jets at $18 million a unit, 90 F-15 Eagle jets at $38 million a unit, 42 AH-64 Apache Attack helicopters at $14.5 million a unit, and a number of AGM 114 Hellfire missiles and Harpoon anti-ship missiles.  Raytheon, the chief defense system salesmen, has sold millions of dollars worth of missiles to Israel, including the Tomahawk missile, the Sidewinder, the Maverick, the Sparrow and the Patriot.
    
144 These corporations have a stake in Israel using its military arsenal so it can be replenished, or they at least need the perception that more and better weapons are needed in efforts to combat “imminent threats.”  Observing the relationship between these corporations and the U.S. government, a steady flow of weapons will always exist.   
   
                                                         143 Walter Pincus, “United States Needs to Reevaluate its assistance to Israel,” 
Washington Post, October 18, 2011, accessed October 18 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/united-states-needs-to-reevaluate-its-assistance-to-israel/2011/10/15/gIQAK5XksL_story.html 144 Hartung, “Reports:  U.S. Arm Transfers.”  
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III. Government-Corporate Connection  Ranked no. 135 on Fortune magazine’s list of the world’s 500 biggest corporations, Lockheed Martin is the largest weapons manufacturer in the United States.  The majority of its profits stem from government contracts, and many of these contracts are for weapon sales to Israel.  It profited over $19 billion in weapon sales to Israel alone from 2000 to 2005.145  Besides the $17.5 billion Lockheed Martin pulls in annually from the United States Department of Defense, it receives close to $8 billion a year from U.S. federal agencies as diverse as the Social Services Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Energy, the Federal Aviation Administration, the U.S. Postal Service, the Department of Transportation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Census Bureau.146  A 2010 report notes that approximately 85% of Lockheed’s annual revenue (nearly $40 billion) comes from government contracts.147  In 2010, Lockheed received $35.9 billion from the Department of Defense alone.148  Only a few months into 2012, and Lockheed has secured a contract to sale $900 million worth of PATRIOT PAC-3 missiles to Israel.149
                                                        145 Girard, “The Weapons Manufacturer.”  
  An examination of its Board of Directors demonstrates that its links with the government are much stronger than simply contractual agreements. 
146 Ibid. 147 United States Securities and Exchange Commission, “Lockheed Martin Corporation,” Annual Report, December 31, 2010, www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/936468/000119312511045739/d10k.htm. 148 Ruth Flower, “Rein in Profits of Major Pentagon Contractors,” FCNL, March 2012, www.fcnl.org/issues/budget. 149 Matthew Potter, “FY12 Defense Contracts Flow and Lockheed Martin Benefits,” January 31, 2012, www.defenseprocurementnews.com/topics/countries/israel/. 
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 Able to exercise all the powers of the corporation, in 2005 the Board of Directors was made up of former Under Secretary of Defense, Pete Aldridge Jr., former director of the Transportation Department, John Brophy, former Deputy Attorney General, James Comey, former Admiral and Commander of the U.S. Navy, James Ellis Jr., and former policy advisor on national security, William Inglee.  This revolving door spins in both directions, as a number of former Lockheed directors have, or still do work for the U.S. government.  These include Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs in the Department of Energy, Everet Beckner, the wife of Vice President Dick Cheney, Lynne Cheney (who was compensated $120,000 a year for attending four meetings)150, Deputy Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy, Gordon Engand, and National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley.151 The current Board of Directors consists of Robert J. Stevens, who was recently appointed to the Obama Administration’s Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations, James Ellis, former Admiral and Commander for the U.S. Air Force, Gwendolyn King, former commissioner of the Social Security Administration, James Loy, former Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, and Joseph Ralston, former Vice Chairmen for the Joints Chief of Staff.
 
152 Besides the government-corporate revolving door of directors, Lockheed is a member of a number of influential industry associations and think tanks including:  Aerospace Industry Association, Business Industry Political Action Committee, 
 
                                                        150 Michelle Ciarrocca, W. Hartung, “Axis of Influence:  Behind the Bush Administration’s Missile Defense Revival,” World Policy Institute, July 2002.  http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/execsumaxis.html. 151 Girard, “The Weapons Manufacturer.”  152 Lockheed Martin, Board of Directors, www.lockheedmartin.com/us/who-we-are/corporate-governance/board.html. 
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Center for Security Policy, National Defense Industrial Association, and the US Council for International Business.   Lockheed’s involvement with these organizations, coupled with their extensive lobbying efforts,153 offers them a unique opportunity to influence policies favorable to the defense industry and the corporation itself.154 The benefits that Lockheed receives from the U.S. government are obvious, but how do the governing elites benefit from the relationship?  Besides the revolving door of high earning jobs provided, Lockheed Martin is one of the largest political donors.  In the three U.S. election cycles (2000, 2002, 2004), Lockheed donated $7,271,339 (40% to the Democrats, 59% to the Republicans) to Federal candidates.
   
155  This money was not targeting a specific party, but was strategically aimed at candidates who are members of congressional committees overseeing defense budgets.  Nearly 60% of their donations were donated to members of Congress who were sitting either on the House Armed Services Committee or on the Committee on Appropriations.156 This same corporate-government connection is seen in the U.S. arms company, Raytheon.  Totaling $21.7 billion dollars in sales in 2007, with 96% of it in arms sales, Raytheon is fifth largest arms company in the world.
   
157
                                                        153 Between 1998 and 2004, Lockheed Martin spent $55,373,840 on lobbying members of the U.S. Congress on legislation. Ibid.  
 The majority of Raytheon’s arms sales are to the U.S. government, specializing in missile defense 
154 Ibid. 155 ibid.  156 Ibid. 157 David Hess, “Raytheon Fact Sheet,” Medical Association for Prevention of War, October, 2008. www.mapw.org.au. 
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systems.  Raytheon is a large recipient of U.S. defense contracts.   It should be noted that Raytheon has found itself in the courtroom recently, pleading guilty of corruption in obtaining these defense contracts.158
 The corporate-government connections run at the highest of levels with Raytheon.  Richard Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State, is a company consultant, Sean O’Keefe, former Director of the Office of Management and Budget, is a strategy advisory board member, Warren Rudman, a former Senator, sits on the Board of Directors, and John Deutch, former director of the CIA, is also a member of the Board of Directors.
  Not being deterred by these charges, Raytheon developed all four of Israel’s defense systems during the past decade, which were gifted by the U.S. government and paid for by the U.S. taxpayer.    
159  Secretary Armitage made his name known in the corporate media when he made a bold statement about the “threat” that Hezbollah poses:  “Hezbollah made the A-team of terrorists, while maybe al-Qaeda is actually the B-team.”160
                                                        158 Ibid. 
  Discussed more in Chapter 6, this statement, although made in 2003, has, and still is, being used in the corporate media.  This accusation came as no surprise as Raytheon’s defense systems were given to Israel for the main reason of “defending Israel against rocket attacks from Hezbollah.”  Armitage’s statement served as a strong sales point for the multi-million dollar missile systems delivered to Israel.  Secretary Armitage has also served as a consultant to Boeing’s weapons department, another large distributer to Israel.   
159 Ibid. 160 Daniel Byman, “Should Hezbollah Be Next?” Foreign Affairs Magazine, November/December 2003.  
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 The corporate-government connections is also seen in Northrop Grumman who has employed Lewis Libby, former White House Chief to the President, Dov Zakheim, former Under Secretary for Comptroller, Douglas J. Feith, former Defense Under Secretary for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz, former Deputy Defense Secretary, and James Roche, former Secretary of the Air Force, who would become the Vice President of Northrop.  Exhausting the point, during George W. Bush’s first term, thirty-two major appointees of the administration were former executives, consultants, or major shareholders of top weapons contractors.161  Continuing the trend, President Barak Obama has appointed officials such as Secretary of the Navy and former director of the defense contractor Enersys, Ray Mabus, Deputy Under Secretary for the Department of Defense and former Vice President for Raytheon, Frank Kendall III, General Counsel for the Department of Homeland Security and former Vice President to G.E., Ivan Fong, Director of National Intelligence and former Executive Director for the defense contractor Booz, Allen & Hamilton, James Clapper, and Deputy Secretary of Defense and former lobbyist for Raytheon, William J. Lynn III.162 Within the weapons industry, the CEO’s of these large corporations and top government officials gain tremendous benefits.  Some gain large incomes from these high status positions, others improve their stock portfolio; such as former White House Advisor Karl Rove who is a major shareholder of Boeing.  The established formula allows members of the power elite to attain large sums of money and high 
   
                                                        161 Ciarrocca, “Axis of Influence.” 162 Washington Post, “Who’s Who,” http://projects.washingtonpost.com/2009/federal-appointments/by-branch/ 
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political status.  Within this transaction – Lockheed sells weapons to the U.S. government and the government gives them to Israel for free - the American taxpayer ends up with the bill.  While the U.S. government is currently cutting education and medicare programs to combat the current economic problems, how is it able to justify the amount of military aid to Israel?    
IV. Maintaining The Formula  One means to maintain this formula – a steady flow of weapons to Israel at the taxpayers’ expense - is the qualitative military edge (QME).  “Enshrined in congressional legislation, it requires certification that any proposed arms sale to any other country in the Middle East will not adversely affect Israel’s qualitative military edge over military threats to Israel.”163  In 2009 meetings with defense officials in Israel, Undersecretary of State Ellen Tauscher “reiterated the United States’ strong commitment” to the formula and “expressed appreciation” for Israel’s willingness to work with newly created “QME working groups,” according to a cable of her meetings that was released by WikiLeaks.164  A unique aspect about the formula is that some neighboring countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, are U.S. allies, but are considered threats by Israel.  So when Obama made an agreement to sell 84 F-15 fighter jets and other weapons worth $60 billion to Saudi Arabia,165
                                                        163 Pincus, “Assistance to Israel.” 
 it had to counter those weapons for Israel to maintain their military edge.  That counter came 
164 Ibid. 165 Ian Black, “Barack Obama to authorize record $60bn Saudi Arms Sale,” The 
Guardian, September 13, 2010, accessed October 12, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/13/us-arms-deal-saudi-arabia.  
   50  
in the form of giving Israel 20 F-35 fifth generation stealth fighters, which are still being developed.   This process can also be referred to as a U.S.-generated arms race – the U.S. government sells weapons to Saudi Arabia, and then is legally obligated to sell better weapons to Israel, and then later sells Saudi better weapons, and then is legally obligated to sell Israel better weapons, and then the process is repeated.    The QME program helps justify the enormous amount of weapon sales to these countries, but it is not the only program that ensures weapon sales.  Other avenues to ensure a consistent flow of weapons to Israel are the missile defense programs that make up their multilayered missile and defense apparatus; including the Iron Dome System, the Arrow III system, the Magic Wand system, and the new, David’s Sling Short Range Missile Defense System.  The U.S. weapons manufacturer Raytheon has played an extensive part in producing all four of these systems.  Although all four are currently active, Israeli military commanders have recently stated they need at least 10-15 more to effectively cover the northern border from potential attacks from Hezbollah.166  To fund these additional Iron Domes’ the U.S. Congress passed a bill to authorize an additional $205 million, on top of the existing $3 billion, for the project.167  The Magic Wand system was also implemented to combat missiles fired from Hezbollah.168
                                                        166 UPI, “Raytheon-Rafael get boost for Iron Dome,” August 23, 2011, accessed October 15, 2011, http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/08/23/Raytheon-Rafael-get-boost-for-Iron-Dome/UPI-18551314128093. 
  Each projectile fired from the Magic Wand 
167 Pincus, “Assistance to Israel.” 168 Defense Update, “Israel Embarks on a Third Ballistic Defense System,” 2007, accessed October 15, 2011. http://defense-update.com/newscast/0207/news/010207_iron_cap.htm. 
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system will cost $1 million.169  Adding another layer to Israel’s missile defense program, Lt. Gen. Henry Obering, Director of the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency, recently signed a Project Agreement with Israel in efforts to develop David’s Sling.170  Unlike the U.S.-Israel Arrow interceptor, which is managed by Israel, funded jointly by the two countries, but intended only for Israeli defense, David's Sling, will be co-managed, co-funded, and optimized to meet operational requirements of both governments.171
 If the U.S. manufactured fighter jets, tanks, armored vehicles, defense systems, and plethora of missiles and other weaponry were not enough, the U.S. War Reserves Stocks for Allies, beginning in the 1980’s, ensures at least another $1.2 billion of U.S. weapons can be stored in Israel in 2012.
  This system is designed to combat long-range missiles, with the primary strategy to eliminate potential threats from Hezbollah and Iran.  Maintaining all four of these systems requires a constant flow of weaponry from the U.S., and the higher the threat, the faster the flow, and the more wealth transferred to the power elite.     
172
                                                        169 ibid. 
  This ensures another $1.2 billion to the power elite.  This military program allows the U.S. to store arms and equipment on Israeli bases for use in wartime.  In the 1990’s, the arrangement was expanded to allow Israel to use the weapons, but only with U.S. permission.  This was first enacted during the 2006 war against Hezbollah, with the U.S. allowing 
170 Barbara Opell-Rome, “U.S.-Israel to Develop David’s Sling Missile Defense,” 
Defense News, August 7, 2011, accessed October 18 2011. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3664531. 171 ibid 172 Starting in 2012, the U.S. will be able to store $1.2 billion of weaponry on Israeli bases. Pincus, “Assistance to Israel.”  
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Israel to use stored cluster artillery shells.  The use of these cluster bombs drew large international criticism, as the majority of the targets were Lebanese civilians.  The cluster bombs used were the M77 submissions delivered by the Lockheed Martin Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).173  At least one million unexploded bomblets remained on Lebanese soil after the war ended, leading to at least 200 post-war casualties.174  These casualties led to a global ban known as the Cluster Munitions Convention, which is part of international humanitarian law aimed a protecting civilians.  This global ban has been endorsed by more than a hundred nations, yet unsurprisingly not by either the U.S. or Israel.175 The above programs are well established, providing multiple opportunities for an abundance of weapon sales to Israel.  Yet in order to continue a steady flow of these weapons, ensuring high profits for the military contractors, there must be a conflict, or at least the perception of an imminent threat to Israel.  If organizations such as Hezbollah or Hamas can remain dangerous threats, or manufactured threats, these weapons can continue to flow without question.  This thesis argues that the power elite is able to utilize the corporate media to communicate and construct this requisite threat.  Before examining the filtered news fit to print in regards to Hezbollah, a historical analysis of Hezbollah followed by an examination of the FTO designation process is required to further the stated argument – Hezbollah has 
    
                                                        173 Frida Berrigan, “Made in the U.S.A.:  American Military Aid to Israel,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies 38, No. 3 (Spring 2009): 6-21.  174 Human Rights Watch, “Israel and Cluster Munitions,” February 8 2008, cited in Berrigan, “Made in the U.S.A.” 175 Berrigan, “Made in the U.S.A.” 
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evolved away from the definitions of a FTO, and is only included on the list because the inclusion serves the interests of the power elite.               
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Chapter 4   
Historical Analysis of Hezbollah 
 
I. Origins, Founding, and the Initial Cadre of Hezbollah  
  Hezbollah’s former Deputy Secretary General, Naim Qassem, cites the Israeli invasion of 1978, “The Litani Operation,” as the precursor for the establishment of Hezbollah.176
 After winning its independence from France in 1943, Lebanon’s search for an identity began.  Signing the defining National Pact, Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims set the terms of reference for Lebanon’s independence.  This pact created a political system that was based on sectarian communities, or confessions.  Consisting of 18 different recognized sects, each according their own political privileges, the political system of Lebanon is incomparable to any other nation. Holding the most power, the Maronites were awarded the presidency, the Sunnis won the premiership, and the Shi’a were given speakership of parliament, a position that held little constitutional power.  This disempowered political position coupled with their impoverished and underdeveloped community in Southern Lebanon,
  The exact date is unclear, but it is assumed that this operation and the 1982 Israeli invasion both contributed to an environment that enabled young Shiite men to unite in a resistance movement that would become Hezbollah.   
177
                                                        176 Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: Saqi Books, 2005), 67. 
 represents a common theme in Arab Shi’a history.  Found in Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, 
177 Augustus Norton, Amal and the Shi’a:  The Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1987), 16-23.  
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and Saudi Arabia, the Shi’a community is often oppressed due to the dominant Arab Sunnis despising them for their deviation from the path of Sunni Islam.178 Against the difficult backdrop of constraining domestic policies,   179
 Starting in the early 1970’s, the armed Palestinian presence began to rapidly increase, and the civil war began to show its face.  These heightened tensions provided an array of secular parties an environment to capture the support of the Shi’a community.  Among these emerging groups was the predecessor and eventual rival to Hezbollah, the reformist Amal movement.  
 the influx of a hundred thousand Palestinian refugees from the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, and the PLO establishing a virtual state-within-the state of Lebanon, the Shi’a community was hungry for radical change.  Attracted to parties, which denounced the tribal, religious, or ethnic bases of discrimination, many Shi’a turned to the secular opposition parties like the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), and the Organization for Communist Labor Action.   
  Founded in 1975 by Sayyid Musa al-Sadr as the militia wing of al-Sadr’s Harakat al-Mahrumin (Movement of the Deprived), Amal (Afwaj al-Muqawamat al-Lubnaniyya), won many adherents serving as a viable option to the parties of the Left.   Aligning with other radical reformists groups within the Lebanese National Movement, Amal quickly grew in popularity.   Amal was seen as a feasible protector in a conflict torn country, although a large amount of its support came from an                                                         178 Augustus Norton, Hezbollah:  A Short Story (NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 12.  179 Norton, Hezbollah, 13. 
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outside state, Libya.180  After fading in popularity due to its support for Syria and its armed intervention to prevent a victory by the PLO and the LMN over the Maronite militias,181 Amal strongly reemerged after a confluence of events:  founder, al-Sadr, mysteriously disappeared, the Israeli invasion in 1978, and the Iranian revolution in 1979.  Challenging the presence of the Palestinian guerrillas, who were seen as an occupying force prone to brutality, Amal drew much support from the growing Shi’a middle class.182  Clashes began to erupt between Amal militiamen and Palestinian guerrillas, ultimately leading to Amal tacitly welcoming the Israeli invasion of 1982 in order to break the power of the Palestinian fighters.183  Amal’s leaders, Nabih Berri and Daoud Suleiman Daoud, were seen as the orchestrators’ of this devious act.  This move by Berri, combined with his participation in the National Salvation Committee, created a deep divide within Amal, as the young radicals within the organization described the Committee as no more than an “American-Israeli bridge” allowing the United States to enter and control Lebanon.184  With no clear hierarchy, ideological disagreements began to run rampant among the Amal leaders.  Young Lebanese clerics such as Subhi al-Tufayli and Abbas al-Musawi, who were being educated at the revered Shi’a seminaries in al-Najaf, Iraq, sought to penetrate and reform Amal’s secular outlook from within.  Faced with much inhospitality in Iraq due to the growing power of the Shi’a in Iran, these young clerics came back to Lebanon with a revolutionary fervor and commitment to 
   
                                                        180 Judith P. Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 22. 181 Norton, Hezbollah, 18.  182 Ibid., 22. 183 Ibid., 23.  184 Norton, Amal and the Shi’a, 105.  
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change their society.  Their agenda was further affirmed when Hussein Fadlallah, who was the most influential ‘alim’ in Lebanon, urged them to stray away from Amal’s de facto secularism and toward something approximating an Islamic system of rule.185 Wanting to eliminate the PLO and establish a pro-Israeli government in Beirut, Israel launched the “Peace for Galilee” operation on June 6th, 1982.  Augustus Norton, an expert on Lebanese politics, explains that within the Israeli government at the time, as within the American foreign policy establishment, there was little understanding of the developments under way among the Shi’a Muslims of Lebanon, and no analysis was made of the impact of this invasion on them.
  
186  Although the revolutionary Shi’a were pursuing a path of emulating Iran’s Islamic revolution, the invasion pushed the Shi’a further in this direction, creating conditions for the establishment of Hezbollah.  The former Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, stated in July 2006, “When we entered Lebanon…there was no Hezbollah.  We were accepted with perfumed rice and flowers by the Shi’a in the south.  It was our presence there that created Hezbollah.”187
 From 1982 through the mid 1980’s, Hezbollah was less an organization than a “cabal”
  Instead of swiftly withdrawing, Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon created an environment for Hezbollah to rapidly expand.   
188 or “a clandestine militia.”189                                                        185 Jamal Sankari, Fadlallah: The Making Of A Radical Shi'ite Leader (Saqi Books, 2005), 172.  
  Although the group was young and lacking in 
186 Norton, Hezbollah, 33. 187 Quoted in Norton, Hezbollah, 33. 188 Ibid., 34. 
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organization, it was committed and indeed effective.   Occupied Lebanon was plagued with deadly violence.  After the U.S. led agreement between Israel and the PLO, calling for the departure of all Palestinian fighters, including Yasser Arafat, a multinational force (MNF) led by U.S., French,  British, and Italian troops arrived in Lebanon in late August 1982 to provide stability.  Within three weeks of their arrival, Lebanese President Bashir al-Gemayyel was assassinated.  Two weeks later, the U.S. and other MNF participants mobilized additional forces.  However, instead of a peacekeeping force, their objective changed to assisting the new Lebanese government and army.  This new task charged to the MNF, as well as their heavy-handed presence, was not well received.   In its first operation on November 11, 1982, Hezbollah member, Sheikh Ahmad Qasir, drove a bomb-laden car into the Israeli Intelligence headquarters in the southern city of Tyre.  More than 75 Israeli officials and soldiers were killed.  In April of 1983, in what was perceived to be a direct statement by Hezbollah in opposition to the MNF, a suicide bomber struck the U.S. embassy in Beirut killing 63 people.  Although most western officials charge that Hezbollah was involved in this attack, many place the responsibility solely on Iran.190
                                                                                                                                                                     189 Harik, Hezbollah, 2. 
  Robert Baer, a former CIA agent with extensive experience in Lebanon and in the middle east, has argued that Hezbollah was not involved:  “It’s not that Hezbollah is doing the terrorism out of Lebanon.  They didn’t do the U.S. Embassy in 1983 or the Marines.  It was the Iranians.  It’s a political issue [in the U.S.] because the Israelis want the Americans to 
190 Norton, Hezbollah, 71. 
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go after Hezbollah.”191
   Within a week of the al-Nabatiya incident, on October 23rd, two trucks loaded with explosives were driven into the Marine Corps and French Paratroopers barracks in Beirut.  For both the U.S. and France, this attack, killing 241 Americans and 58 Frenchmen, remains one of the deadliest in their history.  Although Hezbollah’s involvement remains an allegation, there is little question the attacks were carried out by Lebanese Shia militants under Iranian direction.   The October 1983 attack, along with the continuing violence throughout Lebanon, led Ronald Reagan to “redeploy” the marines by early 1984, and the MNF ceased to exist. 
  After a U.S. brokered agreement was signed on May 17th, 1983 by Israel and Lebanon, calling on Israel to withdraw back to the “security zones”, many Lebanese, tired of blood-shed, favored the agreement and hesitated to join or support the resistance.  Five months later on October 16th, an Israeli army patrol blundered into the small town of al-Nabatiya during a mass procession on Ashura and opened fire in an attempt to disperse the crowd.  Whatever the intent, the result left several Lebanese citizens dead.  This was a defining event in the sense that those sitting on the fence quickly threw their weight behind the resistance.  
 
II. The Open Letter Of 1985 And The Developments That Led To Its 
Irrelevance 
  The U.S. Department of State claims that Hezbollah was founded in 1982, but it could be argued that it did not become a cohesive organization until the mid-1980’s.  Prior to 1985, Hezbollah was a secretive organization, with no published ideology or 
                                                        191 Christian Science Monitor, July 7, 2003 cited in Norton, Hezbollah, 78. 
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identity.  The original cadre did not want to participate in the official Lebanese political system, since this might divert the movement from promoting the resistance activities.192  Deputy Secretary Naim Qassem stated that Hezbollah avoided political activity at the time because of the need to organize its ranks, to consolidate the movement, and to protect itself from infiltration by Israeli intelligence.193  By 1985 the leadership within Hezbollah began to see the harm in remaining secretive in their operations.194  Wanting to show its transparency, Hezbollah’s leaders published an open letter addressed to the “Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World” that put forth their founding principles and organizational structure.195  Providing a framework for Hezbollah’s outlook on the world, the letter declared that the world is divided between the oppressed and the oppressors, with the latter struggling for influence at the expense of the Third World.196  It highlighted the “misguidance and ignorance” of Western ideas, and the “progression and creativity” that Islam can bring.197  Domestically, it stated the need to eradicate foreign corruption by “the final departure of America, France, and their allies from Lebanon and the termination of the influence of any imperialist power in the country.”198 One of the main burdens of the letter was to explain and justify Hezbollah’s use                                                           192 Eitan Azani, Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God (Palgrave Macmillian, 2008), 141. 193 Ibid., 141. 194 Harik, Hezbollah, 66. 195  “An Open Letter:  The Hizbollah Program,” The Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 48, (Fall 1988): 15.  http://www.standwithus.com/pdfs/flyers/hezbollah_program.pdf. 196 Translation in Norton, Amal and the Shi’a, 178. 197 Ibid., 184.  198 Ibid., 173.  
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of violence, which the West trivialized as “a handful of fanatics and terrorists who are only concerned with blowing up drinking, gambling, and entertainment spots.”199  They then positioned themselves as a force of resistance against Israel’s occupation of Lebanon and Palestine stating, “Israel’s final departure from Lebanon is a prelude to its final obliteration from existence and the liberation of venerable Jerusalem from the talons of occupation.”200 Although the letter was precise on the movement’s friends and enemies, it remained ideologically ambiguous and never stated the movement’s intended political design for Lebanon.  Not hiding its “commitment to the rule of Islam,” Hezbollah advocated the “adoption of the Islamic system on the basis of free and direct selection by the people, not the basis of forceful imposition, as some people imagine.”
  
201  It also stated, that once Lebanon was free “the Lebanese will be allowed to determine their fate; if they choose freely, they will choose Islam.”202 The letter was conveniently published during a triumphal time in Lebanon, as political and military successes had led to the humiliating departure of the American marines and an Israeli withdrawal from most of Lebanese territory.  By January 1985, a month later, the celebrating ceased when Israel decided to position its forces in its self-declared “security zone”, becoming a magnet for Hezbollah attacks.
   
203 Not deviating from the militant tone of the open letter, Hezbollah moved                                                           199 Ibid., 170. 200 Ibid., 173. 201 Norton, Amal and the Shi’a, 175.  202 Norton, Hezbollah, 39. 203 Augustus Norton, “The Future of Civil Society in the Middle East,” Middle East 
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aggressively in the mid-to late 1980’s.  Groups linked to Hezbollah, if not directly controlled by the party, began to kidnap foreigners.  Perhaps the most infamous act during this period was the June 1985 high-jacking of TWA flight 847 orchestrated by Imad Mughniyah, an individual associated with Hezbollah’s External Security Organization until his assassination in 2008.  Imad was driven by the fate of 766 Lebanese prisoners who were being held in Israel’s Atlit prison and suffering from extremely difficult conditions without recourse to the protections of international law.204
 At the end of the decade, numerous events, including the end of the Lebanese civil war and the last days of the Cold War, began to change the outlook of Hezbollah, and notably the Iranian-Hezbollah relationship.  Although Hezbollah was highly influenced and funded by Iran throughout the 1980’s, Iran focused on restoring a post-revolutionary and post-Gulf War Iran, prompting it to distance itself from Hezbollah.   
  The crisis finally ended when Israel quietly released the Lebanese prisoners from the Atlit prison.  Another notable event during this time was the February 1988 kidnapping of U.S. Marine Corps Colonel William R. Higgins.  While Higgins was serving with the UN forces in he south, he was taken captive by a group known as the “Believers’ Resistance,” a group with ties to Hezbollah, and eventually murdered.   
 Through the 1980’s Hezbollah refused to participate in the Lebanese political system due to political corruption.  But by the 1990’s, in contrast to the 1985 open letter, Hezbollah had decided to engage the Lebanese political arena.  This change                                                         204 Norton, Hezbollah, 42. 
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was prompted due to the attitudes and aspirations of its growing domestic constituency, mostly consisting of an expanding Shi’a middle class.   Although admiring Hezbollah’s relative veracity and dissatisfaction with Amal’s blatant corruption, this broadened constituency made known that it did not want to live in an Islamic Republic.  Observing the benefits of having a place at the table of government, Hezbollah withdrew its goal of establishing an Islamic State, and has characterized the open letter as “obsolete and no longer an authoritative guide.”205  After a number of high-ranking officials in Hezbollah were interviewed on al-Jazeera TV in September 1998, the conclusion made was that “the open letter belonged to a certain historical moment that had passed.”206   
III. “Rules Of The Game,” The 2000 Israeli Withdrawal, and Hezbollah’s 
Political Entry  
  By 1990, Keeping with the 1989 Ta’if Accord, all the militias in Lebanon, except for Hezbollah, agreed to disband.  Hezbollah justified maintaining its arms on the grounds it was a “resistance movement,” aimed at ending Israel’s occupation and defending the country against the Israel-sponsored SLA (South Lebanon Army), not a militia.  With many in Lebanon, especially in the south, seeing the Israeli occupation as an impediment to the country’s recovery and seeing the Lebanese army as too weak or ineffective to push Israel out, Hezbollah’s position was widely 
                                                        205 Norton, Hezbollah, 46. 206 Joseph Elie Alagha, The Shifts in Hizbullah's Ideology:  Religious Ideology, Political 
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accepted.207 During the 1990’s practical “rules of the game” emerged between the Hezbollah-led resistance forces and Israel and the SLA.
   
208  Israel would not attack civilian targets in Lebanon, and the resistance would only attack the Security Zone.209   On July 25th 1993, Israel launched  “Operation Accountability” in response to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Hezbollah killing 5 IDF soldiers in the Security Zone.  Through aerial attacks, Israel targeted Shi’a towns and villages with the goal of disrupting civilian life, which disrupted the “rules of the game”.  This was designed to push the civilians out of the south in hopes that they would shift their support away from Hezbollah.  After a U.S. brokered cease-fire, Israel and Hezbollah agreed to a temporary reduction in violence and the exclusion of civilian attacks.  Although both held to the agreement for a time, the agreement collapsed in 1996 after Hezbollah fired katyusha rockets into Israel in retaliation for a roadside bomb explosion that caused the death of a 14-year old Lebanese boy and injured three others in the village of Barashi.210  In response to the rockets, coupled with the campaign season, the IDF launched “Operation Grapes of Wrath” on April 11, 1993, intended to undermine popular support for Hezbollah among the Lebanese, as well as prompt Syria to rein in the organization.211
                                                        207 Ibid., 40-41. 
  The strategy failed, mainly because of the horrific massacre at Qana.  Among the 300,000 to 500,000 
208 Norton, Hezbollah, 83.  209 For a more detailed account of this time peridou see Daniel Sobelman, New Rules 
of the Game: Israel and Hizballah after the Withdrawal from Lebanon (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2004). 210 Norton, Hezbollah, 84, citing a 1996 UNIFIL report and a 1996 Amnesty International report.  211 Ibid. 
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residents who were seeking refuge from the barrage of Israeli missiles, some took cover at the U.N. base in Qana – a protected zone under international law.  Instead of finding safety, 106 civilians were killed by Israeli artillery that came pouring down on the U.N. base.  Not only did a U.N. and Amnesty International report find the attack intentional, but also the UN Secretary-General military adviser stated that the shelling of the UNIFL site was not accidental.212   “No incident in recent memory has inspired more hatred for the Jewish state than the Qana attack.”213 Following this horrific event, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher brokered an agreement that followed the same rules as the 1993 agreement.  Progressing past the oral agreement of 1993, this agreement was committed to paper, though neither party ever actually signed it.  One exceptionally critical point about these negotiations was that Israel never challenged the right of Hezbollah to attack its soldiers in Lebanon, thus conceding that the IDF was an occupation force in the country.  Further, the agreement committed both sides to refrain from attacking civilians and launching attacks from civilian areas.
  
214
 One notable observation during this period was Hezbollah’s apology in November 1998 for the katyusha firing, stating it had never authorized the firing and condemned the act.  Also, it should be emphasized that the resistance 
  A U.S.-led monitoring group oversaw the implementation of the agreement, which operated effectively in policing and reinforcing the “rules of the game” from 1996 to 2000.   
                                                        212 See UN Security Council document S/1996/137, May 7, 1996.  See also Amnesty International, “Unlawful Killings during Operation ‘Grapes of Wrath,’” July 1996, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE15/042/1996, (accessed January 30, 2010). 213 Norton, Hezbollah, 85. 214 Ibid., 85.  
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operations carried out by Hezbollah were targeted against Israeli soldiers and the SLA, not against civilians.  The twelve suicide attacks launched by Hezbollah were all targeted against the occupation forces and their allies - all legitimate resistance targets.215 The “rules of the game” were not always honored.  Usually if a resistance attack against Israel resulted in the death of an Israeli soldier, Israel’s disproportionate response would result in the “accidental” death of civilians.  Hezbollah did well to move within the “rules of the game,” leaving Israeli soldiers frustrated.  Adopting a “shoot first and ask questions later” policy, civilians were regularly killed; a total of five hundred Lebanese and Palestinian civilians were killed between Israel’s invasion and withdrawal in 2000.  This number is 30 times the number of Israeli civilian fatalities during this time.
   
216 This period was also marked by indirect Israeli-Hezbollah negotiations, usually through UNIFEL or a European state.  In 1996, in return for the bodies of two IDF and 17 SLA soldiers, Israel released 45 detainees and the remains of 123 Lebanese.  In 1998, another notable exchange involving the body of Hadi Nasrallah, the son of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hasan Nasarallah, was completed.  
      
 When General Ehud Barak was elected prime minister of Israel in 1999, he promised he would withdraw from Lebanon within 12 months.  After attempting bilateral negotiations with Syria, accompanied by President Clinton, the 
                                                        215 Ibid., 85.  216 Ibid., 87.  
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negotiations failed.217  These failed negotiations began to cause speculation that Israel might unilaterally withdrawal from Lebanon.  Fear of mass chaos, including “the slaughter of collaborators and bloody vendettas,” began to overcome Beirut and Damascus. 218
 Following the Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah’s leaders began to debate whether the movement should focus on Lebanese politics, or maintain the resistance posture both in Lebanon and in the Middle East.  After internal party discussions, and Nasrallah consulting with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, they chose the latter strategy.  This resistance was to be aimed at Israel and its presence in the village of Shebaa, a disputed territory occupied by Israel.  Although Hezbollah maintained its resistance posture, the next 6 years, apart from harassing fire, aggressive patrolling, and heated rhetoric by both sides, was a relatively quiet, peaceful time by historical standards.
  Hasan Nasarallah began to play politician, sending out clear analysis and calm assurances of Hezbollah’s preparation for the withdrawal, and condemning revenge attacks or retaliatory killings.  During this period, Hezbollah settled on a position of calculated and modest ambiguity concerning the Israeli withdrawal, never stating its intentions after the occupiers left.  On May 24, 2000, Israel withdrew after 22 years of occupying Lebanon, and the country remained remarkably calm.  
219
                                                        217 William Quandt, Peace Process:  American Diplomacy And The Arab-Israeli Conflict 
Since 1967 (University of California Press, 2005), 328.  
  This 6-year period was an important time as both parties understood the “rules of the game,” and stability across the hostile border was observed to be possible.   Obtaining much support during this time, Hezbollah was seen to be a 
218 Norton, Hezbollah, 89. 219 Ibid., 91.  
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crucial and effective means to deter another Israeli invasion, giving it a viable platform in the political arena.    When the civil war in Lebanon finally ended in 1990, elections had not been held for 18 years, and only about two-thirds of the 1975 Chamber of Deputies survived the bloody war.  After an unpopular, Syrian influenced, transitional step of parliamentary appointments in 1991, which filled 40 seats, the first post-civil war elections were finally held in 1992.   These elections posed a difficult question for Hezbollah:  Should it adhere to its previous denunciation of the confessional electoral system as corrupt and reject participation, or change directions and contest the elections?  Although the majority of Hezbollah’s leaders had rejected participation throughout the 1980’s, one of the most influential Shi’a clerics in Lebanon, Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, had been arguing for years that a revolutionary transition to Islamic rule in Lebanon was impossible given the state’s diverse society, and therefore a gradual restructuring and increased participation would be required.220  Another Lebanese cleric, the late Shaikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, president of the Supreme Islamic Shi’a Council from 1978 to 2001, told Augustus Norton in a 1997 interview that it was necessary for Islamist parties to take into account the power of contending secular forces.  Shams al-Din emphasized that political compromises are often necessary.221 Debated by 12 leading members, including Na’im Qassem, Nasrallah, and Subi al-Tufayli, the questions at hand were:  Was participation in a “non-Islamic” government legitimate?  Should ideology bend to practical interests?  And would 
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Hezbollah, by its participation, be co-opted into a secular political system, thereby abandoning its principles and Islamic vision?222  In the end, with the blessing from Ali Khamenei to participate, 10 of 12 members embraced the idea of running for office.  Seeing the benefits of gaining official recognition as a political institution in Lebanon, a public podium, and the means to influence the budget to its constituents’ advantage, Nasrallah announced on July 3, 1992 that the party would compete in that summer’s elections.223 In the 1992 elections, Hezbollah and its allies won 12 seats in the Lebanese parliament, including eight Shi’a seats.  Since this election, Hezbollah has routinely won around 10 percent of all parliamentary seats.  Notably, one of Hezbollah’s attractions is it avoids religious themes in its political campaigns, and focuses on economic exploitation and under development, inequities in the political system, personal freedom and opportunity, and, most of all, security.
 
224 In the 1996 elections, Hezbollah performed well, stressing its crucial role in protecting the country. Campaign posters read:  “They [Israel] resist with their blood, resist with your vote.”
  
225
                                                        222 Qassem, Hizbollah. 
  In the 2000 elections, Hezbollah formed an alliance with Amal – the Resistance and Development Bloc – winning all 23 available seats in southern Lebanon and more than a quarter of all seats in parliament.  This momentum carried through to the 2005 elections, where Hezbollah won 11% of the parliamentary seats, and the Resistance and Development Bloc won 27% of the 
223 Norton, Hezbollah, 101. 224 Ibid., 102. 225 Ibid., 102.  
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seats nationwide.226 Hezbollah’s political achievements, social services, and security attracted much support from the Shi’a in the southern Lebanon.  But after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, Lebanese officials and citizens began to increase pressure on Hezbollah to disarm.  Yet, Hezbollah refused, claiming it was the only legitimate force capable of defending Lebanon against an Israeli invasion.  Observing the movement’s military stature and growing arsenal, most supporters were convinced that it could, in fact, repel a foreign invasion, or at least resist more effectively than the Lebanese national army.  In July 2006, Hezbollah had to substantiate its claims as it entered a 34-day war with Israel.   
  
 
IV. The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah Conflict  Tensions began to increase in November 2005 when Hezbollah attempted to capture several Israeli soldiers to trade for Lebanese prisoners.  In May of 2006, Hezbollah fired on an Israeli border post, wounding an Israeli soldier.  Within the “rules of the game”, Israel would normally shell a few Hezbollah positions and command and control centers.  Instead, Israel opted for a larger, more punishing operation, shelling 20 Hezbollah positions.  Hezbollah responded again by launching eight, very inaccurate Katyusha rockets at Safad, home to the Israeli army’s northern headquarters.     The proximate catalyst was the dramatic and extremely successful operation carried out by Hezbollah on July 12, 2006.  Hezbollah militants ambushed a                                                         226 Angus Reid Global Monitor: Election Tracker. http://www.angus reid.com/tracker/view/6962, (accessed January 30, 2011). 
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motorized Israeli patrol in an unpopulated area of northern Israel on its border with Lebanon,227 and captured two Israeli soldiers and killed three others.  After the IDF pursued the militants into Lebanon, five more soldiers were killed.  Although Hezbollah expected an Israeli response, the July 13th Israeli retaliation showed that Nasrallah had made a major miscalculation, a statement he eventually admitted.228 On July 13th Israel destroyed 59 stationary rocket launchers concealed in the homes of Hezbollah activists.  This initial attack proved Israel to be firing with relative precision and intelligence as only 20 Lebanese civilians were killed, a small number compared to their past record.
   
229
 By July 14th Lebanon was blockaded from the sea, the Beirut airport was damaged, and Nasrallah’s offices had been bombed.  In response, Nasrallah instructed his listeners on the radio to look towards the sea, making perfect theatrical timing as an Iranian-produced C-802 Noor guided missile struck an Israeli naval vessel, killing four of its sailors.  Just as Nasrallah was surprised with Israel’s response, this attack surprised Israel in how well Hezbollah was prepared.
  Unfortunately, this precision quickly faded, and the civilian casualties began to multiply.     
230
                                                        227 The majority of sources used by this author state this operation happened in northern Israel, yet the exact location is unknown.  
  This became even more evident after Hezbollah struck the city of Haifa on July 16th with longer-range rockets provided by Syria and Iran.  By the end of the war, Israel realized its miscalculation, as one Israeli Brigadier, General Guy Zur, described 
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Hezbollah as “by far the greatest guerrilla group in the world.”231 Israel’s strategy was centered on creating a “killing box.”         232  Relying on its air power, Israel targeted roads, bridges, seaports, and airports throughout Lebanon, cutting off re-supply routes for Hezbollah.  It also struck Hezbollah’s television station, al-Manar, repeatedly, but strangely enough, the station was never interrupted.  The population in southern Lebanon was forced to flee to relative safety, many taking refuge in schools or parking garages.  Part of the “killing box” strategy was to clear out the civilians, as Israel not only struck gasoline stations but food stores as well.  This “killing box” strategy is also defined as collective punishment, a war crime under the fourth Geneva Convention.233 The day after Hezbollah struck Haifa, Prime Minister Olmert addressed the Knesset stating his goals:  the return of the two captured soldiers, a complete cease- fire, the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south, and the expulsion of Hezbollah from the south.
 
234  The Israeli government was confident it could eliminate Hezbollah entirely, and it tried to make this known to Washington frequently.  One Israeli official promised President Bush a “quick and decisive”235 result, and told Condoleezza Rice,  “You did it in 70 days [in Kosovo], but we need half of that.”236                                                        231 USA Today, September 14, 2006, cited in Norton, Hezbollah, 140.  
   
232 Norton, Hezbollah, 137. 233 The Fourth Geneva Convention defines collective punishment as the punishment of a group of people as a result of the behavior of one or more other individuals or groups. The punished group may often have no direct association with the other individuals or groups, or direct control over their actions. 234 Ibid., 139. 235 Ibid., 139. 236 Hersh, “Annals of National Security,” 31. 
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 Israel’s goal of completely eliminating Hezbollah was soon to be seen as wishful thinking, and at the expense of over a thousand civilians.  On July 30th, Israel’s international support faded quickly after it again bombed the village of Qana, killing 28 civilians, including 16 children.237
 On August 11th 2006, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1701, which was shaped by the “Seven Point Plan” previously proposed by Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora.  The following day the Lebanese cabinet, including two Hezbollah ministers, unanimously approved the cease-fire.  Shortly after the vote, Siniora gave a speech to the Lebanese parliament praising Hezbollah and highlighted, “the perseverance of Hezbollah fighters” and their vital role in Lebanon.
  By mid-August 2006 a UN and Lebanon-brokered cease-fire was in place, Israel and the U.S. were forced to dramatically scale back their demands and expectations for the war’s outcome, and southern Lebanon lay in ruins. 
238
 What was projected to be an easy Israeli victory and elimination of Hezbollah from southern Lebanon, at least by the U.S. and Israel, ended up being a lose-lose war that caused an enormous amount of damage and the unnecessary death of over a thousand civilians.  The war demonstrated that Israel, and the majority of the rest of the world, was unaware of Hezbollah’s capabilities.  Moreover, the war demonstrated that Israel and the U.S. had minimal understanding of Lebanon’s 
  Following this speech, Nasrallah announced that Hezbollah, being part of the Lebanese government, would hold to its part of the agreement.    
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politics.    By the end of the 34-day war, half the population of northern Israel was displaced (500,000 people) and most of the civilian population of southern Lebanon was displaced (900,000 people, or one-quarter of Lebanon’s population).  Material losses were also high, totaling $500 million in Israel and about $4 billion in Lebanon.  But the most disturbing number was the amount of civilians killed.  At the end of the war 43 Israeli civilians and 1,109 Lebanese civilians had been killed.239 Although there was no unequivocal winner, many would grant the victory to Hezbollah.  Hezbollah competed well with the highly revered IDF, and was by no means eliminated.  Hezbollah actually emerged stronger and with greater support from the Lebanese community.  Capitalizing on the destruction in southern Lebanon, including 900 factories and 15,000 homes severely damaged or destroyed,
   
240 Hezbollah responded rapidly to the needs of civilians.  One Lebanese shopkeeper reported receiving $1,000 for redeemed IOUs that Hezbollah fighters had left during the war.241  More astonishing was that Hezbollah paid $10,000 to $12,000 to each of the 15,000 homeless families in southern Lebanon, and distributed about 25 thousand free meals.242
                                                        239 Norton, Hezbollah, 142. 
  Although the 2006 conflict was devastating for all parties involved, Hezbollah increased its legitimacy within the Lebanese government, gained further domestic support through its post-war aid, and further justified its militant posture by cooperating with the Lebanese army, 
240 BBC, “Middle East Crisis:  Facts and Figures,” August, 31, 2006, accessed September 28, 2011, http//news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5257128.stm. 241 Reinoud Leenders, “How the Rebel Regained His Cause:  Hizbullah & the Sixth Arab-Israeli War,” MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies 6, 2006, 46. 242 Norton, Hezbollah, 142. 
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since half of the army consisted of Shi’a, and by displaying its ability to protect Lebanon from further attacks. 
 
V. Hezbollah Today  At the end of the 2006 war, Hezbollah enjoyed an abundance of international support.   At home, Hezbollah began to increase its work within the community, capitalizing on its strong post-war support.  Social services and public works is a notable feature of Hezbollah, yet is unknown to most in the U.S. and other countries in the West.  Based in a community plagued with poverty and war, Hezbollah provides much for the struggling families in southern Lebanon.  The Lebanese government offers extremely poor social services, and what is offered is mainly distributed in Beirut.  This system offers little to the southern Lebanese, causing them to turn to other means.    Hezbollah offers an array of social services, including construction companies, schools, hospitals, dispensaries, news organizations, and banking institutions.243 Hezbollah’s most effective banking institution is al-Qard al-Hasan, meaning the “good loan”, which offers 750 small loans a month.244
                                                        243 See “Lebanon: The Many Hands and Faces of Hezbollah,” UN Office for  
  Although these services are concentrated in the south and predominantly Shi’a areas, many of Hezbollah’s services meet the needs of anyone that needs help.  Hezbollah’s medical services, including three hospitals and twelve health centers, treats all walk-in patients, regardless of political views, religion or race.  The movement also provides free 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, March 29, 2006. 244 Norton, Hezbollah, 110. 
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health coverage and prescription-drug coverage.  Educationally, Hezbollah’s Education Unit operates a number of primary and secondary schools at extremely low costs.245 One of the largest organizations created by Hezbollah is Jihad al-Bina Development Organization, which was responsible for the reconstruction and repair of southern Lebanon after the Israeli attacks in 1993, 1996, and 2006.
   
246
 Hezbollah not only meets the basic needs of the southern population, which is ignored by the national government, it provides well.  One Shi’a in southern Lebanon said, “there are no needy people in al-Dayhiya”, explaining that the rich fabric of social and charitable organizations meet the needs of people who would otherwise be impoverished.
  This organization, along with other Hezbollah oriented organizations, promptly met the needs of the 15,000 displaced families following the 2006 war, displaying the competence and professionalism that has won much of its support from the Lebanese Shi’a.  Other notable Hezbollah-led organizations are the Hezbollah Women’s Committee and the Islamic Health Committee.   
247  Today, Hezbollah is the country’s largest and most dependable providers of social services.248 Politically, Hezbollah knows the game well, maneuvering through “a patchwork of competing sectarian and personal interests, joined only by fraying threads of national identity.”
 
249                                                        245 Flanigan, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad,” 3-4. 
  Following the 2006 war, Hezbollah began to call for 
246 Azani, Hezbollah, 116. 247 Norton, Hezbollah, 111. 248 Flanigan, “Hezbollah’s Social Jihad,” 8.  249 Norton, Hezbollah, 171. 
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the establishment of a “National Unity Government”, which would have entailed the movement and its allies obtaining one-third of the cabinet positions and veto power within the Lebanese government.  After Prime Minister Fouad Siniora and the ruling coalition dismissed these demands, Hezbollah and its allies sparked the “Lebanese Revolt”, which consisted of large-scale protests and sit-ins.  A dead lock soon arose and so did violence.  After the Lebanese government shut down Hezbollah’s extensive fiber-optic communications network, an integral part of the movement’s security infrastructure, Hezbollah blocked off the airport.  It became evident that the government was not going to be able to return to the status quo.  The United States had always clung to the “politically convenient fiction that a consensus government (with an attendant role for Hezbollah) could be avoided.”250
 After a grueling 34-day war, Hezbollah emerged even stronger, competing well with the IDF and proving its abilities to its constituents.  Its performance during the June war shocked not only Israeli officials, but Washington as well, dismantling their misguided approach of solving the  “Hezbollah problem” with force.  
  But after seeing the realities on the ground in May 2008, the U.S. grudgingly supported the effort by the Emir of Qatar to mediate the negotiations that would lead to a consensus government that included Hezbollah.  On May 21st, 2008, the Doha Agreement was signed and a consensus government was created in which the opposition would hold an effective veto.  This was a significant victory for Hezbollah and the opposition bloc, obtaining a broad role within the Lebanese political arena.    
 In 2007, further substance was given to the argument that Hezbollah is more                                                         250 Norton, Hezbollah, 170. 
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capable of defending the country than the national army.  In May of 2007, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) was tested when Fatah al-Islam (FAI), a Sunni extremist group based in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp near Tripoli, attacked an LAF unit killing several soldiers.  The LAF responded forcefully, but the FAI put up a fierce resistance that ended up lasting over three months and killed 168 soldiers.  The LAF enjoyed great public support during the fighting, but its insufficient capabilities were on display for all to see.  At the early stages of the fighting, the LAF actually ran out of ammunition, and was able to continue only because the U.S. airlifted it more supplies.251 In June of 2007, another Sunni militant group set off a roadside bomb that ended up killing six UNIFL peacekeepers.  Although UNIFEL had been charged with the task of ensuring that Hezbollah would not reconstitute an armed presence adjacent to the Israeli-Lebanese border, the June attack prompted several of the national military contingents in UNIFL to quietly bolster informal liaison arrangements with Hezbollah in order to benefit from its “well-oiled intelligence network” and enlist its help in forestalling future militant attacks.
   
252  This reliance on Hezbollah also stemmed from an April 2008 comment from Al-Qaeda’s new leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, calling for attacks on “Crusaders and Jews,” specifically including UNIFEL.253
                                                        251 Norton, Hezbollah, 164. 
  The UNIFL-Hezbollah alliance and al-Zawahiri’s statement is a clear example that the grouping of Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda together is a false political construction.    
252 Ibid., 165. 253 Ibid. 
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 The Hezbollah disarmament debate continues in Lebanon, but events like those discussed above and other actions by the Lebanese government have continued to legitimize Hezbollah as a national resistance movement.  For example, in the November 2009 “Policy Declaration” the Lebanese government publicly supported Hezbollah’s resistance against Israel’s occupation.  The declaration stated:   It is the right of the Lebanese people, Army and the Resistance to liberate the Shebaa Farms, the Kfar Shuba Hills and the northern part of the village of Ghajar as well as to defend Lebanon and its territorial waters in the face of any enemy by all available and legal means.254   With the national government publicly supporting Hezbollah along with its continued status as the only force capable of defending Lebanon, Hezbollah will remain a dominant force in the country and will more than likely not disarm.  Hezbollah is an organization that encompasses a large network of social services, a large foothold within the national government, and an impressive military and intelligence unit.  It has proven that it cannot be easily destroyed by force, and that it will only be recognized as a legitimate political organization so long as it maintains its resistance wing.  Moreover, Hezbollah shows no signs of disappearing and will be an important part of the future, constructive or not.  Current U.S. policy makers need to appreciate this reality, and approach the crucial state of Lebanon with a strategy that includes all parties.  This comprehensive approach will require the removal of Hezbollah from the U.S. FTO list.   The next chapter examines the current FTO designation process and its                                                         254 Franklin Lamb, “Lebanon ‘accepts’ Hezbollah’s weapons,” Aljazeera Magazine, December 2, 2009. 
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political nature, the criteria for designation, and other notable cases of designation in efforts to assess the accuracy of Hezbollah’s FTO designation.            
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Chapter 5   
The FTO Designation Process: Implications and Political 
Nature   During the 1980’s and 90’s, a shift in rhetoric began to fuse Islam and terrorism, producing an idea that terrorism can only be terrorism when the element of Islam is present.  Although the majority of terrorist attacks during this time period were carried out by Puerto Ricans (76), followed by Jewish groups (16), right-wing groups (6), and then Muslims (5),255 the latter group was constructed to be the most radical and dangerous threat.  Immediately after the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City, numerous “terrorism experts” within the corporate media were linking Arabs, Muslims, and Middle Easterners to the explosion.256  After it was known a white American from New York committed the attacks, a New York Times reporter asserted that although the Oklahoma massacre was the work of American terrorists, “most other attacks against Americans came from the Middle East.”257
 This linkage has contributed to a change in the meaning of terrorism, used with emotionally charged language and politically driven motives.   The process of labeling a terrorist organization is too often driven by the political climate and not 
  This neatly framed report was among many that contributed to the linking of Islam and “terrorism.”   
                                                        255 Federal Bureau of Investigation. Terrorist Research and Analytical Section. 1995. 256 For example:  CBS Evening News, 19 April 1995; New York Times, 20 April 1995; 
Washington Post, 20 April 1995; and the International Herald Tribune, 26 April 1995. 257 A.M. Rosenthal, “Things America Can Do to Curtail Terrorism, Domestic and Foreign,” New York Times, April 1995. Cited in Fawaz Gerges, “Islam and Muslims in the Mind of America,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 588, no. 73, (2003): 73-87. 
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actual intelligence.  Counterterrorism is a critical element of U.S. law enforcement and should be focused on actual, imminent threats.  This chapter analyzes the FTO designation process and its political nature, investigating if Hezbollah’s designation is still accurate.     
I. Defining Terrorism, FTO Designation Criteria, And Legal Ramifications 
  The term terrorism is one of varying definitions.  With differing perspectives and ideologies, establishing an agreed upon definition on the international stage has proven to be impossible.  Some governments, although vague and open to interpretation, have stated their official definition of terrorism, but many have been unwilling to commit to defining the term.  These vague definitions, or absence of definitions, can create political complications.   Without a clear set of criteria, the decision to label an individual or an organization a terrorist becomes completely subjective depending upon whether one sympathizes with the individual, group, or cause being addressed.258 Since this thesis is investigating U.S. policy, it will focus on the definitions of the U.S. government.  Yet, even when one focuses only on the U.S. government’s definition, the same inconsistencies found on the international stage are seen between the numerous U.S. government agencies.  A 2003 U.S. Army report cited a 1988 study, which identified 109 separate definitions of terrorism.
   
259
                                                        258 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 32. 
  Each agency 
259 Jeffrey Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, December 01, 2003), 6 
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has its own objectives and authorities, producing differing usages of language within each definition.    Complicating this issue further, the U.S. government not only has differing language between its agencies, but has several different “terrorists lists”.  This includes the “State Sponsors of Terrorism” list, the “Specially Designated Terrorists”  list, the “Specially Designated Global Terrorists” list, the “Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons” list—a master list that contains the other lists - the “Terrorist Exclusion List,”  the “Foreign Terrorist Organization” list, and the newly formed “Foreign Terrorist  Organization of Global Reach” list.  Since the FTO list is the primary U.S. government resource in designating foreign terrorists organizations, this list is the focus of this thesis.  Further, the FTO list is unique in that it authorizes specific measures to be legally carried out against a designated group and simultaneously serves as a symbolic tool for U.S. foreign policy.   Analyzing the FTO designation process, this thesis focuses on the criteria used during FTO designation under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  Provided by section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, “terrorism” is defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.”  Provided by section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA, “terrorist activity” is defined as “Any activity which is unlawful under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State) and which involves any of the following: 
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(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including aircraft, vessel, or vehicle.)    (II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or detained.    (III) A violent act upon an internationally protected person (as defined in section 1116(b)(4) of title 18, U.S.C.) or upon the liberty of such a person.    (IV) An assassination.    (V) The use of any: (a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or (b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.    (VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.  Since these definitions are used during the FTO designation process, these are the definitions that will be used to assess the applicability of the designation to Hezbollah.  The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which amended section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),260
1. The organization must be foreign.  
 was signed into law in order to "deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, provide for an effective death penalty, and for other purposes." Further, the AEDPA provided the Secretary of State authorization to designate an organization as a “foreign terrorist organization” (FTO) if the following legal criteria are met:  
  2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined by section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA, or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the                                                         260 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(1), 110 Stat. 1214, 1247 (1996) [AEDPA]. 
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Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.    3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests) of the United States.   If the Secretary of State decides an organization meets the above criteria, he or she may add the organization to the FTO list by informing Congress and publishing a notice in the Federal Register.261
An FTO may file a petition for revocation 2 years after its designation date (or in the case of redesignated FTOs, its most recent redesignation date) or 2 years after the determination date on its most recent petition for revocation.  In order to provide a basis for revocation, the petitioning FTO must provide evidence that the circumstances forming the basis of the designation are sufficiently different as to warrant revocation.  If no such review has been conducted during a five-year period with respect to designation, then the Secretary of State is required to review the designation to determine whether revocation would be appropriate.
  When first put into practice, a designation lasted for two years and then had to be reviewed and re-designated.  But in 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) replaced this requirement by explicit review and revocation procedures. The IRTPA states: 
262  Further, the Secretary of State can remove an organization from the FTO list at any time if he or she feels the reasons for its designation have changed.   When an organization is assigned to the FTO list, numerous legal ramifications ensue.  Once an organization is designated, the Treasury Department can block financial transactions, directly affecting its assets.263                                                        261 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “The “FTO” List and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” Congressional Research Service (CRS): CRS Report for Congress, RL32120, October 2003, 2. 
  The designation also enables 
262 United States Department of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) Fact 
Sheet (Office of Counterterrorism, October 11, 2005) 263 Ibid.,18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(2). 
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the Justice Department to prosecute anyone who violates these sanctions, providing material support or resources to the designated organization.264  Further, Homeland Security is given the ability to conduct immigration sanctions and deportations of any person affiliated with a designated group.265    
II. Political Nature   Since its inception, the FTO designation process has become increasingly vulnerable to the prevailing political winds.  As discussed above, the IRTPA of 2004 amended the original law, further centralizing the designation process.  The amendment placed numerous restrictions on the judicial branch’s ability to review the designations, and gave the executive branch the ability to designate the organization of its choice without review from other branches, effectively eliminating the crucial democratic element of checks and balances.   With the enactment of these laws the list has an enormous potential for misuse and abuse, "emerging as a handy tool to suppress dissent, dissuade Americans from backing insurrectionary movements overseas, and deport immigrants tied to the groups.”266  The State Department can effectively tie an organization to one end or another of the “axis of evil” almost on a whim, whether they are an Al-Qaeda-style terrorist group or a group engaged in a civil war or liberation struggle.267
                                                        264 Ibid., 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). 
  Nancy Chang of the Center for Constitutional Rights points out, “foreign policy interests often determine who is added [to the FTO list] and who is not.  And once a group is on the list, it’s 
265 Ibid., 8 U.S.C.S. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (LexisNexis 2008). 266 Robert Dreyfuss, “Colin Powell’s List,” The Nation, (March 2002): 16. 267 Ibid. 
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just about impossible to be removed.  It’s a highly politicized process.”268 Adding to the political nature of the designation process, the criteria used to designate an organization is structured in extremely broad terms.  The primary reason the U.S. has not succeeded in convincing the other 191 countries to apply its “terrorist” designation to Hezbollah is these countries prefer a more precise conception of terrorism rather than the vague criteria of the U.S.  It should be noted that besides the U.S., only Britain, Canada, Australia, and Israel designate Hezbollah as a current terrorist organization.  Britain is the only country that recognizes the political wing of Hezbollah while still maintaining their terrorist label for the militant wing of Hezbollah.  Unlike the rest of the world, and these four other countries, the U.S. has set its criteria to be extremely vague; to the point one member of the organization can cause the whole organization to be designated for a one-time use of a “dangerous device”.
   
269
 The most problematic aspect of the process is the ability of one to use non-factual information as evidence to designate an organization.  A 1999 ruling in the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pointedly noted, “the law does nothing to prevent the Secretary of State from using gossip, innuendo, misinformation and disinformation in assembling the case against a group.”  When reviewing a case regarding the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), the court noted that the administrative record “consists entirely of hearsay, none of it 
   Further, the definition of “terrorist activity” listed above is extremely broad, in that it could be applied to traditional criminal activity.   
                                                        268 Ibid. 269 8 U.S.C.S. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)-(iv) (LexisNexis 2008). 
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was ever subjected to adversary testing, and there was no opportunity for counter-evidence by the organizations affected.”270
 Confining the designation process solely to the executive branch without proper checks and balances from other branches, structuring the designation criteria in broad terms, and allowing misinformation and disinformation to be included in the administrative record, the FTO designation process holds a tremendous amount of potential to be utilized as a political tool for the power elites. 
  This case demonstrates how the designation process was created so that even though the laws within the process are followed, an organization can be designated without evidence.  Simply stated, a group can be placed on the FTO list if the Secretary of State wants them on the list to further a political agenda.  
  
III. Notable Cases  Before the FTO list was ever created, its politicized nature was evident.  Seeing it as a means to weaken Arab and Islamic organizations that opposed the Oslo peace process, the pro-Israeli Anti-Defamation League quickly blasted Secretary of State Warren Christopher for “dragging his feet” in implementing the FTO list.271  The New 
Yorker reported that when Newt Gingrich, then Speaker of the House, heard Hamas and Hezbollah were not going to be added, he quickly utilized his influence within the lobby system, mounting enough pressure for the two to be designated.272
                                                        270 Dreyfuss, “Colin Powell’s List,” 19. 
  In 2001, when Hezbollah and Hamas did not make the new “FTO of Global Reach,” list, 
271 Ibid.17. 272 Ibid.  Along with Hamas and Hezbollah, 12 other Palestinian and Islamic groups were included in this additional designation.  
   89  
the Israeli lobby and pro-Israel Congressmen applied enough pressure on President Bush, even after Secretary Rumsfeld said this would be “redundant”, to include the two organizations.273 There are currently 47 organizations on the FTO list.  Many of these have been challenged, not only by the groups themselves, but also by U.S. officials.  One notable case was the designation of the Peoples Mujahedeen Organization of Iran (PMOI).  After it was designated in 1997, a senior government official said that the "inclusion of [PMOI on the FTO list] was intended as a goodwill gesture to Tehran and its newly elected moderate president.”
       
274  The PMOI quickly petitioned the D.C. Circuit to review its designation.  This petition was declined by the court, which was under heavy restrictions, basing its decision on the Secretary of State’s “political judgment.”275  The court recognized that "because nothing in the legislation restricts the Secretary of State from acting on the basis of third hand accounts, press stories, material on the Internet or other hearsay regarding the organization's activities, the 'administrative record' may consist of little else."276  In 1998, a majority of the House of Representatives signed a letter challenging the PMOI’s FTO designation.277
                                                        273 Norton, Hezbollah, 48. 
  Instead of fulfilling their request, the State Department re-designated the PMOI in 1999, and added the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a sister 
274 Norman Kempster, “U.S. Designates 30 Groups As Terrorists,” Los Angeles Times, October 9, 1997, A16. 275 Shapiro, “Politization of the Designation,” 4. 276 PMOI I, 182 F.3d at 18-19.  Cited in Ibid., 4. 277 Audrey Kurth Cronin, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Foreign Terrorist Organizations 67 (Feb. 6, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32223.pdf. Accessed October 20, 2011.  
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organization of the PMOI.278  In 2000, when asked why the State Department had decided to add NCRI to the list, Martin Indyk, former U.S. ambassador to Israel, stated, “the Iranian government had brought this to our attention.”279 Not only are organizations placed on the FTO list for political purposes, but also some who may fit the FTO criteria are left off. Two Pakistani-based groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammed, have been requested by some within the State Department to be added to the list.  After their assault on India’s parliament in 2003, Selig Harrison, director of the national security project for the Center for International Policy, voiced his concern saying, “They assassinated civilians, they assassinated police…they really are terrorists.”
 
280  But others within the State Department claimed that their designation would offend Pakistan and undermine President Musharraf.281
  
  The concern for the U.S. relationship with Musharraf ended up outweighing any evidence supporting their designation.   
IV. Evaluating the Accuracy of Hezbollah’s FTO Designation 
  When the first FTO list was published on October 8th 1997, 30 organizations were designated.  Hezbollah was included, but only after the exertion of Gingrich’s political pressure discussed earlier.282
                                                        278 See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112 (Oct. 8, 1999). 
  Hezbollah’s initial designation was justified by its role in the 1983 attacks on the U.S. embassy and marine barracks in Beirut, 
279 Dreyfuss, “Colin Powell’s List, 18. 280 Ibid.  281 Ibid.  282 U.S. Department of State. Office of the Coordination for Counterterrorism. 
Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997. Released April 1998. 
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the attack on the U.S. embassy annex in Beirut in 1984, and the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Argentina.       In the 2011 State Department publication Country Reports on Terrorism,283
 Also noted in the report are Hezbollah attacks against the IDF after Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000.  But if one applies the definitions of “terrorist activity” in section 212 (a) (3) (b) or “terrorism” in section 140 (d) (2) within the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, terrorism is defined as an “act against a non-combatant target.”  Clearly, the IDF is not a non-combatant target.  Additionally, the attacks were carried out in the Shebaa Farms region, an area that Hezbollah, and the rest of the members of the Lebanese national government claim as occupied territory.  Israel’s own Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert made the statement after an 
 Hezbollah’s inclusion on the FTO list is still justified by the 1983 bombing of the U.S. embassy and marine barracks, the 1985 high jacking of TWA flight 847, and its implication in the 1994 bombing of the Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) building in Buenos Aires.  In addition to these events, the report also states that Hezbollah is training and supporting Iraqi Shi’a militias in Iraq.  This allegation was made after a senior Hezbollah member, Ali Mussa Daqduq, was captured in 2007 by U.S. forces in Iraq while he was assessing Shi’a militia groups.  Yet, the report never states that these organizations were terrorist organizations, nor does it claim that their training was for the purposes of carrying out terrorist attacks.  Applying the above definitions and criteria, Hezbollah’s connection to these militias cannot serve as support for its FTO designation.  
                                                        283 U.S. Department of State. Office of the Coordination for Counterterrorism. 
Country Reports on Terrorism 2011. August 18, 2011. 
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attack in 2006 against IDF soldiers, “The events of this morning cannot be considered a terrorist strike; they are the acts of a sovereign state that has attacked Israel without cause.  The Lebanese government, which Hezbollah is a part of, is trying to upset regional stability.”284
 The resistance operations against Israel were further legitimized in the “Policy Declaration” of 2009, discussed earlier in chapter 3, which explains Hezbollah’s extensive role within the Lebanese government.  The document recognizes Hezbollah as a crucial part of the Lebanese Resistance against the Israeli occupation forces, and charges the movement with defending Lebanon from its enemies.    
  If the Israeli Prime Minister is stating these are not terrorist attacks, how can the State Department’s accusation regarding these attacks hold any validity? 
 When the U.S. State Department included Hezbollah on the 2011 FTO list, it was stating that Hezbollah is a current, active terrorist organization.  When utilizing the FTO designation criteria and definitions of the U.S. State Department, the accuracy of Hezbollah’s designation is flawed.  Explained above, Hezbollah’s involvement with the Shi’a militia’s in Iraq and its conflict with the IDF after it withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 cannot be used to designate Hezbollah a FTO.  The most recent activity that is used to designate Hezbollah on the FTO list is the 1985 high jacking of TWA flight 847.   Therefore, to label Hezbollah a current, active terrorist organization based on an event that occurred 26 years ago is not accurate.                                                             284 Harel, 34 Days, 75.  
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V. Current Threat?  The FTO list is re-evaluated every two years for good reason:  in the hopes that designated organizations may alter their behavior due to a change in leadership or objectives.  Since Hezbollah was first included on the FTO list in 1997, no sound evidence has been added to sustain its designation.  Discussed in the previous chapter, Hezbollah’s development into an active political organization that provides extensive social services has only moved it further away from the designation criteria.  Yet its designation remains, and the accusations that landed it on the list have only become more insistent throughout the past two decades.  Notably, not one Congressional resolution mentioned Hezbollah in the 1980’s, when it was engaging in more resistance activities, but in March of 2005, 17 years after the last U.S. government defined Hezbollah sponsored terrorist attack, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution, by an overwhelming 380-3 margin, condemning “the continuous terrorist attacks perpetrated by Hezbollah.”285 Given the preceding, how is Hezbollah’s FTO designation maintained? How is the U.S. House of Representatives able to pass a resolution that states Hezbollah is currently carrying out terrorist attacks?  How does the movement remain an imminent threat to the U.S., although it has never attacked or tried to attack the U.S. within its borders?   
  
 The FTO designation process is highly politicized.  It is organized in a manner that allows it to be utilized as a political instrument for the interests of the power elite.  To further a political agenda, the power elite can place any organization on the                                                         285 U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Congress, (2005-2006). 
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list that threatens its interests.  In the case of this thesis, keeping Hezbollah on the list enables unwarranted support for Israel, specifically a steady flow of weapons that provides a steady flow of profits to the power elite.  But if Hezbollah is not currently engaging in terrorist activity, there needs to be a perception that it is an active terrorist organization to sustain the designation.  This perception is created through the corporate media delivering propaganda to the general public, or the “bewildering herd,” operating as a member of the power elite.  This thesis now moves to investigate the corporate media outlet The New York Times, and coverage of Hezbollah.    
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Chapter 6  
All The Propaganda That’s Fit To Print 
  The PM states that the corporate media operate, and propagandize on behalf of, the powerful societal interests, or the power elite, of which they are apart.  Among other functions, these media giants continuously support the policy line of the governing elite and rarely deviate from the boundaries they establish.  Further, the PM explains that the “liberal” media serve the crucial function of setting the “left” boundary of debate, or the farthest one can go before leaving the frontier of “thinkable thought”.  With numerous studies conveying its support for the power elite, coupled with its accepted label as a leading representative of the “liberal” media, The New York Times is the focus of this analysis.     
I.  The Track Record  The Times has an extensive track record for creating the parameters of elite opinion.  Reporting has either been slanted to support or justify the actions of the power elite, or has succumbed to remaining silent on issues that may be too difficult to defend.  A veteran Times reporter, James Hess, stated that in all 24 years of his service at the paper he "never saw a foreign intervention that the Times did not support, never saw a fare increase or a rent increase or a utility rate increase that it did not endorse, never saw it take the side of labor in a strike or lockout, or advocate a raise for underpaid workers.  And don't let me get started on universal health care and Social Security.  So why do people think the Times is liberal?"286                                                        286 Quoted in Edward S. Herman, “The New York Times Versus Civil Society: 
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 Representing the “left” of American media, the Times is an establishment institution and serves establishment ends.  Times historian Harrison Salisbury stated about former executive editor Max Frankel, "The last thing that would have entered his mind would be to hassle the American establishment, of which he was so proud to be a part."287 The Times propaganda service dates back at least to the Russian Revolution.  Investigating the Times, Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz found that the paper had reported the imminent or actual fall of the revolutionary government 91 times, and had Lenin and Trotsky in flight, imprisoned, or killed on numerous occasions. 
Times news about Russia was "a case of seeing, not what was there, but what men wanted to see."
 
288   During the McCarthy era, the management caved in under the pressure from the Eastland Committee289 by firing employees who were former communist.290 During and after the Vietnam War, a common theme spewed out by conservative mythology was that the “liberal” media, which included the Times, “lost the war,” and the Times was simultaneously celebrating its ability to pursue a critical role.  Yet, both were wrong as the Times consistently served the state, transmitted propaganda, and confined criticism to matters of tactics while excluding 
   
                                                                                                                                                                     Protests, tribunals, labor and militarization and wars,” Z Magazine, (December 2005), http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Herman%20/NYTimes_CivilSociety.html. 287 Ibid. 288 Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz, “A Test of the News,” New Republic, August 4, 1920.  289 A Congressional Internal Security Subcommittee, led by James Eastland, serving to investigate the Communist Party.   290 Edward S. Herman, “All News Fit to Print”, Z Magazine, April, 1998, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Herman%20/AllNewsFit_Herman.html. 
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criticism of premises and intentions.291  Harrison Salisbury conceded that in 1962 the Times was “deeply and consistently” supportive of the war policy and never questioned the war’s intentions.292
 Many look to the Pentagon Papers as a moment when the liberal media broke through the parameters of debate and provided the public with information that informed them of the truth.  Although the Times did become critical of the war, to this day, even in the Pentagon Papers, the Times confined criticism to tactics and cost, never questioning premises and intentions.  Further, the Times never abandoned the framework and language of apologetics, never labeled the U.S. invasion as aggression, and held with the government spouted line that the U.S. was “invited in.”  Moreover, the fact that the Times became critical of the war after 1965, does not discount the fact that it supported the war for 20 years prior.  It was only when public and elite opinion became critical did the Times become critical.  The 
Times never broke the parameters of debate. 
  However, in 1965, when elite opinion began to shift to the idea that the intervention was a tragic mistake, the Times reporting began to be more critical.  This critical reporting culminated into the publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1971.   
 Throughout the Cold War, the Times was a consistent publisher of anticommunist language.  Publisher Arthur Hays Sulzberger regularly admonished his editors to focus on the Soviets as "colonialists," to use the phrase "iron curtain," 
                                                        291 Ibid. 292 Edward Herman provides a detailed account of the language used by reporters that keeps them within the established framework.  See Herman, “All News That Fits to Print.” 
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and generally exhibited the Manichean world-view of anticommunist ideologues.293  In 1946, the constructed Soviet threat was utilized to send money to the government in Greece, as the Times echoed State Department press releases on their front page, asserting that the "issues" were containment of an expanding Soviet Union and American willingness to aid a government "violently opposed by the Soviet Union."294  Of course this was disinformation, as Stalin honored the postwar settlement with the West, leaving it free to dominate Greece.295 Pushing the “threat” further, the Times was a regular reporter of falsified reports about the amount of weapons the Soviets possessed.  In December of 1976, the CIA’s “Team B” was established to produce the administration’s desired conclusions, and included hardliners Richard Pipes and Paul Nitze.  The team produced a politicized document that claimed the Soviet Union had increased its military spending by 45 percent within one year.  Failing to analyze its potential political nature and ignoring other experts within the field, David Binder of the 
Times wrote a front-page article that took the Team B report at face value.
   
296
                                                        293 Herman, “All News That Fits to Print.” 
  Unfortunately for the Times, in 1983 the CIA admitted that these estimates were fabrications.   Revealing numerous lies streaming from the administration through the corporate media, Tom Gervasi, in his book, Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy, explains the Times continuous production of disinformation.  After Gervasi compared the Time’s reports of their data of Soviet warheads with a report he obtained from the Pentagon, he concluded the paper’s reports “were inconsistent, 
294 James Reston, New York Times, February 28, 1947. Cited in Ibid. 295 Ibid. 296 David Binder, New York Times, Dec. 26, 1976.  Cited in Ibid. 
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distorted, incompetently assembled, and persistently biased toward overstating Soviet capabilities.”297 If reporting false information about opposing militaries was not enough to scare the public into unwarranted support for government policies, the Times was extremely effective at creating the “Evil Empire” perception of the Soviet Union.  One subtle yet potent example was the reporting of Jerzy Popieluszko, a Polish priest murdered by the Polish police in October 1984.  The Times produced 78 articles, including ten front-page articles of this story alone.
  
298
 The Times also did well to help ignite the “terrorism” propaganda campaigns during the Reagan administration, specifically tying the Soviets to sponsors of “international terrorism”.  Between 1976 and 1981 numerous acts of terrorism were committed in Latin America, yet the Times only reported 22 victims of state 
  This high amount of reporting made sure that everyone knew who Jerzy Popieluszko was, that he was murdered, and that this murder occurred in a Communist state.  In comparison, between the years 1964-1978, 72 religious leaders were murdered in Latin America.  The Times produced eight articles related to those murders.  Between 1980-1985, 23 priests, missionaries, and other religious workers were murdered in Guatemala.  These victims received seven articles from the Times.  Even four American women religious workers who were murdered in El Salvador in 1980 only had a third of the Times articles of the Polish priest.  The reason for the vast difference in the amount of reporting is that the Polish priest was murdered in a Communist state, whereas others were murdered in U.S. client states.   
                                                        297 Tom Gervasi, Myth of Soviet Military Supremacy (Harpercollins, 1986). 298 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.) 38.  
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terror, of which 21 lived in the Soviet Union.299  In 1981, the Times contributed to the propaganda campaign of assigning responsibility of an assassination attempt against the Pope to the KGB.   Accepting reports from figures such as Claire Sterling, author of the Terrorist Network, the Times blindly reported the findings without further investigation.300  And in 1990, when Melvin Goodman, a CIA officer, testified that the KGB plot was a fraud, the Times neglected to report it.301 Leading another propaganda campaign, the Time’s reporting of the commercial Korean airliner that was shot down by the Soviets compared to its reporting of the commercial Iranian airliner that was shot down by the U.S., serves as another potent example.  Flight KA007, which was shot down on September 1, 1983 by the Soviet military, produced 147 articles in the Times in September alone, and for 10 days merited a special section in the paper.
    
302  Taking administration claims at face value, the Times dismissed the Soviets accidental explanation, and used words such as “savage,” “brutal,” and “uncivilized”.  One article stated, "There is no conceivable excuse for any nation shooting down a harmless airliner."303  But, when the USS Vincennes shot down the Iranian commercial airliner in 1988, the 
Times stated it was a “tragic error” and “irresponsible behavior” by the victims.304
                                                        299 Herman, “All News Fit to Print.” 
   
300 For more on the Times excepting Claire Sterling as an expert on terrorism see Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.), 145.  301 Herman, All News Fit to Print.” 302 Ibid. 303 New York Times, September 2, 1983. Cited in Ibid. 304 New York Times, August 4, 1988. Cited in Ibid.  
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 One study explained how these similar stories were framed differently in the 
Times by measuring the magnitude305 of each story.  The findings found that the 
Times carried 286 stories of the KAL incident, and 102 stories of the Iran Air incident.  Further, the findings showed that the Times used sharply contrasting frames on each event, demonizing the Soviets and covering for the Americans.306 Surveying the past decade, the Times carried out one if its most impressive propaganda campaigns in history – setting the stage for the 2003 Iraq war.   Prone to serve the government’s war policy, as was observed throughout the Cold War and the Vietnam War, the Times was already in full swing at the beginning of the decade when it editorialized in favor of barring Ralph Nadar from the 2000 Presidential debates on the grounds that Gore and Bush provided the public with all the alternatives it needed.
  
307  Throughout 2002, the Times saturated its pages with the threat of Saddam housing weapons of mass destruction.  This information, primarily reported by Judith Miller, was being supplied by military and intelligence officials, and as was later discovered, Ahmed Chalabi, a convicted embezzler and head of the Iraqi National Congress, a U.S.-financed exile group with close ties to the Pentagon.308
                                                        305 Developed by Robert Entman in Projections of Power, magnitude is defined as magnifying those elements of a depicted reality that favor’s one sides position, and further, how much material on the event is available.  
  Chalabi provided Miller with disinformation concerning weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and Miller provided myriad front-page stories that sought 
306 Entman, Robert, Projections of Power:  Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. 
Foreign Policy (Chicago:  The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 29-31.  307 Herman, “The New York Times Vs. Civil Society.” 308 Oliver Boyd-Barrett, “Judith Miller, The New York Times, and the Propaganda Model,” Journalism Studies 5, no. 4, (2004): 438. 
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to convince the public that Iraq had WMD.309  Interestingly, Chalabi was never cited in her articles, and her sources consisted of “anonymous sources and hearsay.”310  Coordination was at its best between Miller and various government officials as stories would hit the paper containing “new evidence,” and then be echoed the next day by Dick Cheney who would site the Times “new evidence.”311  The most daring critique of the Times Iraq propaganda was its over reliance on sources sympathetic to the administration.  Dissenting voices, made up of nuclear, intelligence, and other experts were either ignored or “buried deep.” A January 9, 2003 report from the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated, “after weeks of intensive inspection, [it] had found no sign whatever of any effort by Iraq to resume its nuclear program,” was buried on page A10.312  But on April 23, 2003, Judith Miller wrote a front-page report titled, “Illicit Arms Kept Till Eve of War, An Iraqi Scientist Is Said To Assert."313
                                                        309 Michael Massing, "Now They Tell Us", New York Review of Books, LI:3, February 26 2004, accessed October 18, 2011. http://www.nybooks,com/articles/ 16922.  
  Reading closely, the title explains that Miller never spoke to the scientist, who is “said to assert” something by “U.S. military officials.”  The criticism of the Times propaganda became too strong for the paper when the industry publication, Editor & Publisher, called on the Times to reassess Miller’s 
310 B. Vann, "New York Times Reporter Judith Miller Accused of hijacking Military Unit in Iraq", World Socialist, June 27 2003, accessed October 24, 2011. wsws,org/arHcles/2003/jul2003/. 311 Herman, “The New York Times Vs. Civil Society.”  312 Boyd-Barrett, “Judith Miller,” 440. 313 Judith Miller, “Illicit Arms Kept Till Eve of War, An Iraqi Scientist Is Said To Assert,” New York Times, April 23, 2003, accessed October 20, 2011. 
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work.  On May 26, 2004, Bill Keller, the executive editor, published a piece “apologizing for aspects of the Times coverage.”314
 One might assume this embarrassing exposure would deter the Times from publishing this type of war propaganda again, but a recent article by Robert Naiman, published in Al Jazeera, uncovers the papers misleading reports on Iran’s nuclear program.
  
315
The threats from Iran, aimed both at the West and at Israel, combined with a 
recent assessment by the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iran's nuclear 
programme has a military objective, is becoming an important issue in the American presidential campaign [emphasis added by Naiman].
   Naiman highlights a Times article written by Steve Erlanger that included this paragraph: 
316  Highlighting the misleading accusation that the IAEA’s most recent report shows the programme to have a military objective, Naiman cites a Washington Post article published on December 9: But the IAEA report does not say Iran has a bomb, nor does it say it is building one, only that its multiyear effort pursuing nuclear technology is sophisticated and broad enough that it could be consistent with building a bomb.317  Interestingly enough, if one tries to search for this deceptive article on the Times website, one will not find it as it no longer exists.  It was removed from the paper without any note explaining why, something it is supposed to do.                                                         314 The Editors, "The Times and Iraq," New York Times, May 26, 2004, accessed October 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/26/world/from-the-editors-the-times-and-iraq.html?scp=1&sq=the+times+and+iraq&st=nyt.  315 Robert Naiman, “The New York Times Misleading Public on Iran,” Al Jazeera, January 12, 2012, accessed January 13, 2012. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/01/20121872656281735.html.  316 Steve Erlanger, “Europe Takes Bold Step on a Ban of Iranian Oil,” The New York 
Times, January 4, 2012.  317 Patrick Pexton, “Getting Ahead Of The Facts On Iran,” The Washington Post, December, 9, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/getting-ahead-of-the-facts-on-iran/2011/12/07/gIQAAvvCjO_story.html. 
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 These examples demonstrate that the Times has, and is, an effective media outlet for distributing propaganda on behalf of the power elite.  Playing a large role in establishing the “liberal” boundary, effectively suppressing dissent or ignoring alternative sources, and utilizing its political relationships to produce opinion-shaping articles, while simultaneously maintaining the “liberal” label, the Times is one of the most compelling media corporations in executing systematically the PM.     
II.  The New York Times & the Propaganda Model 
A.  Size, Concentrated Ownership, Owner Wealth, and Profit Orientation    The owners of The New York Times Company control a large and complex business organization, which had 2010 revenues of $2.9 billion and earnings of $1.4 billion.318
                                                        318 The financial profile of the Times can be accessed at http://finance.yahoo.com/q/is?s=NYT&annual. 
  The Times Company operates in two segments, News Media Group and About Group.  The News Media segment comprises the New York Times Media Group, the New England Media Group, and the Regional Media Group. The New York Times Media Group comprises the New York Times, the International Herald Tribune, NYTimes.com, Baseline, Inc., the New York Times Index, which produces and licenses the New York Times Index, Digital Archive Distribution business which licenses electronic archive databases, and the New York Times News Services Division, which transmits articles, graphics, and photographs from the Times, the 
Boston Globe, and other publications to newspapers, magazines, and Web sites, as well as owns interest in Epsilen, LLC, a hosted online education solution.  It also 
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distributes content on other digital platforms, including mobile applications, social networking sites, and reader application products.  The New England Media Group includes the Boston Globe, Boston.com, the Worcester Telegram & Gazette, and Telegram.com. The Regional Media Group consists of 14 daily newspapers in Alabama, California, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, and South Carolina, as well as related print publication businesses. The About Group segment consists of the Web sites of About.com, ConsumerSearch.com, UCompareHealthCare.com, and Caloriecount.about.com.  Additionally, the company holds interest in a Canadian newsprint company; Metro Boston LLC, which publishes a free daily newspaper in the greater Boston area; quadrantONE LLC, which is an online advertising network; New England Sports Network, a regional cable sports network; and 50% of Roush Fenway Racing.319  And oddly enough, the Times owns a substantial portion of the Boston Red Sox.320 The Ochs-Sulzberger family has owned the paper since 1896.  Adolf Ochs was the first owner of the Times, followed by his son Arthur Hays Sulzberger, followed by his son Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, followed by is son Arthur Ochs Sulzberger Jr., who is now the current chairman and publisher.
 
321  Sulzberger is just one of the 27 family members that currently sit in high positions at the Times.322                                                        319 Ibid. 
    
320 The Times owns 17% of New England Sports Venture which owns the Boston Red Sox and Fenway Park, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/02/business/media/02times.html 321 "New York Times Timeline 1881–1910". The New York Times Company, accessed October 25, 2011, http://www.nytco.com/company/milestones/timeline_1881.html. 322 Joe Hagan, “Bleeding ‘Times’ Blood,” New York Magazine, October 5, 2008, accessed November 2, 2011, http://nymag.com/news/media/51015/. 
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 Occupying the majority of the board of directors, the Sulzberger family keeps a tight grip on the information that flows out to the public.  Evidence has been revealed that the publisher frequently contributes to numerous news decisions.  Analyzing memos between employees, one researcher notes “Sulzberger was not reluctant to express opinion on news coverage or to request specific stories.”323 This type of ownership control has resulted in the belief systems of the family trickling down into print.  Susan Tifft, a chronicler of the Times, concludes that the family’s ideological and religious beliefs shape much of what is published.  She concludes, “It has become increasingly apparent that the family’s self-image as Jews has profoundly shaped the paper.”
   
324  Although Sulzberger Jr. was the first in the family not to be raised Jewish, he maintains what Tifft calls the “Jewishness” of the Times, including his uncritical support for Israel.  Writing an article during his senior year at Browning University, Sulzbeger states, "Israel will survive…Arabs may finally overrun the country, but she will survive. It is impossible to work with the people [Arabs], talk with them, and live with them and think otherwise. Israel will survive simply because she has everything to gain, and nothing to lose."325
                                                        323 Daniel Chomsky, “An Interested Reader:  Measuring Ownership Control at The New York Times,” Critical Studies in Media Communication 23. No. 1 (March 2006): 1-18.   
  More recently, Sulzberger has publicly shown his support for Israel when he and the executive editor, Bill Keller, visited an Israeli settlement in Ariel as part of a Yesha 
324 Susan Tifft, The Trust:  The Private and Powerful Family Behind the New York 
Times (Back Bay Books, September 20, 2000).  325 Cited in Palestine: Information with Provenance (PIWP database), “Arthur Ochs Sulzberger Jr.,” October 30, 2010, accessed November 13 2011, http://cosmos.ucc.ie/cs1064/jabowen/IPSC/php/authors.php?auid=11163. 
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Council PR campaign.326
          Of the 97.6 million Class A shares of stock, the Sulzberger family owns 17.5 millions shares, or 18%, but the family also owns 87% of the Class B shares, which entitles them to elect a majority (9) of the 14 directors.  Explained in “The 1997 Proxy Statement of The New York Times Company,” these special voting rights were implemented to insure family control.
  This support was seen throughout the analysis in the next section of this chapter.  
327 One of the other key elements of this filter is the media industry’s integration into the market; something the Times has done well.  The owners often associate with other power elites who are anxious to build relationships with such a powerful newspaper.  Many of these contacts are made on the board of the holding company, which includes top business leaders from IBM, First Boston (a major investment bank), the Mercantile Bank of Kansas City, Bristol-Myers Squibb (drugs), Phelps Dodge (copper), Metropolitan Life, Verizon Communications, Nabisco Inc., and other corporations.  The company also has a $200 million line of credit with a group of commercial banks, and periodically uses investment banks to underwrite its bonds and notes and help it buy and sell properties.
  
328
                                                        326 Akiva Novick, “New York Times execs visit West Bank city,” ynetnews.com, October 29, 2010, accessed November 13, 2011, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3976644,00.html. 
  These bankers, directors, and other stockholders create enormous amounts of pressure to focus on the bottom line, and would not be pleased if the Times published news hostile to the interests of the corporate community.  Deeply integrated into the market, the ownership of the 
327 Kenneth Richieri, “The New York Times Proxy Statement,” March 11, 2009, pg. 5,13, http://www.nytco.com/pdf/2009_Proxy_Statement.pdf.  328 Herman, “All the news that fits to print.”  
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Times is an active member of the power elite.   This author conducted a search of Times articles that included the words “Lockheed,” and “Lebanon.”  Of the 40 articles that included these two words, not one was critical of Lockheed’s weapon sales to Israel, and never mentioned the cluster bombs, discussed in chapter 3, that claimed 200 civilians after the 2006 war with Hezbollah had concluded.  Only one article, dating back to 1982, discussed Lockheed’s controversial cluster bombs, yet the article was not critical of the bombs themselves.329
 Another structural relationship of importance is the media’s dependence on and connections with the government.  One crucial connection that emerged in the 1950’s was the Times relationship with the CIA.  Veteran Times reporter Harrison Salisbury wrote in Without Fear of Favor, that CIA officials like Allen Dulles, James Angleton, Frank Wisner, Kim Roosevelt, Richard Helms, and others, “were good friends of, and wined, dined, and vacationed with, a large array of Times officials and reporters.”
  The article was only reporting that the Reagan administration had delayed the shipment to Israel, but never mentions why.  As noted earlier, the Times is fully integrated into the market and will not be hostile to large, profiting corporations such as Lockheed Martin.  
330
                                                        329 News Summary; SATURDAY, JULY 17, 1982, accessed January 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/17/nyregion/news-summary-saturday-july-17-1982.html?scp=2&sq=Lockheed+Lebanon+cluster&st=nyt. 
  He goes on to quote CIA official Cord Meyer that there had been a "relationship of cooperation between the Times and the Agency, a relationship of 
330 Harrison Salisbury, Without Fear or Favor:  The New York Times and its Times (Times Books: 1980). 
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trust between the CIA and Times correspondents.”331 The Times is also keen on making friends with the top political figures.  Max Frankel, former executive editor, was extremely close to Henry Kissinger.  Throughout his term, Kissinger "put that relationship to good use, employing Frankel's trust to delay stories.”332 The Times close relationship with government has also been shown through the revolving door of personnel. The most notable example is Leslie Gelb, who moved from director of policy planning at the Pentagon (1965-68) to the Times, then to policy planning at the U.S. State Department (1977-79), and then back to the 
Times as diplomatic correspondent, Op Ed column editor, and foreign affairs correspondent (1981-93), and then on to head the Council on Foreign Relations.
   
333  Another example is Richard Burt, the Times's Pentagon correspondent during key Cold War years (1974-83), who moved into the Reagan State Department in 1983.334 The revolving door is still revolving with the Obama administration.  Solomon Watson, former chief financial legal officer at the Times, now serves as the general counsel for the U.S. Army, and William Kennard, who was elected to the Times board of directors in 2001, served as the chairman of the FCC (1997-2001), and is now the U.S. ambassador to the European Union.    
   
 The Sulzberger family has created a large, complex media company that allows it to guide its publications with its own personal ideologies.  Along with the paper’s full integration into the market, causing profit oriented forces to constrain reporting                                                         331 Ibid. 332 Herman, “All the news that fits to print.”  333 Ibid. 334 Ibid. 
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to a strict “corporate friendly” bottom line, and its close relationship with government agencies, the Times fits well into the first filter of the PM.    
B.  The Advertising License To Do Business  The Times first felt the need to adjust to an advertising based model in the 1970’s when its stock price fell from $53 in 1968 to $15 in 1976.335  While at its lowest in August of 1976, Business Week ran an article explaining that the Time’s decrease in profits was due to its “slide to the left,” and its “anti-business” reporting.336  Quickly, the Times made adjustments to rectify this “left” problem by first bringing on A.M. Rosenthal, who was referred as a “terrific anticommunist” and a self described “bleeding heart conservative,”337 as the executive editor.  Along with other moves such as ousting editor John Oakes and replacing him with the more conservative Roger Starr, the Times shifted to softer, more advertising friendly news.338  Rosenthal established a Product Committee, and entire sections of the paper began to be allocated to Men's and Women's Clothing, House & Home, Food and Dining, and Style.339  This trend has continued, and the Times has taken efforts to create a business friendly, consumer atmosphere that is attractive to big advertisers.  And now that the Times is the top U.S. online newspaper,340
                                                        335 Ibid. 
 the advertisement-based model will only intensify.  Further, this model will push 
336 “Behind the Profit Squeeze at the New York Times,” Business Week, August 30, 1976. Cited in Ibid. 337 Quoting William Buckley Jr. in Ibid.  338 Ibid. 339 Ibid.  340 According to May 2010 Score Media Metrix Data. 
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foreign news and news of international conflicts aside, as these stories could put their consumers out of their shopping mood.341  Former Times editor Max Frankel says that the more newspapers pursue Internet audiences, “the more will sex, sports, violence, and comedy appear on their menus, slighting, if not altogether ignoring, the news of foreign wars or welfare reform.”342 Testing Max Frankel’s prediction, this author conducted a search of front-page 
Times articles discussing the Boston Red Sox, news of fashion, and the deadliest conflict in the world since World War II, the conflict in Congo.  Between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2010, the Times published 117 articles discussing the Red Sox, 716 discussing fashion, and 17 discussing a conflict that kills 45,000 people every month.  
  
 In 2010, the Times revenue from advertising alone was $26 billion.343
 
  Providing a consumer friendly environment, and avoiding stories of war and civilian casualties, or a least placing them on back pages, will continue to be the aim of the 
Times whose main focus is to generate profits.   
C. Sourcing Corporate Media 
 Economic necessity and reciprocity of interests drive the corporate media to                                                         341 For a detailed account of how the advertizing based model drives conflict-oriented news to the side, see Peter Hart and Julie Hollar, “Fear and Favor 2004,” Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, (March/April 2005), http://www.coldtype.net/Assets.05/Essays/05.Fair.pdf. 342  Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed), 17. 343 Tanzina Vega, “Online Ad Revenue Continues to Rise,” New York Times, April 13, 2011, accessed October 12, 2011, http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/13/online-ad-revenue-continues-to-rise/. 
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utilize official government sources.  These official sources can come in the form of press conferences, interviews, and press releases.  Or, information can flow from “countering” unofficial sources that become labeled as “experts,” who are usually found to be on the government payroll. The Times has regularly been observed to be a mouthpiece for official and “unofficial” government sources.   The examples discussed earlier – U.S. policy on Greece, Vietnam, the “evilness” of the Soviets, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 – were all reported by echoing government sources.  Other examples not discussed above include the Times relentless support for NAFTA,344 the vilification of Hugo Chavez,345 the Milosevic tribunal,346 and the U.S. invasion of Panama.347 The Times has also been known to utilize “experts” as their sources.  Besides Reagan’s “terrorism expert” Claire Sterling,
   
348 discussed above, the Times regularly cited Soviet arms and intelligence “expert” Arkady Shevchenko.  It was later known that Shevchenko was only an “expert” because the Times featured him as one.349
                                                        344 See Thea Lee, “False Prophets: The Selling of NAFTA,” Economic Policy Institute, (July 1995); Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, citing Times articles Thomas Lueck, “The Free Trade Accord: The New York Region,” New York Times, November 18, 1993; and editorial, “NAFTA’s True Importance,” New York Times, November 14, 1993.    
 Recently, the Times cited terrorism “expert” Will McCant in the 2011 Norway attack, stating: 
345 See Kevin Young, “Colombia and Venezuela:  Testing the Propaganda Model,” 
MALA, (November/December 2008).   346 See Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, "Marlise Simons on the Yugoslavia Tribunal: A Study in Total Propaganda Service," ZNet, (2004). 347 See Sandra Dickson, “Understand Media Bias:  The Press and the U.S. Invasion of Panama,” Journalism Quarterly 71:4 (1994): 809.  348 For Sterlings credentials see Herman, Bulgarian Connection, 125–46. 349 See Edward J. Epstein, “The Invention of Arkady Shevchenko.”   
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A terror group, Ansar al-Jihad al-Alami, or the Helpers of the Global Jihad, issued a statement claiming responsibility for the attack, according to Will McCants, a terrorism analyst at C.N.A., a research institute that studies terrorism.350   It was later discovered that McCant’s information was wrong, and his credentials as an “expert” was simply the Times invention.351 As the propaganda campaign for the Iraqi invasion of 2003 blatantly displayed, the Times has a close relationship with government officials.  The symbiotic relationship is seen in numerous cases, flooding the public with “analysis” of elite guided stories.  This thesis projects that this pattern will be observed in the Times reporting of Hezbollah.  
 
 
D.  Flak and the Enforcers   Flak refers to negative responses to a media statement or program.352
                                                        350 Times article cited in Benjamin Doherty, “How a clueless “terrorism expert” set media suspicion n Muslims after Oslo horror,” The Electronic Intifada, July 23, 2011, accessed November 10, 2011, http://electronicintifada.net/blog/benjamin-doherty/how-clueless-terrorism-expert-set-media-suspicion-muslims-after-oslo-horror. 
  It can stem directly from the government, or indirectly from government funded monitoring or think-tank operations such as the American Legal Foundation, the Capital Legal Foundation, the Media Institute, the Center for Media and Public Affairs, and Accuracy in Media (AIM).  AIM, functioning to harass the media and put pressure on them to follow the corporate agenda and a hard-line, right-wing foreign policy, was headed by Reed Irvine.  In 1982, Irvine launched a campaign against 
351 See Doherty, “clueless terrorism expert,” July 23, 2011.  352 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.), 26.  
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Times reporter Raymond Bonner, criticizing the Central America correspondent for reporting that U.S.-trained troops had massacred civilians at the Salvadoran village of El Mozote.353  After Bonner was fired from the Times for speaking against the power elite’s interests, the story faded from the pages.  Twenty-three years later, the 
Times ran an article titled, “O.A.S. to Reopen Inquiry Into Massacre in El Salvador in 1981,” confirming the findings of Bonner.354
 Bonner has not been the only journalist to be dismissed for his investigative reporting.  The Times follows a certain party line, and those who do not adapt to that line are eased out, such as Richard Eder
  Unfortunately, “flak” hindered the democratic responsibilities charged to journalists, causing this story to be buried for over two decades.    
355 or Sydney Schanberg.356  More recently, 
Times columnist, Ben Stein, was fired because as he says, “I started criticizing Mr. Obama quite sharply over his policies and practices.”357  In sum, the Times is an establishment paper, and as a result of the fourth filter, reporters will report within an establishment framework or leave.358
 
 
                                                        353 On Irvines’ direct contribution to the firing of Raymond Bonner see Wolf, “Accuracy in Media,” 32–33.   354 Ian Urbina, “O.A.S. to Reopen Inquiry Into Massacre in El Salvador in 1981,” The 
New York Times, March 8th, 2005.  355 Herman, “All news that fits to print.” 356 After writing the article “New York; Doer and Slumlord Both,” New York Times, March, 9th, 1985, exposing the ways the powerful real estate owners abuse the poor, Shanberg was asked to leave the paper. 357 Danny Shea, “Ben Stein Hints: I was fired from New York Times for criticizing Obama,” Huffington Post, May 5, 2011, accessed October 16, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/10/ben-stein-hints-i-was-fir_n_255897.html. 358 Herman, “All the news that fits to print.”  
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E. Manichean Thinking   The fifth filter, Manichean thinking, mobilizes the populace against an enemy, and because the concept is fuzzy, it is used against anybody advocating policies that threaten the interests of the power elite.359  This filter tends to cause issues to be framed in terms of dichotomous thinking, for example the “west” and “them”, “with gains and losses allocated to contesting sides, and rooting for “our side” is considered an entirely legitimate news practice.”360 Edward Herman explains that “the Times's commitment to anticommunist ideology, and its acceptance of the Cold War as a death struggle between the forces of good and evil, ran deep and severely limited its objectivity as a source of information.”
   
361
 One of the most popular dichotomies that is spread across the pages of the 
Times is the  “West” and Arab/Muslim, also observed as civilized and uncivilized.  Although this Arab/Muslim filter has become stronger after September 11th, 2001, the Times has a history of portraying “them” in a negative way.     
  Continuously used throughout the Cold War, this same restrictive, dichotomous thinking still plagues the Times in the post-Cold war era.   
 In his content analysis of the Times portrayal of Arabs from 1917 – 1947, I. Mousa concluded that the Times’ coverage was mostly conflict-oriented and unfavorable to the Arabs.362
                                                        359 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.), 29. 
   He noted that western sources were cited more often 
360 Ibid., 30-31.  361 Herman, “All the news that fits to print.” 362 I. Mousa, The Arab Image in the US Press (New York: Peter Lang, 1984). 
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than Arab sources,363 and that coverage was limited, distorted and presented from a colonial viewpoint.364  Analyzing articles between 1947-1948, another scholar concluded that the Times actively mobilized public support for the creation of Israel.365  When Truman changed his mind to support a UN trusteeship over Palestine, the move was framed by the Times’ editorials as “cowardly, weak and indicative of Truman’s lack of leadership skills.”366  Analyzing Times coverage of the 1956 Suez War, the 1967 Six-Day Arab–Israeli War, the 1973 Arab–Israeli October War and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, two scholars carrying out two different studies concluded Arabs were not presented fairly and objectively, and were described as backward, dishonest, and unreliable.367  Analyzing editorials of the Times between 1967–1977, Daugherty and Warden found that “anti-Arab New 
York Times” editorials outnumbered those supportive of Israel by a ratio of three to one.368  Analyzing the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Batarfi found that the 
Times portrayed Israel as aggressive, but that it still justified Israel’s actions twice as much as the Arabs.369                                                        363 The use of western sources more frequently has also be confirmed by K. Batarfi, ‘Three American Prestige Newspapers’ Stand toward the Arab–Israeli Conflict:  A Content Analysis of Editorials,” (1997), paper presented at the International 
Communication Division at the 1997 AEJMC Convention.; and M. Suleiman, Arabs in 
the Mind of America (Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1988). 
  Conducting a content analysis of the Times coverage of the 
364 Ibid. 365 B. Evensen, “Surrogate State Department? Times Coverage of Palestine,” 
Journalism Quarterly 67, no. 2, (1990):  391–400. 366 Ibid., cited in Dina Ibrahim, “The Middle East in America Media:  A 20th century Overview,” International Communication Gazette 71, no. 511 (2009). 367 Suleiman, Arabs in the Mind of America; and Batarfi, “Three American Prestige Newspapers.” 368 D. Daugherty, and M. Warden, “Prestige Editorial Treatment of the Mideast during 11 Crisis Years,” Journalism Quarterly 56 no. 4 (1979): 776–82. 369 Batarfi, “Three American Prestige Newspapers.” 
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term ‘Islam’ between 1988-1992, another researcher found that coverage was mostly centered on crises, conflict, and war, and that the Times was consistent in justifying Israeli actions.370   In her content analysis of editorials in the Times between 1997-1998, Ghada Khouri found that the Times did not publish one single Arab perspective out of 59 articles.371 More recently, one study investigated how the Times reported the Arab/Muslim six months before and after 9/11.  The study found that the Times discussed American Arabs or Muslims in 17 articles six months before 9/11, and discussed them in 376 articles in the six after 9/11.  Further, the Times reported the term Muslim in 345 articles six months before 9/11 and in 1,468 articles six months after 9/11.
  
372 The Times has also played its part in merging the terms Islam and terrorism together, making Islam a required element for the term terrorism to be applied.  The 
Times made this mistake about the bombing in Norway discussed above.  After it was known that a non-Muslim, Anders Beivik, was responsible for the attacks, it ran an article stating: 
 
Initial reports focused on the possibility of Islamic militants, in particular Ansar al-Jihad al-Alami, or Helpers of the Global Jihad, cited by some analysts as claiming responsibility for the attacks. American officials said the group was previously unknown and might not even exist.                                                         370 K. Sheikh, V. Price and H. Oshagan, “Press Treatment of Islam: What Kind of Picture do the Media Paint?,” Gazette 56, no. 1 (1995): 139–54. 371 G. Khouri, “The Other Gulf War Syndrome: Flaws in US Media Coverage of the 1997/98 Iraq Crisis, Issue Paper # 27,” Washington, DC: ADC Research Institute (1998). 372 Nacos, Brigitte, “Muslim Americans in the News before and after 9/11,” Colombia 
University, August 8th, 2002, http://www.apsanet.org/~polcomm/news/2003/terrorism/papers/nacos.pdf. 
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There was ample reason for concern that terrorists might be responsible.373  In other words, now that we know the attacker was not a Muslim, we know “by definition” that terrorists are not responsible. Conversely, when it was thought that Muslims were responsible, that meant also “by definition” that it was an act of terrorism.  The fifth filter, Manichean thinking, is powerful, and the Times is not immune.  The paper’s reporting has and will be guided by this filter, as deviating away would place them on the “uncivilized” side, thus outside of the system and into economical turmoil.  As Bush so famously said to a joint session of Congress on September 20th, 2001, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”   
III. The Cleansed Residue Fit To Print:  The NYT’s Coverage of Hezbollah 
  The analysis of the Time’s reporting of Hezbollah was analyzed in three different sections.  First, this thesis analyzed the Times reporting during the six months following 9/11.  Before 9/11, Hezbollah had not been accused of a terrorist attack since the 1994 AMIA building, a charge never proven.  Further, no evidence has ever been found that links Hezbollah to 9/11, or Al Qaeda.  This analysis examined if and how the Times linked Hezbollah to 9/11, to Al Qaeda, and how it portrayed it as a current, active terrorist group.  The PM states that the corporate media will serve the policy of the power elite – maintaining Hezbollah’s FTO designation.  Thus, this thesis projected that the Times would link Hezbollah to 9/11, Al-Qaeda, and portray it as a current, active terrorist organization.                                                           373 Article cited in Doherty, “clueless terrorism expert,” July 23, 2011 
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 Second, the PM states that the corporate media will marginalize dissent.  This analysis examined the few government officials and other prominent voices who have stated their disagreement with Hezbollah’s designation, and examined the amount of coverage awarded to their dissent.  Further, the analysis observed the prominent voices that have made public statements for not only Hezbollah’s continued designation, but also for the U.S. to engage the organization militarily.  This thesis projected that very little, or none, of these dissident voices would be reported in the Times, and that ample coverage would be awarded to those who spoke supportively for Hezbollah’s continued designation.   Third, this thesis briefly examined the most current coverage of Hezbollah in the Times.  This analysis researched the most recent reports concerning the organization, searching for dissent coverage or reporting that broke with past coverage.       
A. Applying 9/11, Al Qaeda, and the 1980’s, again, to Hezbollah 
 Between September 11th, 2001 and March 11th, 2002, the Times published 122 articles that were either centered on Hezbollah, or at least discussed the group in relation to the main focus of the article.  During this time period, Hezbollah never carried out any “terrorist” operations or acts of violence, made any major political changes, or any other action that would cause an increase in international news representations of the movement compared to the six months before 9/11.  Yet, the 
Times increased its coverage of Hezbollah nearly three and half times more (36 articles) than the six months prior to 9/11.  Overall, the Times journalists presented 
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Hezbollah in a manner that displayed their acceptance of the State Department label, writing within the accepted boundaries and never questioning the current U.S. policy.    In describing Hezbollah, 89 articles used “terrorists” as the preceding adjective, 17 used “anti-Israeli,” and 9 used “extremists”.  Other popular descriptions were “Israeli-focused,” “terror-dispenser,” and “a coalition of terror.”  Found in 52 articles, the Times kept a steady flow of reporting that echoed senior political figures who grouped Hezbollah and Al Qaeda together.  Forty-two articles discussed the movement’s inclusion on the FTO list, with the majority discussing its initial absence on the new FTO of “global reach” list and then its addition after mounting political pressure.  Only one article out of the 122 articles discussed Hezbollah’s “other side” – its medical services and construction company that has rebuilt much of the south’s damage of years of conflict – describing Hezbollah as a “difficult quandary” for the U.S. in labeling the group a terrorist organization of global reach.374   After listing the events in the 1980’s that the State Department uses to justify Hezbollah’s designation, the article concluded with a quote from Condoleezza Rice stating “it remains a dangerous organization.”375 This pattern, “regularly selecting and ignoring history in order for them to make their favored political points,” is a common theme at the Times.
   
376
                                                        374 Neil MacFarquhar, “To U.S., a Terrorist Group; To Lebanese, a Social Agency,” The 
New York Times, December 28th, 2001, accessed September 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/28/world/to-us-a-terrorist-group-to-lebanese-a-social-agency.html?scp=10&sq=terrorist+group&st=nyt.  
   During these six months, readers of the Times were reminded of the events in the 1980’s – 
375 Ibid.  376 See Herman, “All the news fit to print.” 
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the 1983 Marine barracks and U.S. embassy bombing, and the 1985 hijacking of the T.W.A. flight – in 83 different articles.  On a number of occasions, the focus of the article would not be Hezbollah, but the historical reference would still make a subtle appearance.  An article on September 27th, 2001 discussing the potential Arab allies in the “War on Terror” provides an example: Syria, Iran and Lebanon, for example, have given unapologetic support to Hezbollah, the group that was blamed for suicide bombings against American targets during Lebanon's long civil war and remains on the State Department's list of terrorist organizations.377  Or an article in January discussing Iranian relations with Afghanistan:  In Lebanon, Iran has also retained its close ties to Hezbollah, the Shiite group that has waged terrorism against the United States and Israel since the 1980's.378  Notice the author said, “since the 1980’s,” implying that Hezbollah was currently “waging terrorism” against the U.S. and Israel.  The author would have been more accurate to say “in the 1980’s,” and to specify that the movement has never carried out an attack within the United States.  Other articles would stretch the events of the 1980’s as if they happened in the last few years by slipping in lines such as, “Its official funds sustain Hezbollah, with its long record of spectacular terrorist 
                                                        377 Douglas Jehl, “A NATION CHALLENGED: THE NEIGHBORS; Arab Allies Not Jumping to Join U.S. Side,” New York Times, September 27, 2001, accessed September 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/27/world/a-nation-challenged-the-neighbors-arab-allies-not-jumping-to-join-us-side.html?scp=1&sq=Arab+Allies&st=nyt.  378 Eric Schmitt, “A NATION CHALLENGED: REGIONAL POLITICS; IRAN EXERTS SWAY IN AFGHAN REGION, WORRYING THE U.S,” New York Times, January 10, 2002, accessed September 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/10/world/nation-challenged-regional-politics-iran-exerts-sway-afghan-region-worrying-us.html?scp=2&sq=Afghan&st=nyt. 
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attacks.”379 As noted above, there has never been any evidence linking Hezbollah to the 9/11 attacks, or Al Qaeda.  In fact, Hezbollah not only condemned the 9/11 attacks, but repeatedly condemned other attacks by Al Qaeda.  Hezbollah has expressed outrage over the atrocities committed by Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan,
  
380 it viciously condemned the current leader of Al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in November 1997 when his Gama’at al-Islamiyya committed a massacre among civilians in Luxor, Egypt,381 and in April 2008 when Ayman al-Zawahiri renewed Al-Qaeda’s call for attacks on the “Crusaders and Jews,” specifically including UNIFIL, the organization that Hezbollah was working with to combat Sunni militant groups in Lebanon.382
 The Times including of Hezbollah as a suspect began immediately when an article by John Burns on September 12th, 2001, stated that many of the groups that celebrated the attacks “will now be on the list of suspects.”  Listing those suspects, 
  Yet, Times reporting during the six months after 9/11 continuously included Hezbollah as a potential suspect in the attacks, or grouped Hezbollah and Al Qaeda together as one “unit of terror.”   After it was known that Hezbollah did not have a part in 9/11, the Times continued to portray Hezbollah and Al Qaeda as one enemy in the “War on Terror.”   
                                                        379 Edward Luttwak, “New Fears, New Alliance,” New York Times, October 2, 2001, accessed September 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/02/opinion/new-fears-new-alliance.html?scp=1&sq=new+fears&st=nyt. 380 See Nasrallah’s statements in Al-Massira (Beirut), August 24, 1998, Al-‘Ahd (Beirut), November 6, 1998, Al-Anwar (Beirut), September 16, 1998, and Al-Mujahid al-Siyyasi (Beirut), May 21, 2000. 381 Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbullah: Politics and Religion (Pluto Press, 2002), 101 – 102. 382 Norton, Hezbollah, 165. 
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Burns spoke of, “Islamic militant groups like Mr. bin Laden's Al Qaeda…and the Iran-backed Hezbollah.”383  Burns must have interpreted Hezbollah’s condemning of 9/11 as a celebration.  Serge Schmemann wrote a week later about Bin Laden’s motivations for 9/11, describing him as an “Islamic zealot,” and then warned of “a new wave of Islamic zealots, movements like Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and Hamas that have waged relentless terror campaigns against Israel.”384  The sources used in the article were Joseph Alpher, an Israeli Security Analyst, and Martin Indyk, former U.S. ambassador to Israel.  On October 1st, Judith Miller, the propagandist discussed earlier, wrote about the administration “taking aim at organizations with links to Mr. bin Laden's operations.”  She continued, making a false statement that this included “Hezbollah and other terrorists groups that bin Laden occasionally taps for his activities.”  Her sources consisted of “administration officials” and “federal officials.”385
Q. -- Are there any other suspects? 
  Another bold statement made without any supporting evidence written by Stephen Engelberg and Matthew Purdy in their own question-and-answer formatted article read: 
                                                         383 John Burns, “A DAY OF TERROR: THE MILITANT; America the Vulnerable Meets a Ruthless Enemy,” New York Times. September 12, 2001, accessed September 18, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/12/us/a-day-of-terror-the-militant-america-the-vulnerable-meets-a-ruthless-enemy.html?scp=1&sq=enemy&st=nyt. 384 Serge Schmemann, “Aftermath: The Target; Israel as Flashpoint, not Cause” New 
York Times, September 23, 2001, September 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/23/weekinreview/aftermath-the-target-israel-as-flashpoint-not-cause.html?scp=3&sq=aftermath&st=nyt. 385 Judith Miller, “A NATION CHALLENGED: THE INVESTIGATION; U.S. SET TO WIDEN FINANCIAL ASSAULT,” New York Times, October 1, 2001, accessed September 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/01/us/a-nation-challenged-the-investigation-us-set-to-widen-financial-assault.html?scp=1&sq=assault&st=nyt. 
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A. -- American officials continue to investigate whether any nation or other terrorist group had a hand in the attacks. One of the hijacking suspects, Mohamed Atta, met with an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague in June 2000. And Al Qaeda, Mr. bin Laden's group, has forged ties to Hezbollah and other Islamic fundamentalist groups.386  Some articles actually named sources, but the majority were administration, State   Department, or Pentagon officials, displaying the third filter of the PM, such as:  Some senior Pentagon officials argued that there was strong, if inconclusive, evidence linking Hezbollah and Mr. bin Laden.387   Joseph Kahn reported on November 3rd, 2001:  The Bush administration imposed stringent financial sanctions today on the anti-Israeli organizations Hamas, Hezbollah and 20 other suspected terrorist groups.  ''It reinforces the president's message that people have to choose and choose now,'' the official said. ''Al Qaeda was first and after that we're going after the rest of the terrorists.''388Clyde Haberman stated the same day:  Anger over terrorism impelled the Bush administration to expand the list of suspected terrorists beyond a few groups like Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden's network. Tough financial sanctions were imposed on 22 organizations, including Hamas and Hezbollah.389
                                                        386 Stephen Engelburg and Matthew Purdy, “A NATION CHALLENGED: THE INVESTIGATION; Countless Questions, a Few Answers,” New York Times, October 7, 2001, accessed September 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/07/us/a-nation-challenged-the-investigation-countless-questions-a-few-answers.html?scp=1&sq=countless&st=nyt. 
  
387 Elaine Sciolino, “A NATION CHALLENGED: HOLY WAR; Hezbollah and Hamas Put on Back Burner,” New York Times, October 4, 2001, accessed September 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/04/world/a-nation-challenged-holy-war-hezbollah-and-hamas-put-on-back-burner.html?scp=1&sq=holy+war&st=nyt,  388 Joseph Kahn, “A NATION CHALLENGED: THE MONEY TRAIL; U.S. Widens Net to Snare Terror Assets; Expands List,” New York Times, November 3, 2001, accessed October 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/03/world/nation-challenged-money-trail-us-widens-net-snare-terror-assets-expands-list.html?scp=1&sq=terror&st=nyt. 389 Clyde Haberman, “A NATION CHALLENGED -- AN OVERVIEW: NOV 2, 2001; Bad Economic News, Troops on the Golden Gate, Angry Firefighters,” New York Times, 
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It should be noted that both authors only highlighted Hamas and Hezbollah out of the 22 organizations added.   Edward Rothstein writing as an “expert” on the root causes of terrorism explained: these judgments accept a view of terror that has been held by many terrorist groups throughout modern history. The theory is that terrorism is an extreme reaction to grievous and long-festering injustices that have not been redressed by other means. Such claims were made by European anarchists at the beginning of the 20th century, by the radical Baader-Meinhoff gang in the 1970's and, of course, by Islamic terrorist groups ranging from Hezbollah to Al Qaeda…But at the very least this theory is inconsistently applied.390Bill Keller wrote in late November:  They talked about whether the initial phase of the war should extend beyond Al Qaeda to target terrorist groups with popular backing in the Middle East, like Hamas and Hezbollah, and whether it should encompass sponsoring states -- Syria, Iran and especially Iraq….“Obviously there's Al Qaeda and there's Afghanistan, but we don't want to send a message that there's good terrorism and bad terrorism. You know, you can't be against Al Qaeda and then support Hezbollah,'' stated an administration official.391This last line was a common argument from the administration that the Times echoed; said Condoleezza Rice on November 9th:  You cannot help us with Al Qaeda 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     November 3rd, 2001, accessed October 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/03/world/nation-challenged-overview-nov-2-2001-bad-economic-troops-golden-gate-angry.html?scp=2&sq=troops&st=nyt. 390 Edward Rothstein, “CONNECTIONS; Exploring the Flaws in the Notion of the 'Root Causes' of Terror,” New York Times, November 17th, 2001, accessed October 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/17/arts/connections-exploring-the-flaws-in-the-notion-of-the-root-causes-of-terror.html?scp=1&sq=flaws&st=nyt. 391 Bill Keller, “The World According to Powell,” New York Times, November 25, 2001, accessed October 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/25/magazine/the-world-according-to-powell.html?scp=1&sq=Powell&st=nyt. 
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and hug Hezbollah -- that's not acceptable.”392
 Donald McNeil wrote an article on December 2nd analyzing which terrorist group in the world would be best to use when making comparisons to Al Qaeda.  He stated, “The intensity of Al Qaeda's violence suggests comparisons to the Shining Path in Peru…but there was nothing suicidal in its ideology.”  He continued:  “These killings (the Israeli assassination of Sheik Musawi) obviously didn't stop Hezbollah or Hamas, which, like Al Qaeda, incorporate in their ideologies the notion that martyrs are to be admired, rewarded in Paradise, and avenged on Earth.”
  
393
Until now, the State Department has resisted lobbying from American Jewish organizations and lawmakers to advertise rewards for Palestinian-related terrorism. Instead, it has confined its public appeals for information to terrorist suspects like Osama bin Laden (up to a $25 million reward) and 
 Not only did he paint Hezbollah and Al Qaeda with one brush, he displayed his elementary understanding of terrorism, suggesting that suicide missions are a necessary component of terrorism, and all suicide missions are considered terrorism no matter who they target.  Making the same kind of generalizations, Elaine Sciolino published an article on December 13th discussing an advertising campaign implemented by the State Department that offered rewards to citizens who gave information about “Palestinian terrorists,” a topic that should not need reference to Hezbollah.  Sciolino wrote:   
                                                        392 Elaine Sciolino, “Saudi Charges Bush With Failure to Broker Mideast Peace,” New 
York Times, November 9th, 2001, accessed October 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/09/world/saudi-charges-bush-with-failure-to-broker-mideast-peace.html?scp=2&sq=Saudi&st=nyt. 393 Donald McNeil, “The Nation: Afterlife; Can Al Qaeda Rise If Bin Laden Falls?,” New 
York Times, December 2, 2001, accessed October 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/02/weekinreview/the-nation-afterlife-can-al-qaeda-rise-if-bin-laden-falls.html?scp=2&sq=rise&st=nyt.  
   127  
organizations like Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite movement.394  Writing about the need for the U.S. to strike Saddam Hussein, Richard Perle, a Pentagon advisor and former member of the Bush administration, stated: We know that he (bin-Laden) has produced quantities of anthrax sufficient to kill millions of people, as well as other biological agents. Disseminated to would-be martyrs from Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad or other terrorist groups, Saddam Hussein's biological arsenal could kill very large numbers of Americans.395  There has never been any evidence, or even allegations, that Saddam gave Hezbollah biological weapons, nor has Hezbollah ever used biological weapons.  Another common theme found in the analysis was the linking of Hezbollah to Iran in efforts to show how dangerous Iran is.  Martin Indyk, former U.S. ambassador to Israel, was given Op-ed space on September 28th to discuss who should be a U.S. ally in the “War on Terror.”  Indyk asserted: In the case of Iran, we should not want that country in our coalition. The State Department has found Iran to be the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism. Iran's terror network of intelligence services, Revolutionary Guards and the Lebanese-based Hezbollah clearly shows global reach.396Misleading the public, Hezbollah has never carried out an attack of “global reach.”  Following the pattern, Elaine Sciolino wrote:                                                         394 Elaine Sciolino, “U.S. to Use Reward Ads In Hunting Palestinians,” New York 
Times, December 13, 2001, accessed October 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/13/world/us-to-use-reward-ads-in-hunting-palestinians.html?scp=1&sq=reward&st=nyt. 395 Richard Perle, “The U.S. Must Strike Saddam Hussein,” New York Times, December 28, 2001, accessed October 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/28/opinion/the-us-must-strike-at-saddam-hussein.html?scp=1&sq=strike&st=nyt. 396 Martin Indyk, “Finding Allies in a World of Shadows,” New York Times, September 28th, 2001, accessed October 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/28/opinion/finding-allies-in-a-world-of-shadows.html?scp=1&sq=Shadows&st=nyt.  
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Iran is listed by the State Department as the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism, largely because of its support for anti-Israeli groups, particularly the Lebanese Hezbollah.397And she stated again one month later:   Mr. Khatami faces an uphill battle in criticizing others for promoting terrorism. Iran is listed by the State Department as the world's most active state supporter of terrorism, largely because of its arming of the Lebanese Shiite organization Hezbollah.398Utilizing the same technique - using Hezbollah as a villianizing mechanism - but instead in connection with Syria, a Times journalists wrote that the only reason “Syria is on the State Department list is because it supports Hezbollah.”
 
399  This is another false statement as the State Department listed many reasons why Syria is on the list other than its support for Hezbollah.400 The most blatant, inaccurate articles during these six months came from 
Times publisher William Safire.  In an article titled “Enemy Of My Enemy,” he wrote these two statements on November 29th, 2001:    
 
The vigilantes of Hezbollah, the ''Party of God,'' are urged by clerics to beat up                                                         397 Elaine Sciolino, “A Nation Challenged, Iranians; Tehran Aide Assails Terror But Opposes U.S. Attack,” New York Times, October 1st, 2001, accessed October 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/01/world/a-nation-challenged-iranians-tehran-aide-assails-terror-but-opposes-us-attack.html?scp=1&sq=Tehran&st=nyt. 398 Elaine Sciolino, “Iran Chief Rejects Bin Laden Message,” New York Times, November 10, 2001, accessed October 23, 2011,  http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/10/world/iran-chief-rejects-bin-laden-message.html?scp=2&sq=Iran&st=nyt. 399 Neil McFarquhar, “A Nation Challenged:  Damascus; Syria Repackages Its Repression of Muslim Militants as Antiterror Lesson, New York Times, January 14, 2002, accessed October 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/14/world/nation-challenged-damascus-syria-repackages-its-repression-muslim-militants.html?scp=2&sq=Syria&st=nyt.  400 See the Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, “Overview of State Sponsored Terrorism,” http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10296.pdf. 
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students with democratic yearnings…  Even today, Iran's air cargo planes fly arms and explosives to Damascus for trucking to terrorist headquarters of Hezbollah in Lebanon, for use by suicide bombers against Israeli civilians.401  The claim in the first statement has never been discovered as a fact, an allegation, or any other kind of reference found in the research of this author.  Safire also fails to name any kind of source for this claim.  The second statement displays the author’s lack of research, as all 12 of Hezbollah’s suicide attacks have been targeted at non-civilians.  Safire’s reproduction of the PM continued in another article on December 17th, writing a piece about the evils of Yasir Arafat.  He stated: “But the inescapable fact is that the suicide-murders of Jewish civilians are organized and carried out not only by Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah, but also by Arafat's Force 17.”402 Examining the six months following 9/11, this analysis found that Hezbollah was consistently grouped, compared, or even elevated above Al Qaeda; was continuously included in the list of suspects for 9/11; and was on numerous occasions used as a villianizing mechanism when the article was discussing U.S.-Iran or U.S.-Syria relations.  Also, if sources were even cited, the majority were found to be administration or federal officials.  Further, journalists consistently cited the events of the 1980’s when describing or discussing Hezbollah’s “current threat,” the same information used in the FTO designation. 
   
                                                        401 William Safire, “Essay; Enemy Of My Enemy,” New York Times, November 29, 2001, accessed October 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/29/opinion/essay-enemy-of-my-enemy.html?scp=1&sq=Enemy&st=nyt.  402 William Saffire, “The Irrelevant Man,” New York Times, December 17, 2001, accessed October 24, 2011,  http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/17/opinion/the-irrelevant-man.html?scp=1&sq=man&st=nyt. 
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B. Marginalizing Dissent   In the past decade, two prominent officials, Ryan Crocker, former U.S. ambassador to Iraq, and John Brennan, former Deputy National Security Advisor, as well as the Rand Corporation, one the major think-tanks in the U.S., have stressed the need for the U.S. government to open a dialogue or negotiations with Hezbollah.403  Also, current Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made the distinction between Hezbollah’s political party and its militant wing, only defining the latter as “a terrorist concern,” on the Charlie Rose show in November 2009.  This was the first time a U.S. diplomat had ever made such a distinction.  But, a few days later a State Department spokesman explained, "The Secretary's statement is fully consistent with our existing policy.  Hezbollah is a terrorist organization."404  And then a few days later in an article in The Nation, a State Department Spokesman stated, "U.S. policy toward Hezbollah has not changed. We do not make any distinction between the political and military wings."405
                                                        403 On June 8, 2010, Ryan Crocker called for direct talks with Hezbollah officials before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. John Brennan called for dialogue in his published study in the July 2008 edition of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The Rand Corporation published a report entitled “Building Moderate Muslim Networks,” which called for negotiations with Hezbollah shortly after 9/11. 
  Whether Secretary Clinton was trying to redefine U.S. policy on her own, or simply made a mistake, the statement, which deviated from the long-standing policy, was made, and the administration, working with the media, quickly corrected it.   
404 Sharmine Narwani, “Did Clinton Just Change U.S. Policy on Hezbollah,” The 
Huffington Post, November 12, 2009.  405 Ibid. 
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 Conversely, the past decade has seen various prominent officials stressing the need for Hezbollah’s designation to remain, some even pushing for military engagement.  Perhaps the most striking was Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, the former Raytheon executive, who stated, “Hezbollah made the A-team of terrorists, while maybe al-Qaeda is actually the B-team.”406  U.S. Senator Bob Graham, the chairman of the Senate’s Intelligence Committee, described Hezbollah’s purported military training camps in the Lebanese Biqa’ region as places “where the next generation of terrorists are being prepared.”407  And, CIA director George Tenet told the U.S. Congress in 2003 “Hezbollah, as an organization with capability and worldwide presence, is [al-Qaeda’s] equal, if not a far more capable organization. I actually think they’re a notch above in many respects.”408 The PM states that the corporate media will marginalize those who deviate from the representations required by the power elite.  Therefore, this analysis searched for the amount of coverage awarded to each voice listed above.  The search reviewed Times articles starting from the date each person made his/her statement to the date this research was conducted, November 30, 2011.  In regards to the voices that challenged the current policy – Ryan Crocker, John Brennan, and the Rand Corporation, and Secretary Clinton’s “mistake” – no articles where found in the 
Times that mentioned their comments.  In regards to the voices that stressed the need for Hezbollah’s designation and even military engagement – Richard Armitage, Bob Graham, and George Tenet – this author found numerous articles either 
 
                                                        406 Byman, “Should Hezbollah Be Next?” 407 Cited in US Council on Foreign Relations, Collateral Damage: Iraq and the Future 
of US – Syrian Relations, New York, 24 April 2003. 408 Byman, “Should Hezbollah Be Next?”  
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discussing the official’s condemnation of Hezbollah or citing the statements quoted above.    Eight articles discussed Richard Armitage and his condemnation of Hezbollah.  Four separate articles did not mention Armitage’s name, but cited his famous “A- team of terrorists” quote.  Three of these stated that multiple officials made this quote, representing it as if it were official policy:  Neil MacFarquhar stated, “Senior American officials have singled out Hezbollah as the ''A team'' of terrorism, more menacing than Al Qaeda,”409 Robert Worth stated, “American officials sometimes referred to Mr. Mugniyah and his Hezbollah peers as the “A team” of international terrorism because of their cold professionalism and secrecy,”410 and Eric Schmitt stated, “Some senior American officials, however, have singled out Hezbollah as the ''A Team'' of terrorism, considering it more menacing than Al Qaeda.”411  One article using the quote to describe U.S. and Israeli policy stated, “Israel and the United States put the armed Shiite Muslim group on the ‘A team’ of world terror.”412                                                        409 Neil MacFarquhar, “Hezbollah Becomes Potent Anti-U.S. Force,” New York Times, December 24, 2002, accessed October 24, 2011,  http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/24/world/hezbollah-becomes-potent-anti-us-force.html?scp=2&sq=Hezbollah&st=nyt. 
   
410 Robert Worth, “Bomb In Syria Kills Militant Sought as Terrorist,” New York Times, February 14, 2008, accessed October 24, 2011,  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/14/world/middleeast/14syria.html?scp=1&sq=Bomb&st=nyt. 411 Eric Schmitt, “THREATS AND RESPONSES: THE MILITARY; Pentagon Draws Up a 20-to-30-Year Antiterror Plan,” New York Times, January 17, 2003, accessed October 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/17/world/threats-responses-military-pentagon-draws-up-20-30-year-antiterror-plan.html?scp=1&sq=20-to-30-Year+Antiterror+Plan&st=nyt. 412 Ian Fisher, “As its role shifts, Hezbollah Gains in Prisoner Trade,” New York Times, January 29, 2004, accessed October 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/29/world/as-its-role-shifts-hezbollah-gains-in-prisoner-
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 Nine articles in the Times represented Senator Graham condemning Hezbollah.  The majority were part of the propaganda for the U.S. to invade Iraq, including: Senator Bob Graham, the Florida Democrat who was chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, has suggested that Hezbollah be dealt with before Baghdad because it is the most dangerous terrorist group on earth.413  Mr. Graham said that beyond threats from Al Qaeda, American intelligence agencies had not adequately assessed threats posed by other Middle Eastern terror groups that are likely to be inflamed by a war with Iraq, among them Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad.  ''I think we make a mistake when we assume that the threat is only Al Qaeda,'' Mr. Graham said.414  One article wrongly applied Armitage’s “A team terrorist” quote to Graham:  And he said he supported giving the president the right to take military action, if necessary, against the terrorist organizations Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and Hamas, which he has called ''the A team of international terrorists.''415   Although Armitage and Graham received an extensive amount of coverage from the Times for their remarks on Hezbollah, CIA director George Tenet trumped both with 34 articles.  Each article cited Tenet’s quote, reported his speech to Congress in 2003, or cited other remarks he has made towards Hezbollah to emphasis the journalists’ point.   Analyzing these voices demonstrates the Times willingness to follow the established policy, and to silence voices that deviated outside of the power elite’s                                                                                                                                                                      trade.html?scp=1&sq=As+its+role+shifts%2C+Hezbollah+Gains+in+Prisoner+Trade&st=nyt.  413 Eric Schmitt, “Threats and Responses.” 414 David Johnston, “THREATS AND RESPONSES: INTELLIGENCE; AGENCIES MONITOR IRAQIS IN THE U.S. FOR TERROR THREAT,” New York Times, November 17, 2002, accessed October 26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/17/us/threats-responses-intelligence-agencies-monitor-iraqis-us-for-terror-threat.html?scp=1&sq=Monitor&st=nyt.   415 Adam Nagourney, “Two Democratic Contenders Clash on Universal Health Coverage,” New York Times, April 28, 2003, accessed October 26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/28/us/two-democratic-contenders-clash-on-universal-health-coverage.html?scp=1&sq=contenders&st=nyt.  
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constructed boundaries.    
C. Current Status 
 Abundant coverage of Hezbollah continues in the Times.  In 2011 alone, the movement was discussed in 243 Times articles, including 29 on the front-page.  The majority of these articles centered on Hezbollah’s alleged bank laundering, the Hariri trial and its alleged involvement in his death, and the organization’s most recent moves in Lebanese politics.    The patterns observed in the previous sections still remain.  Times readers were reminded again of Hezbollah’s record in the 1980’s in ten different articles in the past year.  Linking Hezbollah to Al Qaeda is still found to be a common practice.  One recent example reads: It was during that time that it is believed he [Osama bin Laden] honed his resolve against the United States.  Within Al Qaeda, he argued that the organization should put aside its differences with Shiite terrorist groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the better to concentrate on the common enemy: the United States. He called for attacks against American forces in the Saudi peninsula and in the Horn of Africa.416   It is unknown if Bin Laden actually stated this, as the author never cited a source, but moreover, the author also failed to clarify that Hezbollah has continuously condemned Al Qaeda and has never stated an interest in forging ties with the organization.  Further, the reader is left with the idea that Hezbollah and Al Qaeda are fighting together against “the common enemy:  the United States.”                                                         416 Kate Zernike, “The Most Wanted To Face of Terrorism,” New York Times, May 2, 2011, accessed October 26, 2011, http://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/what-is-your-reaction-to-the-death-of-osama-bin-laden/?scp=1&sq=face+terrorism&st=nyt. 
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 Not only has the Times continued to portray Hezbollah and Al Qaeda as “one unit of terror,” and perpetuated the perception that Hezbollah is currently carrying out “terrorist” attacks, but it has utilized the “radical-style” of Hezbollah as a villianizing term in domestic politics.  Thomas Friedman has likened the Tea Party to Hezbollah in order to indict the former: It [the Tea Party] is so lacking in any aspiration for American greatness, so dominated by the narrowest visions for our country and so ignorant of the fact that it was not tax cuts that made America great but our unique public-private partnerships across the generations. If sane Republicans do not stand up to this Hezbollah faction in their midst, the Tea Party will take the G.O.P. on a suicide mission.417   Contributing to the “current terrorist” perception, Cambanis published an article on January 2011 entitled, “Hezbollah’s Latest Suicide Mission.”418
Hezbollah is likely to emerge the end winner because it is willing to sacrifice the Lebanese state to maintain it’s standing in the Middle East and its perpetual war against Israel.
  Hopefully readers of the Times read the entire article to realize the author was referring to Hezbollah’s ministerial resignation rather than an actual suicide bomb.  Covering this political debacle in Lebanon, Cambanis echoed the alarm sounded by Prime Minister Hariri, an important figure in U.S. policy, stating:   
419
 
  Highlighting the common practice of marginalizing dissent, unlike Cambanis’ 
                                                        417 Thomas Friedman, “Can’t We Do This Right?” New York Times, July 26, 2011, accessed October 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/27/opinion/27friedman.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Cant%20we%20do%20this%20right%20thomas&st=cse. 418 Thanassis Cambanis, “Hezbollah’s Latest Suicide Mission,” The New York Times, January 12, 2011, accessed October 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/13/opinion/13cambanis.html?scp=1&sq=hezbollah%27s+latest+suicide&st=nyt. 419 Ibid. 
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book, A Privilege to Die: Inside Hezbollah’s Legions and Their Endless War Against 
Israel, Augustus Norton’s book, Hezbollah:  A Short Story, which was a major source for this thesis, was never reviewed by the Times.  Norton, who far exceeds the credentials of Cambanis, wrote this detailed account of Hezbollah challenging the current U.S. policy toward Hezbollah.  As the PM hypothesis suggests, the exclusion of Norton’s book comes as no surprise.     Currently, Times coverage of Hezbollah remains supportive of the current U.S. policy, remaining within the boundaries of acceptable debate, and marginalizing those who deviate.    In sum, the Times coverage of Hezbollah satisfies the hypothesis of the PM.  Representations of Hezbollah were presented in a way that upheld and justified its current designation on the FTO list.  This required the Times to group Hezbollah with Al-Qaeda, the 9/11 attacks, and consistently highlight the events of the 1980’s.  At times, false information was presented to further support the current policy.  Those who deviated or challenged the current policy were excluded from the Times, and those who expressed support for the policy were awarded a sizable amount of coverage.  Filtered through the guided-market system, the Times systematic propaganda fits well to print.   
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
 
I. In Sum 
  This thesis investigated the corporate media’s role in U.S. policy toward the Shi’a political organization Hezbollah.  Utilizing C. Wright Mills’ Power Elite theory and Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman’s Propaganda Model, this thesis explored Hezbollah’s inclusion on the FTO list, and the forces that perpetuate its designation.  Specifically, this thesis utilized the PM, investigating if the leading American “liberal” newspaper, The New York Times, portrayed Hezbollah, and its designation, within the boundaries acceptable to the power elite.  The findings concluded that the Times never deviated from the established policy and marginalized dissenting voices, satisfying the hypotheses of the PM.   Before analyzing the Times reporting of Hezbollah, this thesis began by exploring the power elite’s interests in Hezbollah’s designation.  Knowing other variables affect the power elite’s interest in continuing Hezbollah’s designation as a 
   138  
FTO, this thesis focused on the weapons industry.  Chapter 3, investigated the profits generated through government contracts, specifically those contracts that are signed for the purpose of military aid to Israel.  This industry is a large component of the power elite, producing interlocking relationships between the corporate and government elites.  These relationships were seen primarily in the “revolving door” of high-status positions.   The established formula – U.S. weapon companies selling weapons to the U.S. government, and then the U.S. government giving Israel the weapons free while the American tax payer pays the bill – is maintained by the “common threats” Israel faces, and the “common threats” that the U.S. faces.  This formula is executed in various ways, which were discussed in detail in chapter 3.  Yet, the formula can only be continued if there is a constant threat to Israel, which creates a threat to the U.S.  Maintaining the perception that Hezbollah is not only a threat to Israel, but to the U.S., the formula can be justified.  Remaining on the FTO list for over two decades, Hezbollah carries the stigma of a terrorist organization, regardless of its activities.  Further, its designation continues with unwarranted support from the corporate media, which is able to maintain the perception that Hezbollah is a current threat, actively carrying out “terrorist attacks”.    To be sure of Hezbollah’s activities and evolution away from a U.S. defined FTO, chapter 4 included a historical analysis of Hezbollah.  The chapter explored the creation of Hezbollah and its initial objectives, conflict with Israel, entry into Lebanese politics, and evolution into a thriving political organization that possess its own effective military.  Analyzing how Hezbollah developed throughout the past 
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three decades into Lebanon’s largest social service provider, a major entity within the national Lebanese government, and Lebanon’s largest and most effective military force, the primary aim of this chapter was to investigate the accusations that are used to justify Hezbollah’s inclusion on the FTO list.  This analysis was able to provide the information needed to test the applicability of Hezbollah’s FTO designation.    Investigating Hezbollah as a FTO, chapter 4 explored the FTO designation process and its politicized nature.  More specifically, the chapter analyzed the U.S. State Department’s criteria and definitions that are used when placing an organization on the FTO list, and the resulting implications.   Coupled with specific laws set in place detailed in chapter 4, the criteria and definitions used allow the process to be political in nature and used as a political instrument.   After observing the designation criteria and applying it to Hezbollah, the latest event that fits the criteria occurred 26 years ago.  Noting that each FTO is re-evaluated every two years, its FTO designation stands as outdated.  Yet, just as Hezbollah’s activities during the 1980’s are used to justify its continued designation as a current, active FTO, the corporate media echoes the same events portraying the movement as a current, active FTO.  The corporate media’s unwarranted support for this government policy was analyzed in Chapter 6, utilizing the PM with a focus on 
The New York Times.   This paper’s analysis of the Times displayed its long history of operating as an establishment newspaper.  This included analyzing its coverage of elite-led policies during the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and the 2003 Iraq war.  Each policy 
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was, and is, awarded support, guarded from dissenting voices, and remained within the boundaries of acceptable debate.     This behavior – consistently supporting elite-led policies - was explained after observing how the Times functions within the PM.  After applying each filter to the Times, the findings concluded that its reports are cleansed at each filter, leaving a residue that works as a member of the power elite.  Finally, this thesis analyzed the Times coverage of Hezbollah.  After analyzing over 250 articles in three different sections; post 9/11-coverage, the marginalization of dissenting voices, and its current status, this thesis found that the 
Times operated in accordance with the PM hypotheses.  The articles echoed the power elite-led policy toward Hezbollah, consistently portraying the organization as a current, active FTO.  Further, this author could not find one article that questioned the current policy as the Times ignored voices that deviated from the representations that serve the interests of the power elite.  As the PM suggests, the 
Times recreates the perception needed to maintain Hezbollah’s designation.   
 
II. Recommendations 
A. U.S. Policy Toward Hezbollah   The current U.S. policy toward the Shi’a political organization Hezbollah is guided by the prevailing political winds blown by the power elite.  Ignoring current information and failing to engage the complexities of Hezbollah and the political landscape it operates in, the policy is justified by outdated evidence that conveniently resurfaces as “breaking news”.   
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 In light of Hezbollah’s development into a nationally recognized political organization, being the largest social service provider in Lebanon, and the country’s most capable military force, the organization stands as a potent player within regional and global politics.  The organization is continuing to grow in influence, and will be a significant part of the future, constructive or not.  Thus, in the interest of the United States, the current policy toward Hezbollah needs to be re-evaluated, beginning with its removal from the FTO list.  Besides not fitting the criteria of the FTO list, Hezbollah needs to be removed in order for diplomatic options to be pursued.  As Ambassador Ryan Crocker stated in his testimony to the Senate in 2010, “the 2006 conflict with Israel demonstrated that Hezbollah cannot be eliminated by military means.”420
 By engaging Hezbollah diplomatically, not only can the U.S. potentially resolve the U.S./Hezbollah differences, but improve relationships among other countries that recognize Hezbollah.  Awarding an organization for its progression could improve the U.S. image and have a powerful effect throughout the world.  Further, Hezbollah could provide a means for the U.S. to engage Syria and Iran diplomatically, avoiding another costly war.   
  Thus, the current policy stands ineffective.  Although disagreeing with Crocker’s use of the word “eliminated,” this author agrees with his prescription: “We should talk to Hezbollah.” Hezbollah is a large part of the Lebanese government, and the U.S. should deal with it directly.  
 In sum, the current policy has not proven to be effective, yet remains cemented                                                         420 Crocker, Ryan, “Hearing on Hezbollah,” Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 8, 2010, 3.  
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in the politicized nature of the FTO designation process.  Thus, the U.S. policy toward Hezbollah needs to be re-evaluated.     
B. The Larger Problem  In his book, Media Control:  The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda, Noam Chomsky poses two different conceptions of democracy: One conception of democracy has it that a democratic society is one in which the public has the means to participate in some meaningful way in the management of their own affairs and the means of information are open and free. If you look up democracy in the dictionary you'll get a definition something like that.  An alternative conception of democracy is that the public must be barred from managing of their own affairs and the means of information must be kept narrowly and rigidly controlled.421
 
  
When analyzing the functions of the American media, that latter definition, similar to Lippmann’s “progressive democracy” discussed in the introduction of this thesis, serves as the most accurate description of democracy in the U.S.    Describing the media’s role in a functioning democracy, Anthony Lewis cites Supreme Court Justice Powell: “no individual can obtain for himself the information needed for the intelligent discharge of his political responsibilities…By enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the political process, the press performs a crucial function in effecting the societal purpose of the First Amendment.”422
                                                        421 Chomsky, Media Control, 1-2. 
  After observing the media’s functions through the numerous cases applied to the PM, the “societal purpose” of the media has not been its democratic duty of providing the public with “the information needed for intelligent discharge of his political 
422 Anthony Lewis, “Freedom of the Press—Anthony Lewis Distinguishes Between Britain and America,” London Review of Books 9, no. 21, (November 26, 1987).   
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responsibilities,” but rather, in the words of Chomsky, “to inculcate and defend the economic, social, and political agenda of privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and the state.”423 The misuse of the media is not a result of conspiratorial forces, but as the PM explains, a result of the media’s structure and objectives as profit-oriented businesses, guided by market forces. Therefore, large, substantial changes in policy and regulations would need to occur within the media industry, such as guarding against the increasing centralization of the media.  But as Chomsky and Herman note, the tendency for the media to operate as a member of the power elite has only grown stronger in the past two decades.   Working from the bottom up, the more effective way to provide the needed information to the public in efforts to allow them “to intelligently discharge their political responsibilities,” would be for a growth in grassroot movements, non-profit broadcasting networks, more public-access channels, and independent media print.  Whether it’s the growth in more independent publishers who are not tied to the guided-market system, such as Seven Stories Press, the current structure needs to be challenged to protect against the further erosion of the American democratic society.   
   
                                                               423 Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (2011 Kindle ed.), 298.  
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